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The conceptualisation of Political Risk Analysis (PRA) has traditionally been influenced by 
democratic principles. There was an observable increase in academic literature discussing changes in 
the traditional democratic system from 2006. Interestingly, there was an increase in literature 
conceptualising the hybrid regime. If the noticeable decline in democracy continues, how would PRA 
be conducted and conceptualised? The study took a proactive approach to find out if PRA for foreign 
investors could be adaptable to be measured using principles of the hybrid regime. “To what extent 
are the traditional conceptual perceptions of political risk in hybrid regimes still applicable, with 
specific reference to Zimbabwe from 1990 to 2018?” was the main research question. A single case 
study research design was employed, to the case of Zimbabwe.  
To conceptualise the hybrid regime, a hybrid regime conceptual framework was developed utilising 
indicators from Wigell (2008) and Gilbert and Mohseni (2011). This study added political elite 
cohesion as an additional hybrid regime indicator, hypothesising that the agreement among political 
elites had an impact on the nature and durability of the hybrid regime. This study finds the hybrid 
regime to show diverse forms within a single state. Zimbabwe exhibits five types of hybrid regimes. 
Furthermore, the hybrid regime was observed to be fluid and, noted to be durable. 
A political risk framework to analyse the hybrid regime was developed drawing inputs from hybrid 
regime indicators and some political risk indicators. 28 key informants were interviewed from six 
categories of respondents who were relevant to the discussion of political risk observed in Zimbabwe. 
This study found that perceptions regarding illegitimacy, corruption, staleness of leadership, adverse 
government regulation, election violence, and the home-host state relations between the Multi-
National Corporation parent country and the host state had the impact of increasing the perception of 
political risk in a hybrid regime, thus confirming existing literature. Regarding military tutelage, weak 
institutions, relatively flawed elections (absent of violence), military generals in power, undemocratic 
means to retain power, minimum horizontal accountability and weak rule of law did not automatically 
increase political risk as in times past. 
This study found that the levels of political risk differ within the diverse forms of hybrid regimes, 
which is contrary to literature that postulated a positive relationship always. If democracy declines, 
PRA was concluded to be adaptable and, in effect, accurate, taking into consideration the fluidity of 
the hybrid regime and the presence of specific risk factors, relevant to the analysis of risk in such 
regimes. As in any discipline, timely re-conceptualisation is crucial and this study provided that for 





Die konseptualisering van politieke-risiko-analise (PRA) is nog altyd aan die hand van demokratiese 
beginsels gedoen. Akademiese literatuur wat oor veranderings in die tradisionele demokratiese bestel 
handel, het sedert 2006 waarneembaar toegeneem. Dit is beduidend dat literatuur wat die hibriede 
bestel konseptualiseer eweneens toegeneem het. Indien die waarneembare kwyning van demokrasie 
voortgaan, hoe sou PRA uitgevoer en gekonseptualiseer word? Hierdie navorsing het ’n proaktiewe 
benadering gevolg om te bepaal of PRA vir buitelandse beleggers aangepas kan word sodat dit 
volgens die beginsels van die hibriede bestel gedoen kan word. Die hoofnavorsingsvraag was: “In 
watter mate is die tradisionele konseptuele persepsies van politieke risiko in hibriede regeringsvorme 
steeds toepaslik, met spesifieke verwysing na Zimbabwe vanaf 1990 tot 2018?” ’n Enkele 
gevallestudie-ontwerp is toegepas, met Zimbabwe as geval.  
Ten einde die hibriede bestel te konseptualiseer is ’n hibriede konseptuele raamwerk ontwikkel aan 
die hand van aanwysers uit Wigell (2008) en Gilbert en Mohseni (2011). Die navorsing het kohesie 
onder die politieke elite as bykomende aanwyser van ’n hibriede bestel ingesluit op die 
veronderstelling dat die samehorigheid onder politieke elites ’n uitwerking op die aard en 
bestendigheid van ’n hibriede bestel het. Hierdie navorsing het bevind dat die hibriede bestel diverse 
vorme binne ’n enkele staat kan aanneem: Zimbabwe vertoon vyf soorte hibriede regeringsvorme. 
Verder is waargeneem dat die hibriede bestel vloeibaar is en kan oorleef. 
’n Politieke-risiko-raamwerk om die hibriede bestel mee te analiseer, is ontwerp deur aanwysers van 
hibriede regeringsvorme en sekere aanwysers van politieke risiko te gebruik. Onderhoude is gevoer 
met 28 sleutelinformante uit ses respondentekategorieë wat tersaaklik is vir ’n bespreking van die 
politieke risiko wat in Zimbabwe waargeneem word. Die navorsing het bevind dat persepsies oor 
illegitimiteit, korrupsie, futlose leierskap, vyandiggesinde regeringsregulering, verkiesingsgeweld en 
die tuisstaat-gasheerstaat-verhouding tussen die stamland se multinasionale korporasies en die 
gasheerstaat ’n verhoogde persepsie van politieke risiko in ’n hibriede bestel meegebring het. Dit 
bevestig bestaande literatuur. Militêre onmondigheid, verlamde staatsinstellings, relatief gebrekkige 
(hoewel niegewelddadige) verkiesings, militêre generaals in magsposisies, ondemokratiese metodes 
van magsbehoud, minimum horisontale verantwoordbaarheid en verswakte oppergesag van die reg 
het nie – soos in die verlede – vanselfsprekend politieke risiko laat verhoog nie. 
Die navorsing het bevind dat die vlakke van politieke risiko binne die verskillende manifestasies van 
hibriede regeringsvorme wissel – ’n weerspreking van die literatuur wat voorhou dat daar altyd ’n 
positiewe verband is. Waar demokrasie kwyn, is bevind, is PRA aanpasbaar en kan dit, om die 




van die hibriede bestel en die teenwoordigheid van sekere risikofaktore in ag geneem word. Soos op 
enige vakgebied, is tydige herkonseptualisering noodsaaklik, en dit is wat hierdie navorsing bied – 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1.1 Background and rationale 
Political Risk Analysis (PRA) gained recognition and relevance as a multi-disciplinary concept 
during the 1970s. This was triggered by the aftermath of the oil crisis of 19731 which showed the 
significance of including political factors in risk assessments (Chermak, 1992: 164; Brink, 2004: 5). 
There was an increase in political risk consulting firms and political risk insurance coverage for 
governments and investors that sought to invest in foreign host-countries after the oil crisis and the 
Iranian Revolution (Simon, 1982: 66), which signalled the importance of PRA.  
 
PRA traditionally served to warn foreign investors about places that were potentially risky to invest 
in (Kobrin, 1979: 71; Simon, 1982: 66; Sethi & Luther, 1986: 60; De la Torre & Neckar, 1988). If 
foreign investors ventured into these destinations, PRA would inform them of the possible mitigation 
strategies they could use. In the 1980s, there was a dominant perception termed the ‘event school of 
thought’ (Jarvis & Griffiths, 2007: 14). The event school of thought did not forecast the potential 
political risk in specific states; rather, it provided insight into events that could be used to pre-empt 
political instability or events that derailed modernisation (Jarvis & Griffiths, 2007: 14). Ten factors 
were listed as signals of possible increase in political risk. The ten political risk events were: sudden 
expropriation, creeping expropriation, adverse tax changes, civil disorder, war, production 
restrictions, repatriation limitations, domestic price controls, devaluation risk and export restrictions 
(Bunn & Mustafaoglu, 1978: 1558–1559). These political events were suggested to be derived from 
modernising fragile states and developing states, unlike developed states (Bunn & Mustafaoglu, 1978; 
Jarvis & Griffiths, 2007: 14). Developed democratic countries were therefore perceived to present 
lower political risks, while developing non-democratic countries were perceived to accrue higher 
political risks to foreign investors. 
 
PRA has also traditionally adopted the norms and values of democracy and has thus been conducted 
based on the hypothesis that democratic, liberal and capitalist states present low political risks to 
investors, while states that have low democratic levels, non-capitalist and illiberal systems present 
 
1In 1973, members of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) proclaimed an oil embargo which 
limited the number of oil barrels they would supply. The embargo led to an increase in oil prices. OPEC used the embargo, 




high political risks to investors. This claim was first hypothesised by Green (1974: 35). Simon 
(1984:127), Jensen (2008:1050), Sottilotta (2016:74) and authors that subscribed to the event school 
of thought (Jarvis & Griffiths, 2007: 15) validated the guiding hypothesis. 
 
Diamond (2015: 144) claims that the world has been in a mild but protracted democratic recession 
since 2006. Plattner (2015:4) suggests that the minimal gains of countries adopting democracy as a 
political system in the 21st century could be because there were many countries which had transitioned 
to democracy in previous times. However, Plattner (2015: 4) acknowledges that there was a growing 
perception of the decline of democracy in the world. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2019: 7), 
which compiles the Democracy Index, noted that after a protracted stagnation, from 2015 to 2017, 
there was a gradual decline in the number of democratic countries. However, in 2018 it observed that 
there were no regressions for democracy. In preparation to submit this thesis2, the researcher did a 
Google Scholar search of the following terms: the decline of democracy, democracy in recession and 
the demise of democracy. Some of the titles that appeared and were highly cited were: The aborted 
revolution: The demise of Bahrain’s democracy movement (Mitchell, 2012); Democracy in decline: 
How Washington can reverse the tide (Diamond, 2017); Liberalism in threat: The demise of a dream 
(Niblett, 2017); The decline of liberalism as an ideology (Hallowell, 2013); The demons of the liberal 
democracy (Pabst, 2019); Facing up to the democratic recession (Diamond, 2015) and Is democracy 
in decline? (Plattner, 2015). Some of these titles are daunting, for example, ‘The demons of the liberal 
democracy’ which suggests the end of democracy. 
 
The pre-eminence of democracy as the leading political system that aids development is being 
criticised for several reasons. First, there is a high perception that advanced democracies are not 
competently performing, both economically and politically, as they should (Plattner, 2015: 8). 
Scholars have raised concern that democracy in the United States of America (USA) has not been 
functioning effectively enough to address the major challenges of governance (Diamond, 2015: 153). 
Secondly, there are authoritarian states that are performing better economically. China, for example, 
has made huge economic strides without implementing democratic reforms and has presented a 
seemingly lucrative model for other states to follow (Plattner, 2015: 8). China was the world’s second-
largest Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) earner in 2018, receiving United States Dollars (USD) 139 
billion (UNCTD, 2019: 4). China has grown to a level comparable to the USA in trade and artificial 
intelligence, however, the USA exceeds China in its investment in security (Bremmer & Kupchan, 
 




2018: 4–5). Singapore was rated the fifth-largest FDI recipient, while Russia was rated number 14 
(UNCTD, 2019: 4). Singapore and Russia have been classified to follow a hybrid political regime 
(Morlino, 2009: 284; Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011: 294). Hence, democracy is perceived as being in 
decline because some non-democracies are performing better economically.  
 
This study does not aim to research on how democracy is in recession or stagnation. Rather, the study 
notes that there has been a growing conversation about the stagnation and decline of democracy that 
is being debated in the literature. This study does not envision that democracy will cease to be the 
ideal developmental model soon; if it happens, it will likely occur over a protracted number of years. 
The potential recession of democracy is important to political risk because PRA has been undertaken 
using democratic norms and values. This study implores political scientists to start thinking of how 
PRA will be conducted if, suppose, there is a change or a decline in the dominant system of 
governance.  
 
This study takes the proactive position to undertake research to potentially answer how PRA may be 
conducted in a political system and development model that is dissimilar to democracy. The 
researcher cannot predict which system of governance may potentially be the most dominant. 
Possibly, there will be the evolution of a new system or the advancement of a current political regime 
that becomes more dominant. This study prefers to select a currently known political system to 
research if PRA can be adaptable to be measured using principles of a political system different from 
democracy. The three broad political regimes3 identified by this study were democracy, authoritarian 
regime and hybrid regime (Diamond, 2002: 23; Bogaards, 2009: 415; Morlino, 2009: 282; Vukovic, 
2011: 13; Cassani, 2012: 4; Akkoyunlu, 2014: 34).  
 
The study does not perceive the world as increasingly becoming more autocratic in the near future, 
hence the reason for not selecting it. However, some research has been undertaken on political risk 
in an authoritarian regime. Research output on how an authoritarian regime influences political risk 
indicates contradictory findings. It is traditionally argued that authoritarian rule is politically unstable 
(Robock, 1971: 16; Green, 1974: 35), as there may be high levels of public discontent (Venter, 1999: 
78), and that the regime cannot commit to securing property rights (Jensen, 2003: 592). Therefore, 
authoritarian regimes ascribe higher levels of political risk. On the contrary, Howell & Chaddick 
 
3A political regime is a set of procedures and guidelines that identifies who has access to power; who can select the 




(1994: 76) argue that the authoritarian regime contributes to the stability needed by foreign investors 
as there is minimum turnover of elected officials. The stability and predictability given in an 
authoritarian regime should be considered as short-term and not precedence for long-term stability 
(Brewer, 1981: 8).  
 
To critically assess how PRA can be adaptable to a different world system, this study selects the 
hybrid regime. The hybrid regime has been selected for this study for three chief reasons. First, the 
hybrid regime became more prevalent after the ‘third wave of democratisation’ alluded to by 
Huntington (1991a). The political regime was initially viewed to be in transition rather than a 
permanent political regime (Huntington, 1991a: 137). A hybrid regime has both tenets of democracy 
and autocracy co-existing in one political regime type (Diamond, 2002: 23; Bogaards, 2009: 415; 
Morlino, 2009:  282; Vukovic, 2011: 13; Cassani, 2012: 4; Akkoyunlu, 2014: 34). A democracy and 
an authoritarian regime have different and antagonistic objectives, which makes the hybrid regime 
peculiar. The conceptualisation of the hybrid regime in literature has resulted in diverging views with 
regards to its origins, features, functioning and endurance (Cassani, 2014: 543). Hence, by selecting 
the hybrid regime, this study will attempt to contribute to its conceptualisation.  
 
Secondly, the hybrid regime is argued to be the most common political regime in the developing 
world in contemporary times (Brownlee, 2009: 25; Vukovic, 2011: 5). There is a high likelihood that 
a potential foreign investor will invest in a hybrid regime among developing countries. Thirdly, 
regarding political regimes, research has concentrated on democracy and authoritarian. When it 
comes to the hybrid regime, the levels of political risk are inferred to be high from the guiding 
hypothesis of political risk. Extensive research that focuses on political risk in a hybrid political 
regime has not been undertaken.  
 
To analyse the hybrid regime, this study will start by using the frameworks developed by Wigell 
(2008) and Gilbert and Mohseni (2011). The hybrid regime is characterised by relatively competitive, 
multiparty, regular elections with some degree of unelected tutelary bodies imposing limitations on 
elected officials (Levitsky & Way, 2002: 55). Furthermore, this regime has varying levels of 
horizontal accountability with practices of clientelism, patronage and nepotism existing (O’Donell, 
1994: 61; Merkel, 2004: 49). The hybrid regime sets limitations on freedom of expression and access 
to alternative sources of information. There are low levels of citizen participation in the political 
process outside elections, and various other coercive factors that tilt the playing field in favour of the 




hybrid regime will be discussed in Chapter Three Contemporary examples of hybrid regime states 
include Russia, Turkey, Guatemala, Venezuela, Malawi and Zimbabwe (Morlino, 2009: 284; Gilbert 
& Mohseni, 2011: 294). This study selects Zimbabwe as the hybrid regime case study.  
 
Zimbabwe exhibited a hybrid political regime between 1990 and 2018. The period between 1980, 
when Zimbabwe attained independence, and 1990 will be excluded because Zimbabwe had one 
dominant party from 1985 and, between 1985 and 1990, the incumbent political party, the Zimbabwe 
African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), aggressively pursued the formation of a one-
party state (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997). In September 1990, Zimbabwe abandoned the one-party state 
rhetoric and started to open democratic space for other political players. Over the 28 years that 
followed, the levels of competition for political office varied, with some periods showing more 
competition than others. The political system shows a constant negotiation between democratic and 
autocratic tendencies, which is indicative of a hybrid regime. The facet that is most dominant between 
democracy and autocracy largely depends on the incentives and deterrents that political elites sought 
to achieve in differing periods. A thorough contextualisation of Zimbabwe as a hybrid regime will be 
given in Chapter Four. 
 
This study has been stirred by the perception in the academic literature that democracy could be in 
recession. How will PRA be conceptualized and conducted if the noticeable decline in democracy 
continues? The rationale for undertaking this study is to critically assess if PRA can be adaptable to 
a different world system from democracy. The hybrid regime was the selected world system and 
Zimbabwe, from 1990 to 2018, was chosen as the preferred case study. 
 
1.2 Problem statement and research questions 
The central guiding hypothesis for political risk and political regimes has been traditionally stated as: 
democratic, liberal and capitalist countries present lower risks to foreign investors than any other 
political regime type (Green, 1974: 35; Simon, 1984: 128; Jarvis & Griffiths, 2007: 15). By deduction, 
this means that anything dissimilar to the liberal democratic regime is perceived to present higher 
political risks to foreign investors. This is the traditional way of thinking between world systems and 
political risk. The framework in which PRA is undertaken is influenced by democratic norms and 
values. However, democracy could be facing stagnation (Diamond, 2015: 144) and if it continues, 




research is concerned about PRA conceptualisation and how it will be conducted if, one day, what 
the world knows as democracy today is no longer available. If democracy declines or changes, the 
framework for conducting PRA will have to change. The research does not suggest that democracy 
will decline rapidly; if it happens, it will be over a protracted period. The research takes a proactive 
approach in researching if PRA could be adaptable in a different world system. 
 
The hybrid regime is selected as the alternative world system because it is argued to be the most 
common political regime in the developing world (Brownlee, 2009: 25; Vukovic, 2011: 5). In 
addition, the hybrid regime exhibits features of both autocracy and democracy (Diamond, 2002: 23; 
Bogaards, 2009: 415; Morlino, 2009:  282; Vukovic, 2011: 13; Cassani, 2012: 4; Akkoyunlu, 2014: 
34). This study, therefore, makes a critical assessment of whether PRA could be adaptable in a hybrid 
regime.  
 
Thus, the main research question that will guide this study is: To what extent are the traditional 
conceptual perceptions of political risk in hybrid regimes still applicable, with specific reference to 
Zimbabwe from 1990 to 2018? 
 
Given the above research question, political risk is the dependent variable (what is being explained) 
and the hybrid regime is the independent variable (the variable that is causing a change in the 
dependent variable).  
 
1.3 Significance of this study  
This research potentially makes two contributions to literature. First, the output of this study 
contributes to the conceptualisation of the hybrid regime. As noted earlier, the conceptualisation of 
the hybrid regime in literature has resulted in diverging views with regards to its origins, features, 
functioning and endurance (Cassani, 2014: 543). To contribute to the hybrid regime 
conceptualisation, as a starting point, this study adopts the hybrid regime frameworks developed by 
Wigell (2008) and Gilbert and Mohseni (2011). One hybrid indicator, political elite cohesion, is added 
to these hybrid regime frameworks. This hybrid regime model will be applied in the case of 





Secondly, this study will potentially contribute to the literature on the interaction between political 
risk and political regimes. Democracy has been the ideal foundation upon which PRA has been 
conducted (Green, 1974: 35; Simon, 1984: 128; Jarvis & Griffiths, 2007: 15). This research takes a 
critical view of investigating whether political risk could be adaptable to the hybrid regime, which is 
a political system that has different norms and values from democracy. Hence, by analysing political 
risk in a hybrid regime this study could reveal if PRA is adaptable to be measured using to another 
world system. A PRA and hybrid regime framework will be developed that will be applied to the case 
of Zimbabwe from 1990 to 2018. The results of applying this framework will show whether PRA 
could potentially be applied in an alternative world system that is not democracy.  
 
1.4 Research design and methodology 
1.4.1 Research design 
A research design is an overall strategy that the researcher implements to answer the set research 
questions (Mouton, 1996: 175). Its objective is to provide a plan or blueprint to answer the research 
questions in a manner that ensures the validity and reliability of the findings. A single case study 
research design has been selected for this study. This allows the researcher to focus on a specific case, 
thereby deriving detailed and extensive information about it while retaining a holistic and real-world 
perspective (Yin, 2014: 16). The ability to obtain rich and detailed information is one of the reasons 
for selecting the case study. This study seeks a comprehensive understanding of the political risk in 
a hybrid regime. 
 
When considering a case study research design, there are five components to consider, according to 
Yin (2014: 28–44). These are: defining the research questions, theoretical propositions, the unit of 
analysis, logically linking of the data to the propositions and having a criterion to interpret the 
findings. This study will conform to these components of a case study research design. This chapter 
discussed the research questions based on the theoretical propositions of political risk and hybrid 
regimes. The subsequent chapters will show the link between political risk and hybrid regimes and 
interpret the results.  
 
The findings from case studies are analytically generalisable (Yin, 2014: 14). This means that the 
findings contribute at a theoretical level by confirming, modifying, rejecting or advancing theoretical 
propositions. The findings from this study will be used to either confirm, expand or contradict the 




regime state. The perceptions of political risk for foreigners operating in Zimbabwe will be sought. 
Thus, this study’s case is defined as political risk for Multi-National Corporations4 (MNC) and 
foreign investors in Zimbabwe, a hybrid political system, from 1990 to 2018.  
 
1.4.2 Research methodology  
A research methodology is a systematic way of solving a research problem in a valid and reliable 
manner. The different types of research methodologies available for this study to employ were 
quantitative, qualitative and participatory (Mouton, 1996: 37). From these options, the qualitative 
research methodology will be employed because it is mostly associated with the case study research 
design (Yin, 2014: 19). Moreover, the qualitative research methodology presents a rich and detailed 
account of the social phenomenon (Yin 2014:19, Parson 2011:407). Using the qualitative research 
methodology, the study seeks to examine the perceptions, attitudes and experiences of political risk 
for foreign investors operating in Zimbabwe. A qualitative approach is expected to generate a 
comprehensive description of the social phenomenon of political risk in Zimbabwe.  
 
Two data collection methods will be employed in this study. First, secondary data analysis will aid 
the surveying of existing literature on PRA and hybrid regimes. Relevant existing literature will be 
sourced from books, journal articles, newspapers and publications from government and international 
organisations. Secondary data analysis will aid the writing of Chapter Two, which deliberates on the 
theoretical framework and literature review of this study. It will also be utilised in Chapter Four which 
contextualises Zimbabwe as a hybrid regime and in informing the study on the appropriate research 
design and research methodology to use.  
 
Primary data will be collected from key informants; this is the second data collection method. 
Interviews with key informants will be conducted using a semi-structured, in-depth interview guide. 
An interview guide is flexible, can be organised around topics, and an interviewer has room to probe 
and get more information or verify answers (Babbie, 2010: 318). Tremblay (1957: 688) suggests that 
when interviewing key informants, many sectors must be interviewed to capture the varying 
perspectives of an issue. Following this suggestion, this study selects six categories of respondents to 
capture the multidimensions of political risk for foreign investors in Zimbabwe. These actors create, 
 
4MNC can also be referred to as Multi-National Enterprise, Trans-National Enterprise or Trans-National Corporation. 




measure, review, assess, study or adapt to the changes in political risk. The categories of respondents 
are the government, the private sector, academia, embassies, civil society and political risk 
companies. A minimum of 25 key informants will be targeted by using purposive non-probability 
sampling. This number may grow through the process of snowball sampling. Purposive sampling 
involves a deliberate selection of respondents based on their expertise in the subject matter under 
review, while snowballing is when interviewed participants are asked to refer additional people that 
the researcher can interview (Babbie, 2010: 193). The study makes use of Computer-Aided 
Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS), specifically ATLAS.ti in managing the fieldwork 
data. CAQDAS enables better management of the data; the analysis and interpretation of the data 
remain the role of the researcher (Rambaree, 2007: 3). Thematic analysis will be utilised as the data 
analysis method for this study. 
 
1.4.3 Unit of analysis and level of analysis 
The unit of analysis is defined as the who and what the study intends to analyse (Long, 2011: 2). This 
study has one unit of analysis, which is the level of political risk. Zimbabwe, as a hybrid regime, will 
be the state from which perceptions of political risk for foreign investors will be elicited and analysed. 
These perceptions of political risk for foreign investors will be elicited focusing on macro-level 
analysis and not micro-level analysis.  
 
1.5 Delimitations and limitations 
To delimit the study, Zimbabwe, between 1990 and 2018, is the only state selected as a hybrid regime. 
Therefore, any events that have the potential to influence this study after 2018 are beyond the scope 
of this study. The data collection for this study was conducted from June to October 2018, while the 
write up was undertaken from February 2017 to October 2019. Secondly, the perceptions of political 
risk for foreign investors and MNCs conducting operations in Zimbabwe are central to this study. 
This study excludes political risk for domestic enterprises. Although the study takes a multi-
dimensional approach in interviewing six categories of respondents, the researcher will elicit views 
of political risk for foreigners operating in Zimbabwe and not how political risk affects the 
respondents’ categories. For example, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) will give views of 
political risk for foreign businesses operating in Zimbabwe and not how political risk corresponds to 





The study is limited by two factors. First, the single case study has the weakness that the findings are 
analytically generalisable and not statistically generalisable (Yin, 2014: 14). This means that the 
findings of this study cannot be generalisable to populations or the universe, but the findings are 
generalisable to theoretical propositions. This study challenges a theoretical proposition; hence this 
limitation does not hinder the purpose of the study. Secondly, the perception of political risk for 
foreign investors operating in Zimbabwe is sought from different actors. The researcher cannot 
guarantee the accuracy of the information given by respondents; the information given will be 
regarded by the researcher as truthful and honest.  
 
1.6 Outline of the study 
The rest of the study is organised as follows: 
Chapter Two articulates the research design, research methodology and data collection methods that 
will be employed by this study. The chapter discusses the ethical considerations that govern the study. 
The chapter also gives the reflections of the researcher during fieldwork and the research process. 
 
Chapter Three critically discusses the theory of PRA and hybrid regimes. The traditional 
conceptualisation of the hybrid regime will be critically discussed to develop a hybrid regime 
framework. A discussion on the relationship between PRA and political regimes will be undertaken. 
This chapter develops a conceptual framework that this study will use to critically assess the 
conceptual perceptions of PRA in a hybrid regime. Decision-making theory is discussed as the theory 
for PRA. Factors that have influenced the traditional conceptualisations of PRA and factors that are 
contributing to the shift in PRA conceptualisation will be discussed.  
 
Chapter Four applies the hybrid regime framework developed in Chapter Three to the case of 
Zimbabwe. The chapter will give a historical contextualisation of Zimbabwe as a hybrid regime. It 
discusses the different forms of hybridity that Zimbabwe exhibited from 1990 to 2018. This chapter 
answers why Zimbabwe’s hybrid regime has been durable for 28 years without disintegrating into an 





In Chapter Five, the study applies the political risk framework that was developed in Chapter Three 
to the case study of Zimbabwe. The findings from the case are discussed and the chapter concludes 
by answering the main research question. 
 
Chapter Six is the concluding chapter which gives an overview of the study. It summarises the main 
findings and discusses how the findings answer the research question. Lastly, the chapter discusses 
the main contribution of this study and recommends areas for further study. 
 
1.7 Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the reader to the study. The underlying motivation for 
conducting this study was discussed. The key concepts of this study, which are PRA and the hybrid 
regime, were discussed briefly and the potential contribution of this study was explained. The chapter 
provided insights into how the research process will be undertaken. It gave the reader a forecast of 









Chapter 2: Research Design, Methodology and Reflections 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to confirm the validity and reliability of the study’s research design and 
methodology. It also gives the researcher’s reflections on selecting the appropriate research design, 
the data collection methods and the experiences of the researcher during the data collection process. 
The chapter is organised as follows: it initially discusses the case study research design, the unit of 
analysis and the purpose of the study. The chapter then discusses the qualitative research 
methodology. Secondary data analysis and key informant interviews are discussed as the study’s two 
data collection methods, as well as the ethical considerations of the study. In conclusion, the chapter 
reflects on the data collection process in a manner to advise future researchers who want to conduct 
research of political risk analysis in hybrid regimes. 
 
2.2 Research Design 
2.2.1 Research design: Single Case Study 
A research design is viewed as the blueprint of any given research because it minimises the possibility 
of the findings not addressing the set research question (Yin, 2014: 29). A case study is undertaken 
to understand a social phenomenon. The case can focus on a single point in time or a prolonged 
duration. This study selected a single case study as the most appropriate research design to answer 
the research questions. This study sought to comprehensively understand PRA in a hybrid regime. As 
such, the single case study research design enabled the researcher to focus on political risk in the real-
life context of Zimbabwe, a hybrid regime. By focusing on a single case, the study could explore the 
perceptions, experiences and attitudes of political risk for foreign investors in Zimbabwe while 
retaining the holistic and real-world perspective.  
 
Case studies enable researchers to link micro-level analysis to macro-level analysis (Neuman, 2011). 
Moreover, the findings generated from case studies are analytically generalisable at the theoretical 
level (Yin, 2014: 14). This means that the findings contribute to theoretical propositions by 
collaborating, modifying, rejecting or advancing theoretical concepts. Retrospectively, this 




research design because the results of this study, at the level of theory, can be used to either confirm, 
expand or contradict the existing theoretical propositions of political risk in a hybrid regime. 
 
The case study research design is criticised for having a few weaknesses. It is vulnerable to researcher 
bias and the findings are not statistically generalisable to populations and the universe, which are the 
two main weaknesses (Yin 2014: 44). Researcher bias is when the researcher can potentially influence 
the results of the study to have the desired outcome. The study combined data collected from primary 
sources and secondary sources to mitigate and reduce the possibility of researcher bias. Primary data, 
collected through elite key informant interviews, was pivotal in confirming or contradicting data that 
was collected through secondary sources. In addition, the primary data collected had six categories 
of respondents to capture the multi-dimensions of political risk. Having many categories of 
respondents had the impact of reducing any biases from the researcher. The second weakness of the 
case study, that the findings are not statistically generalisable to populations and the universe, is of 
minimum concern to this study. Findings from a case study are analytically generalisable at the level 
of theory; therefore, the case study was selected because the research question addresses theoretical 
propositions of political risk in a hybrid regime. The findings of the study will confirm, reject or 
expand on theoretical propositions, making it analytically generalisable. As such, the findings from 
this study do not need to be statistically generalisable. 
 
Zimbabwe was selected as the hybrid regime for this study. Choosing Zimbabwe was motivated by 
the hybrid regime indicator of political elite cohesion of the dominant party. The researcher was 
interested in analysing if political elite cohesion had any impact on political risk. Thus, when selecting 
a hybrid regime, the research sought one with a dominant party which had been in power for a long 
time. In Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF had been the dominant political party for 38 years, which made 
Zimbabwe interesting to analyse. In addition, the military assisted change in government of 
November 2017 made Zimbabwe a more appropriate case to analyse in relation to political risk. This 
is because the military intervention was mainly stimulated by the factional differences within ZANU-
PF, which pointed to fragmenting political elite cohesion. Being a native of Zimbabwe, the 
researcher’s nationality enabled her to easily gain access to some respondents. In the few cases where 
respondents spoke their mother tongue, Shona, the researcher could understand what the respondents 
were saying without need of a translator. 
 
The perceptions of political risk, specifically for MNCs and foreign investors in Zimbabwe, were 
sought. The object of analysis is the political risk for MNCs and foreign investors operating in the 




foreign investors and MNCs in Zimbabwe between 1990 and 2018. The case study employed a 
qualitative research methodology which will be explained in Section 2.3. 
 
2.2.2 Unit of analysis 
The purpose of the unit of analysis is to help the researcher to focus and delimit what is of greatest 
concern for the study to analyse, as well as the underlying assumptions and concepts to be used. The 
unit of analysis is the level of political risk in Zimbabwe. The unit of analysis is different from the 
unit of observation. A unit of observation is the level at which data is collected (Long 2011: 2). Data 
is collected at the macro-level, making the unit of observation the state level.  
 
2.2.3 Purpose of this study  
Research is conducted to explore a new topic, to describe a social phenomenon and to explain why it 
occurs (Neuman, 2011: 38). This research satisfies these three reasons. The primary reason for 
conducting exploratory research is to examine a phenomenon that is little understood and to move 
towards more specific questions about the concept. It seeks to address questions of “what is” 
(Neuman, 2011). This study explores if PRA can be adaptable to be measured using the hybrid regime 
principles. 
 
The purpose of describing is to give a detailed representation of the social phenomenon. The goal is 
to clarify and provide an in-depth understanding of the social setting. Descriptive research asks 
questions of ‘how’ and ‘who’ in relation to the social phenomenon (Neuman, 2011: 39-40). This 
study will comprehensively describe Zimbabwe’s hybrid development between 1990 and 2018 in the 
contextualisation that will be given in Chapter Four. It will describe how the country transformed 
from one type of hybrid regime to another and the associated features of each hybrid regime.  
 
Explanatory research builds up descriptive and exploratory research. The purpose of explanatory 
research is to provide answers to questions and to build, test or extend theory. The aim is to answer 
why things are the way they are (Neuman, 2011). The study will explain PRA in the hybrid regime 
and make some theoretical linkages of the relationship in Chapters Five and Six. In addition, this 
study proffers reasons why the hybrid regime in Zimbabwe has been durable over a 28-year period 
in Chapter Four. The next section discusses the qualitative research methodology and the data 





2.3 Research Methodology and Data collection methods 
A research methodology is a systematic way of answering the research questions in a manner that is 
most unbiased (Kothari, 2004: 7). This study employed a qualitative research methodology approach. 
The quantitative and participatory research methodologies were among the pool of approaches that 
the study could have taken (Mouton, 1996: 37). The qualitative research methodology was chosen 
because it was expected to reveal a rich and detailed account of the social phenomenon (Parsons, 
2011: 407; Yin, 2014: 19). In this study, the social phenomenon was understanding, in depth, PRA 
in a hybrid regime using the case of Zimbabwe. The quantitative research methodology could have 
answered the research question, but it would not have revealed the in-depth experiences and attitudes 
of the perception of political risk for foreign investors in Zimbabwe.   
 
Retrospectively, employing the qualitative research methodology was the most ideal manner of 
answering the research question. The hypothesis for this study was continuously reworked during the 
research process, which is one advantage of using the qualitative approach. The researcher, during 
the data collection period, was able to elicit the attitudes, perceptions and experiences of the 
respondents of political risk in Zimbabwe. The accounts given were rich, varied and nuanced. The 
researcher was able to draw out new ways of analysing the PRA in a hybrid regime. Furthermore, if 
the study had taken a quantitative approach in Zimbabwe, it would have been difficult to get published 
documents from the period 1990 to 2018 from the MNCs or from their websites. This study employed 
two data collection methods, that is, secondary data analysis and key informant interviews. These two 
techniques are discussed in the subsequent sections. 
 
2.3.1 Secondary data analysis 
Secondary data analysis was the first data collection method employed by this study. The survey of 
existing literature led to identifying the gap in literature and the drafting of the research questions. 
The relevant literature was collected from books, journal articles, newspapers, government 
departments, international organisations, and published dissertations. Secondary data analysis was 
used to do the critical assessment of political risk and hybrid regimes literature in Chapter Three. The 
construction of the two frameworks used by this study are informed by secondary data analysis.  
Chapter Four contextualises Zimbabwe as a hybrid regime and discussed the country’s hybrid regime 
progression which was inferred from existing literature. Furthermore, secondary data analysis 
informed the researcher of the most appropriate research design, methodology and data collection 




It was not difficult to access books and journal articles that the Stellenbosch University library hosted, 
either physically or electronically. Some journal articles, especially recent publications, required 
payment for the researcher to access them. The researcher was able to access some journal articles 
that had required payment in 2017 were for free in 2019. Key texts for the study that were not located 
in the Stellenbosch University Library were accessed through the interlibrary loan facility. Brink 
(2004), Measuring political risk: Risks to foreign investment, was only available in the library on 
short loans of up to three hours, however, through the interlibrary loan facility, the researcher was 
able to have this text for six weeks. The researcher recommends future researchers studying at 
universities to make use of the interlibrary loan facilities at their universities. Researchers who are 
not situated at a university could lobby their institutions to buy the key texts and journal articles that 
they need for their research. Much of the existing literature is written in English which advantageous 
for the researcher to easily understand and critically engage with the texts. 
 
2.3.2 Primary data collection: Key Informant Interviews 
Primary data was collected in Zimbabwe using key informant interviews. Key informants have 
specialised knowledge about a concept or a community (Tremblay, 1957: 689). This data collection 
method was chosen because it would give an in-depth description of the data (Parsons, 2011: 407). 
Using key informants was the only primary data collection method employed by this study to elicit 
the views of political risk in Zimbabwe. The study could not employ other qualitative data collection 
methods, for example, focus group discussions or direct observations, mainly because the nature of 
the topic was not ideal for focus group discussion. Politically motivated topics are regarded with 
much suspicion in Zimbabwe, hence meeting with respondents individually was deemed less 
intimidating. Meeting one individual at a time allowed the respondents to be open about how political 
decisions in Zimbabwe had an impact on MNC activities without fear of being victimised or 
potentially labelled in a group. In addition, it would have been difficult to synchronise the diaries of 
the potential target respondents to conduct a focus group discussion on political risk in Zimbabwe. If 
the study focused on a specific organisation, direct observation could have been applicable, but the 
study focused on the macro-level perspectives of PRA in Zimbabwe. Therefore, this study 
recommends future researchers seeking to elicit perceptions of political risk, especially in a hybrid 
political regime to conduct interviews with key informants as the data collection method. 
 
This study  conducted face to face interviews, which has been recommended as an effective way to 




that mutual trust is developed between the researcher and the respondents. Furthermore, there is room 
for the researcher to probe and seek clarity on specific issues if necessary. A total of 28 key informant 
interviews were conducted between June and October 2018. Of the key informant interviews, 25 were 
conducted face to face, two were administered over the telephone5 and one respondent emailed their 
responses to the researcher. The telephone interviews were necessary because the key informants 
were located in a different and far city from Harare where the researcher was based. Creswell (1998: 
124) asserts that a telephone interview is ideal if the researcher does not have direct access to the 
respondent. If future researchers cannot directly access their respondents, they could adopt the 
telephone interview strategy; it enables the researcher to probe to elicit information.  
 
The interviews were conducted at the respondents’ workplaces and only one was conducted at the 
respondent’s residence. The interviews took between 35 and 50 minutes, while one stretched for over 
two hours because the interview was conducted at the respondent’s home where they were more 
relaxed and not busy. Interviews were conducted using a semi-structured in-depth interview guide6. 
The interview guide aided the researcher to have an entry point into the conversations. Once the 
interviews started, the issues discussed on political risk in Zimbabwe guided the flow of the 
conversation. The researcher had room to probe on matters that needed further explanation. The 
interview guide was necessary because at the end of each interview, the researcher referred to the 
guide to ensure that all relevant issues had been discussed. The researcher recommends future 
researchers conducting in-depth key informant interviews to have a loosely structured guide; it 
reminds the researcher of the key matters to include in the discussion and ensures that all relevant 
issues are adequately discussed. When the same themes kept recurring, the researcher deemed that 
saturation had been reached.  
 
The study was motivated by the suggestion of Tremblay (1957: 688) that a wide range of sectors must 
be interviewed to capture the varying perspectives and underlying issues or problems. Six categories 
of respondents were selected to capture the multidimensions of PRA in Zimbabwe. The categories 
selected participated by creating, measuring, reviewing, assessing, studying or adapting to the 
changes in political risk. The selected categories of respondents were the government, the private 
sector, academia, embassies, civil society and political risk companies. The government was viewed 
as the main creator of political risk through its actions and decisions. It is not the only actor as non-
 
5A total of 29 interviews were conducted, but one was withdrawn as the participant requested to pull out of the study. 




state actors such as individuals and groups could also contribute to creating political risk for MNC, 
however, in this study the government is recognised as the main creator of political risk. Two 
government ministries provided one director and four senior government officers knowledgeable on 
political risk to be interviewed.  
 
MNCs operating in Zimbabwe were the target for the private sector. MNCs were selected over local 
enterprises because these directly represent the views of foreign investors operating in Zimbabwe. 
This category measures, reviews and adapts to the impact of political risk levels in Zimbabwe. The 
study focused on political risk perceptions of MNCs operating in a hybrid regime, hence it was pivotal 
to include this group. Local privately-owned companies, although affected by political risk were not 
included in this study. In some MNCs, there was no risk department, hence the alternative was to 
interview finance or human resources personnel. A total of five respondents were interviewed. 
Academia was included because this category studies the concepts of political risk and hybrid 
regimes. Six academics drawn from three state universities were interviewed; these comprised one 
dean of a faculty, two professors and three senior lecturers. 
 
Embassies advise potential MNCs and individual investors from their home countries on investment 
opportunities that arise in Zimbabwe. Therefore, their perceptions of political risk in Zimbabwe were 
essential for this study. Five political officers from five different embassies were interviewed. NGOs 
were included because they are neutral in the debate of political risk, unlike MNCs and the 
government. NGOs provide an observer’s perspective because they are not directly impacted by the 
political risk of MNCs operating in Zimbabwe. NGO’s views were sought in order to have a diverse 
view of political risk in Zimbabwe. Three executive directors and three senior programme officers 
were interviewed. The last category is political risk companies. There were no political risk 
companies operating in Zimbabwe; the study sought interviews from companies based in South 
Africa. This category is integral because it measures political risk and advises clientele on possible 
courses of action to take. This category’s understanding of political risk in Zimbabwe was perceived 
to enrich this study. An officer who worked on the Southern African portfolio for one company was 
interviewed.  
 
The study employed the use of gatekeepers. Creswell (1998: 60)  defines a gatekeeper as an individual 
who can provide access to the research respondents for the researcher. There was no gatekeeper 




expected the government to be inaccessible and planned to find a gatekeeper. Contrary to this 
expectation, the government was reasonably accessible. The researcher had to make an application in 
writing to the relevant government ministries. The government ministries responded after four weeks, 
authorising the appropriate officers to meet with the researcher. Political risk companies were willing 
to have discussions with the researcher, but the challenge was getting an available meeting time due 
to their busy schedules. Academics understood the value of research, as such, no respondent declined 
to be interviewed. It was next to impossible to speak to anyone from the embassies, private sector and 
NGOs without using a gatekeeper. The challenges and lessons learnt about using a gatekeeper are 
articulated in Section 2.6 which discusses the reflections of the researcher. 
 
2.4 Data analysis 
The study made use of CAQDAS to assist in thematic analysis. ATLAS.ti is the specific CADQAS 
programme used by this study. CAQADS enables better management of the data, however, the analysis 
and interpretation of the data is the role of the researcher (Rambaree, 2007: 3). The research followed 
Braun and Clarke's (2006: 60–69) six steps to undertaking a thematic analysis. The six steps involve 
familiarising with the data, initial coding of the data, generating themes, reviewing and defining 
themes and lastly, producing a report. First, the researcher transcribed the recorded interviews into 
written form, which was the initial step of familiarisation with the data. Transcribing started during 
fieldwork and was time-consuming. The researcher advises future researchers to transcribe as they 
conduct fieldwork as transcribing is repetitive and time-consuming. It can take three months or more 
to transcribe the data set. 
 
Secondly, each interview script was read several times with the researcher adding reactions and side 
notes to the initial reactions to the data. The data was then subjected to open coding. Open coding is a 
process of examining each line, noting reactions and, in the process, the data becomes better organised 
than the raw data (Boychuk Duchscher & Morgan, 2004: 608). Codes generated using open coding were 
grouped and regrouped continuously to fit the most appropriate major codes, which is referred to as axial 
coding. Axial coding has greater descriptive power as it can answer questions regarding when, where, 
why, who, and what (Boychuk Duchscher & Morgan, 2004: 608). Themes emerging from axial coding 
were grouped and, in some cases, some codes were split while others were merged. Selective coding is 
the process of selecting the core code that emerges from axial coding (Rambaree, 2007: 5). To 
illustrate axial and selective coding here is an example: the researcher had four themes which were 




preceding themes were generated from axial coding, and they describe the impact of elections on 
political risk. The researcher grouped these four into the selective codes of election processes.  
 
The researcher did not have predetermined codes, instead, themes were generated from the data set. This 
was to avoid the researcher overlooking issues that could be evident from the data because of a 
predetermined coding list. To come up with codes, the researcher was guided by the political risk 
framework for hybrid regimes and general political risk literature. The merging and breaking up of codes 
required the researcher to be very familiar with the data. When the coding process started, it was slow and 
cumbersome; nevertheless, by continuously reworking the codes and familiarising with the dataset, the 
process became easier. The three stages of coding were undertaken in ATLAS.ti version 8. The final 
list of selective codes comprised of 13 group codes and 69 individual codes. The coding process 
stopped when the level of saturation in relation to the research question was reached. The last stage 
of the thematic analysis is to produce a concise, coherent, logical and nonrepetitive report (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006: 24). Chapter Five presents the findings from the primary data and interprets the results 
in relation to the main research question which critically assesses if the traditional perceptions of 
political risk are still applicable in hybrid regimes. The next section discusses the ethical considerations. 
 
2.5 Ethical considerations 
Every participant was given the Stellenbosch University Ethical Clearance reference letter reassuring 
them that the information was going to be used solely for academic purposes. Procedurally, the 
researcher emailed the ethical clearance to the participants in advance then carried a hard copy to the 
meeting. The ethical clearance clarified to the respondents who had authorised or cleared the 
researcher to conduct the research. It gave the researcher credibility for the respondents. Government, 
MNCs and embassies needed institutional clearances before the researcher could speak to any 
representatives. As a result, most of the MNC interviews were conducted towards the end of the data 
collection period. The purpose of the study and the respondents’ right to withdraw at any time were 
thoroughly explained before the interviews started to ensure the respondents’ voluntary participation.  
 
Anonymity and confidentiality were explained and guaranteed to the respondents. A considerable 
number of respondents were keen to understand how the researcher would protect their identity. It 
was explained to the respondents that the study would refer to them using codes, for example, Key 
Informant Interview (KII) Academia, Respondent 1. In addition, it was emphasised that names and 




contributions on political risk for MNCs in Zimbabwe would be discussed. The resultant effect was 
that the participants liberally discussed their perspectives regarding political risk in Zimbabwe 
without fear of potentially being victimised if their contributions were directly linked to them. From 
the researcher’s observations, respondents in academia and the NGO sector were not threatened by 
disclosing their personal identities. 
 
The researcher made each respondent sign two informed consent forms. One consent form was for 
the researcher's records and the other was to be kept by the respondent. When anonymity and 
confidentiality were explained to the respondents the expectation was that the respondents would sign 
the informed consent forms confirming that their participation in the study was non-coerced and 
voluntary. This was not experienced by the researcher in all cases. In three interviews7 the respondents 
refused to sign the informed consent forms until the interviews were concluded. They wanted to give 
their full consent after going through the entire list of questions. Only then did these respondents 
agree to sign the informed consent forms. KII Academia, Respondent 5 requested that the 
transcription of the interview be sent to them via email, which the researcher respected and adhered 
to. One interviewee pulled out of the research and, as prescribed by the ethical clearance, that 
respondent’s views were not captured in any part of this thesis. For the two respondents who 
conducted telephonic interviews, the informed consent forms were sent via email. They were signed 
and returned to the researcher via email before research was conducted. The one respondent who 
emailed their responses attached their informed consent. 
 
The interviews were conducted in places that were comfortable for the respondents; 25 interviews 
were conducted in the respondents’ offices and one was conducted at the respondent’s residence. No 
financial compensation was offered in exchange for the respondents’ contribution; this was clarified 
in the introductory phase. Five respondents8 requested that the final version of the report of this study 
to be emailed to them for them to learn more about PRA in hybrid regimes. The raw data was stored 
in the researcher’s password-protected laptop with the individual files also encrypted with a 
password. The importance of institutional ethical clearance needs to be emphasised. The researcher 
advises future researchers to seek their institutional ethical clearances before commencing fieldwork. 
It gives the researcher credibility from the respondent’s perspective. In addition, it also provides 
 
7 KII Academia, Respondent 5; KII MNC, Respondent 2 and 5. 
8 KII Academia, Respondent 2, 5; KII Embassy, Respondent 5; KII MNC, Respondent 2 and KII Political risk company, 




guidelines that govern how the research must be conducted. The next section will focus on the lessons 
learnt from the data collection phase  
 
2.6 Reflections of the data collection process 
Conducting research which elicits the political views in Zimbabwe was a difficult task. The researcher 
observed that the environment was generally risk-averse; many potential respondents declined 
because they feared being politically victimised later. Maswikwa (2015: 67) also observes that people 
in Zimbabwe are generally unwilling to have their political views recorded. The culture is not 
accommodative of research on politically related matters, which was echoed by the different 
respondents the researcher approached. One example of how intolerant the environment is to 
academic research was a response given by one potential organisation. The researcher applied for 
institutional permission to conduct an interview in June 2018. In August 2018, via a telephone follow-
up, the organisation said that the period was not the best to conduct research, the researcher could try 
calling again in January 2019. The researcher’s experiences prior to and during the data collection 
period can serve to guide future researchers who seek to undertake research on politically sensitive 
information in a hybrid regime. The advice is structured into two broad categories, first in terms of 
procedural matters and secondly, non-procedural issues with regards to how to question interviewees. 
This section begins with the procedural advice then moves on to the non-procedural advice. 
 
First, when attempting to interview an MNC operating in a hybrid regime about politically motivated 
matters, it is imperative to seek authorisation at regional or global level and not at state level. MNCs 
operating in a country report to a regional or global office that has authority on procedural matters. 
When permission to conduct the research was sought at state level, the response was usually that the 
MNC was not at liberty to disclose any information, citing that it would be in breach of their 
information risk policy which, as a branch, they could not contravene. The researcher assumes that 
the regional or global office has more power to grant permission for the MNC to participate in 
research. Potential MNC, Respondent 1 replied to the researcher’s request for permission to conduct 
research at their company by saying, “Thank you for your email. After consultations, unfortunately, 
this is not something we are able to assist with at this time, as we are governed by global regulations 
with regards to the information we are able to give out …” This shows that the global office can 





 Another response, given by Potential MNC, Respondent 2, was, “After careful consideration, we 
regret to inform you that your request has not been successful, in light of our Information Risk 
Policy. Even if you confirm that all information provided will be kept in the strictest confidence, the 
report contains our name and confidential company information will have been made public. We 
value your course requirements for the completion of your degree, but it is unfortunate that we would 
be found in breach of information security in our company. We wish you all the best in your 
endeavours…” This respondent shows that another potential reason why the localised MNCs deny 
permission is that they assume that their competitors will be able to identify their responses in the 
report and use the information, hence they deny access to researchers. Therefore, this study 
encourages future researchers to seek permission at global or regional level where the information 
policies are crafted; they can directly assess if the potential research will lead to any disclosure of 
trade secrets. Most projects are for a specific time frame; hence the researcher recommends that 
permission be sought from the global or regional office at least four months before the actual data 
collection is set to commence. This is because of the bureaucratic nature of large organisations which 
can result in lengthy approval processes. 
 
Secondly, the researcher cannot overemphasise the need for a gatekeeper in some sectors when 
conducting research on politically inclined issues in a hybrid regime. To gain access to respondents 
from NGOs, private sector and embassies, the researcher made use of gatekeepers. The government, 
academia and political risk companies were accessible without a gatekeeper. The researcher 
anticipated the need for gatekeepers to speak to government’s officials if their initial application was 
denied. Contrary to this expectation, the government was willing to speak to the researcher. Notably, 
the change in government in November 2017 may have influenced the government’s enthusiasm to 
approve the research. The researcher was given contacts of a person from the NGO sector by a 
colleague. Only after mention of the colleague’s name did the potential respondent agree to meet with 
the researcher.   
 
The researcher applied for interviews to approximately 25 MNCs operating in Zimbabwe. From these 
applications, only one gave approval for the researcher to speak to a company representative. 
Permission to speak to the other four MNCs was only granted when the researcher used their network 
to find people that could assist with access to MNCs. Four different people acted as gatekeepers for 
four different MNCs. One person gave the researcher contact details for political officers from five 
embassies, three of these agreed to speak with the researcher. The respondents were confident that, 




The fear of the researcher being a spy was reiterated by the respondents during the interviews. Hence, 
the researcher recommends the use of gatekeepers to access potential respondents for politically 
motivated information in a hybrid regime.  
  
Equally important to note is that having a gatekeeper is not a guarantee that the participants will agree 
to participate in the research. One embassy which had been referred by a gatekeeper declined to 
participate in the research. The following is their response to the researcher’s request: “However, 
because of diplomatic protocol, we are not able to grant you the interview as requested because the 
information would be largely commercial-in-confidence or commercially speculative (diplomatic 
language). So, based on that, it puts us in a very difficult position to grant you the interview….” This 
response was sent via email a few weeks before the July 2018 harmonised elections. The home-host 
relations between this consulate and the Zimbabwean government were to some extent severed, which 
could have motivated the decision by the consulate to decline. 
 
Snowballing was also utilised by the researcher to look for respondents in the NGO sector and 
academia. After concluding the interview with KII NGO, Respondent 1, the researcher asked them to 
refer potential NGO respondents and received contact details for four potential respondents. One 
respondent who was referred by KII NGO, Respondent 1 participated in the study and, in turn, 
referred one potential respondent who agreed to be interviewed. The faculty dean at one university 
referred a professor from another university as a potential respondent in this study. This can be a 
strategy that future researchers working on political issues could utilise if they are facing challenges 
of accessing potential respondents for their study. 
 
The last procedural advice is regarding the most effective method of communication for future 
researchers conducting research on political risk in a hybrid regime. The researcher attempted to drop 
off hard copies of applications for interview candidates at different organisations without prior 
communication. In most cases, the security personnel at the entrance or gates denied the researcher 
access to the premises because they did not have the name of the person they sought to speak to. If 
the researcher successfully dropped the application at the potential organisation’s reception, the 
follow-up on the request was, in most cases, ineffective. Applications sent to the general email 
address in the format “info@xxxxx” were hardly responded either. Thus, from the researcher’s 
experience, the best way to gain access to potential target organisations is by first making telephone 




details of the desired potential respondent and the name of the person to whom the official request 
seeking permission should be addressed. After procuring these names, the researcher can submit a 
hard copy, as well as an email, to the organisation. Large organisations are bureaucratic, which leads 
to the approval process taking much time, hence the researcher should aggressively check for 
feedback at least once a week, in person or via a telephone call. 
 
The procedural challenges were also heightened by Zimbabwe conducting harmonised elections on 
the 30th of July 2018, which was during this research’s data collection. This served as an advantage 
because there was general excitement about the election and the respondents were liberal in 
discussing information about how the election resultantly impacted on political risk in Zimbabwe. 
The election process also deterred some respondents from even considering participating in the study 
due to uncertainty about the election outcomes. The main disadvantage was that the researcher was 
regarded with much suspicion by some potential respondents who thought the researcher was seeking 
to elicit their views as a government spy and would later use the information against them. In other 
instances, potential respondents thought the researcher was aligned to the main-opposition party, 
MDC-A, because the researcher’s surname was similar to some high-ranking MDC-A politicians.  
 
To solve the challenge of being misconstrued as a spy for the government and opposition political 
party, the researcher emphasised the purpose of the study and provided the Ethical Clearance 
Reference letter from Stellenbosch University. The researcher tried to be transparent by providing 
their student number, student email address and their supervisor’s contact details on the application 
letters seeking institutional clearance and on the informed consent form. The Ethical Clearance had 
the university’s research ethics committee coordinators contact details, which was another layer of 
transparency. In addition, confidentiality and the anonymity of the respondents were emphasised by 
the researcher before the interviews commenced. Future researchers are recommended to be 
transparent and to share as much information as they can about where they are coming from to 
facilitate trust between them and potential respondents. This also eliminates any misconceptions the 
respondents may have about the researcher that could lead them to refuse to participate in the study. 
 
Moving on to the non-procedural issues, first, the researcher would advise that when interviewing 
government officials, questions must be stated in a positive or neutral manner. This enables open and 




questions that KII Government, Respondent 1 perceived as negatively phrased about Zimbabwe, 
which were: 
1. Is the legitimacy of the president important? Suppose other countries cry foul, as in times past, 
about the legitimacy of the Zimbabwean government, does this impact the political risk of the 
country? 
2. How has the Indigenisation Act of 2007 influenced political risk in Zimbabwe? 
The researcher learnt from the discussion that the questions were wrongly phrased despite the 
respondent answering the questions. The researcher then revised these questions for the next set of 
interviews. The question of legitimacy was rephrased in a neutral manner, removing the validation 
that in times past Zimbabwe had an illegitimate government. The new question was phrased as: 
“Suppose other countries suspect that the election results are not reflective of the will of the people, 
will this significantly impact political risk?” Before asking about the possible impact of the IEEA on 
political risk, the researcher would praise the government’s efforts on the black empowerment 
initiative. After the praise, the researcher would then ask if the programme had any impact on political 
risk? After these changes, the officials were not offended by the researcher’s questions. Therefore, 
when interviewing government officials, it is important to be neutral in order to draw the respondents 
to engage in the conversation. Furthermore, the researcher should attempt to see the programme, 
policy or activity in question from the point of view of the government to enable better engagement 
with the government officers participating in the interview. 
 
Future researchers must be aware that respondents represent the company’s views, but in their 
individual capacity, they may or may not support the political party of the incumbent government. 
During the conversations, the researcher could, in some cases, distinguish which political parties the 
respondents individually supported. When discussing potentially political issues with respondents, 
future researchers must understand that the respondents have individual opinions about the issues 
discussed. How the researcher addresses these questions can either lead to the respondent being open 
and liberal or withdrawn and despondent. The researcher hence recommends that the questions and 
opinions of future researchers always be neutral in order to gain much information from the 
respondents. 
  
The research sought to examine if the ZANU-PF factional battles had influenced political risk in 
Zimbabwe. As stated above, individuals reflect the opinion of their organisations, but, given their 




views of the respondent in a neutral manner, the researcher would say, “given the factional battles as 
cited in the media or newspapers…” This removed the perception that the researcher was the one 
who had made that conclusion. Therefore, to achieve neutrality on potentially sensitive questions, 
future researchers could establish a valid source for the questions they seek to ask. Establishing a 
source for the researcher’s claim removes any potential prejudices or biases that could be levied on 
the researcher by the respondent. 
 
Lastly, the research sought the perceptions of how the military assisted change in government of 
November 2017 had influenced political risk in Zimbabwe. The researcher noted that this military 
intervention had liberated people to openly talk about politics in Zimbabwe. One respondent when 
discussing Mugabe laughed and said, “...we can talk about these issues now that Mugabe is 
dethroned…” The researcher, to maintain neutrality, referred to it as a military assisted change in 
government. Respondents from embassies, academia and NGOs openly referred to it as a coup. The 
private sector, perhaps for fear of being misquoted, used the same term as the researcher, “military 
assisted change in government”. Therefore, the researcher reiterates the recommendation for future 
researchers to always maintain neutrality when asking questions. 
 
2.7 Conclusion  
This chapter deliberated on the research design and methodology that was employed by this study. 
The data collection and data analysis processes were clearly elaborated. This was undertaken so that 
the reader may understand the research methods employed and how the researcher derived the 
findings of this study which are deliberated in the next chapter. Thus, this chapter served to confirm 





Chapter 3: Critical Assessment of PRA and Hybrid Regimes theory 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter intends to provide a critical discussion of the hybrid regime and PRA literature. In 
addition, the chapter aims to develop a political risk conceptual framework for analysing hybrid 
regimes that will be applied to the case study to critically assess the conceptual perceptions of PRA 
in a hybrid regime in Chapter Five. The chapter is divided into four distinct sections. 
 
The first section focuses on hybrid regime conceptualisation. It begins by giving a historical overview 
of how the debate on this new peculiar regime became prevalent after the ‘third wave of 
democratisation’ which was alluded to by Huntington (1991a). This is followed by an analysis of the 
‘new regime’ as a diminished type of democracy after 1990 and as a diminished type of authoritarian 
regime after 2000. Thereafter, a critique of the diminished regime hypothesis is discussed. Next, the 
study critically discusses the conceptualisation of the hybrid regime. A hybrid regime framework is 
developed by this study, adapted from the traditional frameworks of Wigell (2008), and Gilbert and 
Mohseni (2011). Lastly, this section discusses the durability of the hybrid regime. This section is 
essential as it enables better understanding of the hybrid regime. Also, the indicators of the hybrid 
regime framework developed will be used as inputs in the construction of the political risk framework.  
 
The second section discusses the relationship between the hybrid regime and PRA. This section 
reviews the existing literature on the relationship between the hybrid regime and PRA. The third 
section focuses on discussing PRA. It begins by discussing problem-solving and decision-making 
theories as the traditional theoretical foundation of PRA from the point of view of foreign investors 
and MNCs. Thereafter, factors that have influenced PRA traditional conceptualisation and factors 
that are potentially impacting PRA conceptualisation in the contemporary environment are discussed. 
In conclusion, the conceptualisations of political risk, PRA and some political risk factors are given. 
The political risk factors discussed will be used as inputs in developing the political risk framework 
for analysing hybrid regimes for this study. This section unpacks PRA and shows the progression of 
its conceptualisation over time. 
 
The last section develops the political risk framework for analysing hybrid regimes. Indicators for the 




suggested from the research output by Green (1974), Jensen (2003, 2008) Berlin, Berlin and Vrooman 
(2004) and Jarvis & Griffiths (2007). In addition, factors of the hybrid regime framework developed 
in Section 3.4 will be used as inputs in the Political risk framework for analysing the hybrid regime. 
The Political risk framework will be applied in Chapter Five to critically assess whether the traditional 
conceptual perceptions of political risk are still applicable, with the aim of researching if PRA could 
be adaptable to the hybrid regime.  
 
3.2 Hybrid Regimes  
Kailitz (2013: 39) defines a political regime as a set of procedures and guidelines that identify who 
has access to power, who can select the government, given specific conditions by which authority is 
exercised within a specific state. This study chooses to start the analysis of the hybrid regime after 
the third wave of democratisation. However, the concept of the hybrid regime did not originate then. 
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) had earlier alluded to the hybrid regime as a political regime that 
exhibits features of both democracy and autocracy. Diamond (2002: 23) cites examples of hybrid 
regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. This study focuses on the hybrid regime analysis after the third wave 
of democratisation because that is when the regime became most visible and its discussion became 
amplified. 
 
3.2.1 A diminished democracy and diminished autocracy hypothesis  
Huntington (1991a: 15) defined a wave of democratisation as “a group of transitions from non-
democratic9 to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly 
outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time.” A wave involved 
liberalisation or partial democratisation of a political system (Huntington, 1991a: 15). Notably, not 
all transitions to democracy in history happened during a wave of democracy (Huntington 1991a: 15). 
The third wave of democratisation was an era between 1974 and 1990 in which 30 countries made 
significant transitions to democracy, thereby increasing the number of democracies that existed then 
(Huntington 1991b: 12). It should be noted that preceding the third wave of democratisation were two 
earlier waves. The result of the earlier waves were reversals10, even in some countries that had adopted 
 
9Huntington defined non-democracy as totalitarian, authoritarian, personal dictatorships and military regimes. 
10The first long wave of democratisation   1826 – 1926;  First reverse wave  1922 – 1942 
  Second wave of democratisation    1943 – 1962;   Second reverse wave 1958 –1975 
  Third wave of democratisation   1974 -                                (Huntington, 1991a: 16, b: 12) 
Diamond (2015: 153) claims that although democracy was experiencing a recession or mild stagnation from 2006 to 2015, 




democracy (Huntington, 1991a: 16, b: 12; Diamond, 2002: 22–23). Plattner (2014: 5) stipulates that 
by 1995, 40 more countries had transitioned to electoral democracy, resulting in 60 per cent of the 
world’s dominant political regime being democracy. 
 
The concept of democracy that the ‘third wave’ suggested was Western liberal democracy. 
Democracy focuses on having a representative government through the process of free, fair, periodic 
and competitive elections (Huntington, 1991a: 9; Wigell, 2008: 234), whereas political liberalism 
focuses on limiting the power of the government so that citizens’ rights are protected and government 
does not degenerate into majority tyranny or outright anarchy (Wigell, 2008: 234). Morlino 
(2009:277) defines a minimum democracy as reflective of the following key elements: a) universal 
adult suffrage; b) free, fair, competitive, and periodic elections; c) multiple parties; and d) different, 
independent and alternative media sources. Huntington (1991a: 9), Merkel (2004: 49) and Wigell 
(2008: 237) agree with Morlino (2009:277) on the minimum requirements of a democracy.  
 
Zakaria (1997: 22) and Wigell (2008: 237) define the concept of liberalism to encompass: a) the 
protection of the basic human rights of speech, assembly, association, property and religion to all 
citizens; b) equality before the law; and c) separation of powers between the arms of government. 
Diamond (2002: 25), Armony and Schamis (2005: 115), and Plattner (2014: 8) agree with the 
conceptualisation of liberal democracy as explained by Zakaria (1997:22), Wigell (2008:237) and 
Morlino (2009:277). The researcher adopts the definitions of liberalism by Zakaria (1997: 22) and 
Wigell (2008: 237) and the conceptualisation of democracy by Morlino (2009:277) for the rest of this 
study because the definitions give a criterion that is measurable and allow for comparison between 
the different states of the nature of liberal democracy exhibited. 
 
Several reasons can be given for the widespread adoption of democracy during the third wave. First, 
from 1970 to 1980 the USA aggressively promoted democratisation around the world (Huntington, 
1991b: 15; Levitsky & Way, 2002: 60). Secondly, the end of the Cold War, which ended the 
ideological competition between the Soviet Union and the USA, meant that the most attractive model 
left to adopt for developing countries was that offered by the USA in the form of liberal democracy 
and capitalism (Huntington, 1991b: 15; Plattner, 2014: 5). Thirdly, for developing countries to receive 
aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) in the 1990s, they needed to 




& Mufute, 2004: 32; Plattner, 2014: 17). Fourthly, snowballing11 contributed minimally to the 
democratisation process in this period. Snowballing applied to dictators in that, when one dictator 
adopted democracy it compelled the other dictators to consider democratising. This was evident in 
Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Nepal and Albania in the early 1990s (Huntington, 1991b: 16). These 
reasons motivated the need for non-democratic countries to initiate the ‘transition’12 to democracy. 
Thus, political scientists and development practitioners expected the transition to democracy that had 
started during the third wave of democratisation to result in the adoption of Western liberal 
democracy. 
 
The new political regime that emerged towards the end of the 1990s did not resemble the Western 
liberal democracy that development practitioners and political scientist had envisioned. It is during 
this period that several adjectives were ascribed, mostly perceiving the new regime as a diminished13 
democracy because it significantly differed from the Western liberal style of democracy. A plethora 
of adjectives to illustrate the diminished nature of democracy have been coined; among them are: 
delegative democracy (O’Donell,  1994: 54), illiberal democracy (Zakaria, 1997: 22), defective 
democracy (Merkel, 2004: 52), partial democracy (Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen & 
O’Halloran, 2006: 556, 564–565), pseudo-democracy (Diamond, 2002: 22) as well as limited and 
protected democracy (Morlino, 2009: 287–294).   
 
After 2000 the debate swung in a different direction; the new regime was viewed as a diminished 
autocracy because it did not resemble the features of liberal democracy. This section will define an 
authoritarian regime and its features before continuing with the analysis of a diminished autocracy. 
Linz (1964: 255) defines an authoritarian14 regime as, 
A political system with limited, not responsible political pluralism; without elaborate and 
guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without extensive nor intensive political 
mobilisation (except at some points in their development); and in which a leader (or 
occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually 
quite predictable ones. 
 
11Snowballing is defined as events in state A appear lucrative for state B to adopt the model and pattern as well. 
12The process of democracy follows these stages of transformation. 1. The opening, which involves a shift in the dictatorial 
regime in the mentality between hard-liners and soft-liners 2. The breakthrough, which is the collapse of the old regime 
and the rapid emergence of a new democratic system. Democratic institutions are put in place by the new government 3. 
Consolidation, which takes place over an extended period in which there is a reform of all state institutions and society 
to the acceptance and observance of democracy as the new norm (Carothers, 2002: 7). 
13A diminished subtype is a concept that does not meet the full definitional requirements of a root concept and it lacks 
one or more of its defining attributes (Collier & Levitsky, 1997:448).  
14Authoritarian regimes are classified as one-party states, personal dictatorships, monarchies, etho-oligarchies, theocratic, 




There are four key dimensions mentioned in this definition which are useful for analytical purposes: 
pluralism, leadership, mobilisation and governing ideology. This definition enables measurement and 
comparison of authoritarian regimes. Huntington (1991b: 12) and Vukovic (2011: 12) agree with the 
conceptualisation of an authoritarian regime given by Linz (1964:255). Hence this study will adopt 
the definition for authoritarian regime given by Linz (1964:255). 
 
An authoritarian regime is characterised by the non-existence of elections. However, if they do exist, 
they are a mere façade and lack any real competition (Brownlee, 2009: 518; Ekman, 2009: 9; Adeney, 
2017: 124). The incumbent is re-elected by over 70% of the votes, which makes the process 
uncompetitive (Diamond, 2002: 32; Levitsky & Way, 2002: 55). Legislature is firmly controlled by 
the executive or the incumbent party, amounting to minimal or no horizontal accountability (Levitsky 
& Way, 2002: 55; Ekman, 2009: 9). The actions of state officials are overwhelmingly oriented 
towards the manipulation of procedures to preserve the power of the incumbent (Way, 2006: 167–
168). The police, security officers, tax officials, directors of state schools, universities, hospitals, 
prisons, factories and farms may be called upon to mobilise support for the incumbent. These 
institutions perform their foundational duties, that is, schools educate, the police prevent and fight 
crime, however, these institutions engage in a set of informal tasks associated with the preservation 
of the incumbent’s power (Way, 2006: 167–168). Levitsky and Way (2002: 57) claim that state-
owned media is heavily censored and repressed, and journalists, civil society and opposition parties 
that oppose the government, if they exist, are harassed, arrested, deported or even assassinated by the 
state. 
 
Terms offered for a diminished authoritarian regime include competitive authoritarian regime 
(Levitsky & Way, 2002: 52) and electoral authoritarian regime (Schedler, 2002: 37), which was split 
into hegemonic and competitive authoritarian regime (Diamond, 2002: 29). While the diminished 
democracy typologies focused on the missing elements of the regime, the diminished autocracy 
typologies emphasised the visible elements of the regime. Furthermore, terms such as political grey 
area (Carothers, 2002: 9) and foggy zone (Schedler, 2002: 37) reveal the complexity involved in 
attempting to understand the regime that evolved that was neither liberal democratic nor outright 
autocratic in nature. 
 
The democracy with adjectives debate has not been conceptually beneficial; rather, it has degenerated 




observed (Collier and Levitsky 1997: 445). Vast research has been undertaken regarding diminished 
subtypes of democracy and authoritarianism. However, Cassani (2014: 544) claims that this research 
has not been built on existing knowledge. As a result, it has hampered a nuanced understanding of 
the ‘new regime’ that was visible after the third wave but could not be explained using the existing 
topologies of either democracy or authoritarian regime. The next section will offer a critique of the 
diminished democracy and diminished authoritarian hypothesis as inapplicable solutions to the new 
regime.  
 
3.2.2 A critique of the diminished regime hypothesis 
The expectation that the states which had begun the transition to democracy should result in Western 
liberal democracy is the first critique of political scientists and development practitioners. It should 
have been perceived as one of the possible results and not the only possibility (Zakaria, 1997: 24). 
The first and second waves of democratic reversals attest to the fact that it was a facade that all 
countries which initiated the democratisation process would end up as consolidated democracies. This 
could be because it takes time to go through the democratisation process. Also, each state has different 
actors and the motivation to follow the democratisation agenda is different. Some are perhaps more 
enthusiastic about the change than others, hence some states would adapt faster to democracy while 
others would not adapt to it completely.  
 
Secondly, there is no such thing as a perfect liberal democracy. Offering diminished subtypes of 
democracy for the new regime implied the illusion that some countries can be classified as perfect 
liberal democracies. Armony and Schamis (2005: 115; 121) argue that there are irregularities which 
are inconsistent with the principles of democracy in the well-established democracies of the West, 
thus indicating that irregularities of democracy are not exclusive to upcoming new democracies; they 
also happen in well-established democracies, although there may be an observable difference in their 
maturity levels. They further argue that centralisation of power, bureaucratic delegation, and 
inequalities in the distribution of rights have crippled accountability, deliberation, and democratic 
rule of law in both old and new democracies. It is evident that Western states exhibit the concept of 
liberal democracy more, mainly because they have practised it more and democracy has consolidated 






Thirdly, the creation of new sub-types has hampered proper analysis that can be useful to political 
regime classification. Collier and  Levitsky (1997: 450-451), Armony and Schamis (2005: 114),  and 
Cassani (2014: 544) argue that ample research has been undertaken about the ‘new regime’, but it has 
not resulted in greater understanding. Rather, the outcome has been confusion and conceptual 
ambiguity in regime classification. The subtypes should be able to offer identifiable and distinct 
differences; however, this has not been largely evident. For example, the major difference between 
illiberal democracy (Zakaria, 1997:22) and delegative democracy (Merkel, 2004:52) is that illiberal 
democracy exhibits a regime that compromises on civil liberties, whereas delegative democracy lacks 
horizontal accountability between the arms of government. Delegative democracy can be explained 
as a subgroup of illiberal democracy. This does not warrant the addition of another category because 
confusion arises when a new anomaly constitutes the creation of a new subtype.  
 
The ‘one model to fit all states and regional contexts’ is the fourth critique that can be levied against 
the diminished concept. The expectations could have differed for different geographical regions and 
states due to differences in their economies, culture, religions and commonality of challenges. 
Different geographical regions could adopt the model of democracy while accommodating their 
native values, but having some similarities with the Western liberal democracy style.  Huntington 
(1991b: 27) argues that East-Asia adopted the practice of democracy to serve its own indigenous 
values of consensus and stability in contrast to the Western democratic values of competition and 
change. Japan is a democratic state but it follows the East-Asian type of democracy that the dominant 
party is re-elected in every election (Huntington, 1991b: 26). Japan acts contrary to the Western 
democratic values of alternation of power between political parties.  
 
Lastly, the diminished autocracy hypothesis emphasises one observable element that is democratic. 
This is conceptually inapplicable because suppose there are three observable democratic 
characteristics, how would this differ from the one with one observable characteristic? Would it 
qualify as, to some extent, a democracy or as authoritarian? The debate should not deliberate on the 
level of democracy or degree of authoritarianism. Rather, it should discuss the new peculiar regime 
as a separate regime with features presenting tenets of both a democracy and an autocracy. 
 
At this point, it is critical to emphasise that there is no transition to democracy that is taking place 
(Carothers, 2002: 17), neither is there a diminished authoritarian or democratic regime in place. What 




that the regime should be described within the existing typologies of democracy and authoritarian 
regimes because conceptual innovation is very costly. Therefore, in order to retain knowledge already 
gained, it is ideal to explain the new regime within the existing frameworks of democracy and 
authoritarian regimes. This results in a one-dimensional approach of viewing the new regime as a 
diminished type. 
 
In contrast, Wigell (2008: 231), Bogaards (2009: 412–415), Ekman (2009: 9), Gilbert and Mohseni 
(2011: 271), Adeney (2017: 120–122) and  Mufti (2018: 116) argue that the existing typologies of 
political regimes are insufficient to explain the behaviour of the new regime. Rather, a multi-
dimensional approach will enhance the understanding of this new regime. First, the one-dimensional 
approach focuses on only one element while ignoring all other elements, for example, tutelary 
democracy, that is, the extent to which elected representatives are subservient to an informal power, 
amplifies this one element while ignoring all other key elements. This will not bring about a 
comprehensive understanding of the new political regime, therefore, the analysis becomes acute and 
limited. 
 
Secondly, considering the new regime as a separate class from democracy and autocracy makes the 
analysis relevant and understandable. It also allows for comparisons and measurements within the 
new regime. By offering subtypes of democracy or autocracy, it measures a regime according to the 
degree of democratisation or authoritarianism that the regime exhibits. Hence, a separate 
classification for the political regime is more applicable. Thirdly, the new regime portrays features of 
both autocracy and democracy, hence it is prudent to analyse the regime in a manner that 
accommodates both features. The current typologies of democracy and autocracy cannot account for 
this peculiarity in detail, for example, the regime has regular and multiparty elections- a feature of 
democracy- and during elections, the regime partially manipulates the playing field in its favour and 
fully controls the media, reflective of an authoritarian. It cannot be classified as a minimum 
democracy because it does not satisfy all the requirements. It is inapplicable as an electoral or 
hegemonic authoritarian because it does not indulge in all other serious atrocities of an authoritarian 
regime, for example, assassinating opposition political party members. This regime is reflective of 
both features of an authoritarian and a democracy, therefore it is better analysed accommodating both 





This study agrees with the latter view of using a multi-dimensional approach to analyse this ‘new 
regime’. The new regime is referred to in this study as a hybrid political regime. This study rejects 
the position of analysing the hybrid regime as moving along a linear continuum, and as a regime 
transitioning to democracy or as one stuck in transition, but rather, it is an independent and different 
political regime from democracy and autocracy. The next section will conceptualise the hybrid regime 
and this understanding will be used for this study. 
 
3.3 Conceptualisation of the Hybrid Regimes 
The term hybrid regime was first coined by Karl (1995:80) as a regime that has functional attributes 
of both democracy and authoritarianism. The hybrid regime is not a half-finished or half-hearted 
attempt at democratisation or authoritarianism as some scholars would categorise it  (O’Donell, 1994; 
Zakaria, 1997; Levitsky & Way, 2002; Schedler, 2002; Merkel, 2004). It is a separate and 
independent regime from democracy and authoritarian regime. The argument of a hybrid being a 
distinct and separate regime has been validated by Ekman (2009), Morlino (2009: 282),  Gilbert and 
Mohseni (2011: 294) and Adeney (2017). Thus, the hybrid regime should not be judged by the quality, 
degree or extent of democratisation or authoritarianism that it resembles.  
 
This study adopts the definitions by Diamond (2002:23), Bogaards (2009:415), Vukovic (2011:13), 
Cassani (2012:4), Akkoyunlu (2014:34) and (Morlino, 2009: 282), and conceptualises a hybrid 
regime as one that responds to the following:  
• A regime that has periodic elections 
• Results in multi-party legislature which includes members of the opposition 
• Applies a few limits to the executive arm of government 
• Regular violations of the citizens’ political and civil rights 
It can be highlighted that a hybrid regime displays features of democracy and autocracy which have 
contrasting agendas and are antagonistic towards each other. Due to this antagonism between the 
different elements, the durability of the hybrid regime as a political contestation is debated. In some 
cases, the hybrid regime has been durable, while in others the political regime has not lasted for more 
than ten years (Morlino, 2009: 284; Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011: 294). The durability of the hybrid 





Hybrid regimes have increased in number from the beginning of the twenty-first century and it is 
argued that this political regime type is most common in the developing world (Brownlee, 2009: 25; 
Vukovic, 2011: 5). The Democracy Index 2018 noted that the hybrid regime constituted 24% of the 
number of countries surveyed (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019: 2). The sources of the hybrid 
regime have been highlighted as follows: i) The decay of a full-blown authoritarian regime giving 
way to democratic institutions, often due to domestic and international pressure, ii) The collapse of 
an authoritarian regime, iii) The decay of a democratic regime, iv) A post-colonial new government, 
and v) Unexplainable anomalies of countries who have been hybrid even before the third wave to 
date, for example, Turkey and Iran  (Diamond, 2002: 22; Ekman, 2009: 14; Morlino, 2009: 282; 
Adeney, 2017).  
 
This section conceptualised the hybrid regime to have a nuanced understanding of the term hybrid 
regime. The following section critically discusses the traditional hybrid frameworks and in turn 
develops a conceptual framework that this study uses to analyse the hybrid regime. 
 
3.4 Traditional conceptual framework for hybrid regime   
Wigell (2008) and Gilbert and Mohseni’s (2011) frameworks have been the most commonly used to 
analyse the hybrid regime. As such, the study will critically discuss these two frameworks before 
adopting their indicators to develop this study’s hybrid regime framework. In analysing hybrid 
regimes, Wigell (2008) focused on liberalism and democracy. Democracy aimed for a representative 
government which was facilitated through the process of elections. The indicator of elections was 
judged based on being free, fair, regular and competitive as the minimum requirements. In addition, 
elections should guarantee electoral sovereignty, electoral empowerment, integrity and irreversibility. 
Liberalism was achieved through constitutionalism. The minimum requirements for constitutionalism 
were set as the respect of civil liberties and other extra conditions for executive, legal and local 
government accountability and integrity. 
 
Gilbert and Mohseni (2011) use three dimensions to analyse the hybrid regime, these are: 
competition, civil liberties and tutelary interference. Competition is measured using the indicators of 
multiple political parties, regular and competitive elections. Civil liberties reflect the quality of 
competition within a regime. They suggest that the extent to which civil liberties are respected shows 




subservient to tutelary institutions, for example, an active monarchy, and the military or religious 
bodies. 
 
These hybrid regime indicators can be combined because there are similarities. The indicator of 
competition by Gilbert and Mohseni (2011) is similar to the indicator of elections by Wigell (2008). 
Furthermore, the hybrid regime indicators of civil liberties and constitutionalism are similar. Wigell 
(2008) specifies election empowerment and election sovereignty under the additional criterion of 
elections, which have similar components to what Gilbert and Mohseni (2011) refer to as tutelary 
interference. To discuss each indicator critically, similar classifications can be merged as follows: i) 
competition/elections, ii) civil liberties/constitutionalism, and iii). tutelary interference/ election 
empowerment/election sovereignty. The combining of these hybrid regime indicators is illustrated in 
Table 3.1. A critical discussion of each traditional hybrid indicator follows thereafter.  
 
Table 3.1 Hybrid regime framework: Traditional indicators 
Traditional  hybrid indicators for discussion from Wigell (2008) and Gilbert & Mohseni (2011) 
Competition/Elections 
Civil liberties/ Constitutionalism 
Tutelary interference/ Election empowerment/Election sovereignty 
Source: Author’s compilation (2019) adapted from (Wigell, 2008; Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011) 
 
3.4.1 Hybrid regime indicator of Competition/Elections 
Elections serve different purposes in different political regimes. For a democracy, elections are 
competitive, with fair competition resulting in legitimate elite succession (Wigell, 2008: 243–247; 
Mufti, 2018: 115); whereas for an authoritarian regime, elections are uncompetitive and unfair 
resulting in elite management, distribution of patronage and seeking legitimacy (Brownlee, 2009: 
518; Ekman, 2009: 9; Adeney, 2017: 124; Mufti, 2018: 115). The incumbent in an authoritarian 
regime can receive approximately 70% of the votes (Diamond, 2002: 32; Levitsky & Way, 2002: 55), 
indicating the non-competitiveness of the elections. This section discusses how elections are 





The incumbent party in a hybrid regime actively participates in elections and cannot reduce them to 
a mere façade; nonetheless, major political change is never certain, but remains a possibility 
(Diamond, 2002: 24; Levitsky & Way, 2002: 55). Unlike in an authoritarian regime, instead of using 
obvious tactics to violate democratic election rules, the dominant party resorts to the use of bribery 
and co-option of opposition party members. In addition, the incumbent may use subtler forms of 
persecution such as using tax authorities, compliant judiciaries and state agencies to ‘legally’ harass, 
persecute, or extort cooperative behaviour from critics (Levitsky & Way, 2002: 53). An election run-
off is conducted if the election results do not present a clear winner (O’Donell, 1994: 60). 
 
For the dominant party, the system of elections is largely to generate results, gather information and 
co-opt a few opposition members into the legislature, thereby fragmenting and weakening its 
opposition (Cassani, 2012: 5). Elections serve as a source of domestic and international legitimacy 
for the dominant party (Carothers, 2002: 12; Ekman, 2009: 9; Cassani, 2012: 7). Election integrity, 
which is one person’s vote accounted for as one and not subjected to a weighting system, is commonly 
adhered to in a hybrid regime. Election irreversibility means elections are the only mechanism to fill 
elected offices, and electoral outcomes are regarded as unchangeable. In a hybrid regime, election 
irreversibility is respected to the extent that the incumbent’s party’s interests are preserved. 
 
In conclusion, Gilbert and Mohseni (2011: 285) conceptualise elections in a hybrid regime as highly 
competitive. In addition, they claim that there should be turnover in one out of every four election 
cycles for the executives or legislature indicating competitiveness. This study does not completely 
agree with this conceptualisation. If elections are uncompetitive but convincingly show the other 
features of a hybrid regime, is it disregarded as a hybrid regime. This study hypothesises that there 
may be cases in which there is no turnover of either the legislature or executive after four election 
cycles, but the regime could still be a hybrid regime. This could be because the dominant party exerts 
control over the state and tilts the political environment in its favour, hence limiting the level of 
competition that is necessary to ensure a turnover after four election cycles. Thus, it is possible that 
some hybrid regimes could have uncompetitive elections. 
 
3.4.2 Hybrid regime indicator of Civil liberties/Constitutionalism 
Civil liberties are enforceable freedoms granted to citizens by law. These are nation-state specific and 




(Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011: 285). Strong enforcement of civil liberties results in a fairer electoral 
playing field, which is expected in a democracy. On the contrary, weak enforcement of civil liberties 
leads to a regime being illiberal and the environment tilted in favour of the incumbent which is 
characteristic of an authoritarian regime. The discussion now focuses on how this indicator is 
conceptualised in a hybrid regime. 
 
In a hybrid regime, there are limitations on freedom of expression and few independent alternative 
sources of information. Majorly, citizens rely on state media which is subject to censoring (Karl, 
1995:82). The incumbent party has more access to state media than the opposition parties (Levitsky 
& Way, 2002: 58).  Freedom of association exists, but with restrictions and apart from elections, 
political participation is low (Karl, 1995: 82; Menocal et al., 2008: 33). Wigell (2008: 242) claims 
that civil society exists but its influence is limited due to being banned or controlled by the 
government. There is no equality of citizens before the law, with a level of public corruption 
prevailing in the state (Merkel, 2004: 49; Menocal et al., 2008: 33-34). 
 
Hybrid regimes are at times characterised by unaccountable strong leadership which rarely commits 
to constitutional norms, resulting in opaque decision-making (Merkel, 2004; Menocal et al., 2008). 
The president can use either the legislature or the constitution to remove limitations on presidential 
terms because they detest them (van Cranenbrugh, 2009: 63). The judiciary is weak and fails to 
effectively exercise limits on the executive and there is minimal horizontal accountability (O’Donell, 
1994: 61; Ekman, 2009: 5). The legislature is dominated by the incumbent party which can easily 
advance policies favourable to itself. Although the legislature is weak, it is a focal point for opposition 
parties to engage the incumbent party by sharing ideas and it is also a mechanism to share power 
(Ekman, 2009: 5; Cassani, 2012: 5). Decision-making is centralised to close political elites and 
important decisions are rarely delegated (Menocal et al., 2008: 33; Cassani, 2012: 5). Informal 
practices of clientelism, patronage and nepotism exist and sometimes take precedence over formal 
practices (O’Donell, 1994: 61; Merkel, 2004: 49).  
 
Gilbert and Mohseni (2011: 285) conclude that strong enforcement of civil liberties leads to fairer 
competition, while less enforcement leads to unfair competition among the political players. This 
study agrees with this conceptualisation because institutions that enable relatively fair competition 




a constitution, parliament, and the judiciary. However, it is only when these institutions apply 
selective discretion towards the incumbent political party that unfair competition exists.   
 
3.4.3 Hybrid regime indicator of Tutelary interference/Election empowerment/Election 
sovereignty 
Tutelage is when external bodies coerce elected officials to circumvent proper decision-making 
processes or lead to national legislation being circumvented (Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011: 286; Mufti, 
2018: 115). Tutelage over elected officials can be applied by a person, group, family or institution 
which could be the military, religious bodies, a monarchy, MNCs, regional bodies, terrorist groups, 
as well as other sovereign states (Wigell, 2008: 239). Wigell (2008:239) claims that under tutelage, 
the guardian is the one in control while the elected representative acts according to the dictates of the 
guardian. This study suggests that tutelage is motivated by potential personal gain for the guardian. 
 
The aim of tutelage is to limit the effectiveness of elected officials and this could be undertaken in 
one of the following ways. First, Schedler (2002: 45) claims that tutelage is observed when elected 
officials do not serve their full constitutional term, possibly because of being ousted. Another case in 
which tutelage is observed is when election empowerment is not upheld. Election empowerment is 
when elected officials have the right to govern without being subjected to any formal domains of 
power (Schedler, 2002: 39). The third way in which tutelage is exhibited is when election sovereignty 
is not adhered to. Election sovereignty is when elected officials’ actions through informal channels 
are not subservient to actors outside the decision-making process (Wigell, 2008: 239–240). The 
difference between election empowerment and sovereignty is that empowerment is the possibility of 
constraints using formal channels, while with respect to sovereignty, informal actors constrain the 
ability of elected officials to make decisions.  
 
This study emphasises that while elections and civil liberties can be observed in every hybrid regime, 
it may not be the case for tutelary interference. There is the possibility that tutelage can be experienced 
in a hybrid regime, but it is not present in some hybrid regimes. This study proposes that in a hybrid 
regime that is less competitive and guarantees less civil liberties, there is higher possibility of tutelage. 
Conversely, in a hybrid regime that is highly competitive and adheres to providing civil liberties, the 




The preceding sections have critically discussed the traditional conceptualisation of the hybrid regime 
indicators of elections, civil liberties and tutelary interference. This study proposes one additional 
hybrid regime indicator which is political elite cohesion. The reason for adding this indicator is 
because the relationships among political elites have an impact on how long the hybrid lasts. This 
indicator is deliberated in the next section. 
 
3.4.4 Proposed hybrid regime indicator: Political elite cohesion  
Political elite cohesion is an indicator that seeks to analyse the unity among the key decision-makers 
in a hybrid regime. This indicator is contextual, and can only be analysed on a case by case basis. 
Menocal et al  (2008: 35) stipulate that political elites are important in a hybrid as they are the agents 
of sustainable change and not the masses. It is important to understand the coalition of collective and 
individual actors who are significant in a hybrid as they are responsible for maintaining the regime 
(Mufti, 2018: 116). Political elites maintain the hybrid regime because they seek to perpertuate 
themselves in power by their goals and policies, thus suggeting that the recruitment and selection 
process of political elites is important (Mufti, 2018: 116).   
 
Mufti (2018:116) suggests that future studies should focus on the recruitment and selection of 
political elites. This study, however, chooses to focus on the unity of elected officials. The asumption 
this study makes is that the recruitment and selection process of decision-makers is solved by the 
level of competition that exists in a hybrid regime. If there is stiff competition, there may be a high 
turn-over of elected officials, while low competition entails low turn-over of decision-makers. 
Political elite cohesion could answer questions about why officials agree to enact certain policies and 
reject others. It potentially answers the motivation behind political elites seeking to perpertuate 
themselves in leadership in a hybrid regime. 
 
There are four elements that denote the proposed indicator of political elite cohesion which are 
political elite cooperation, factionalism, prevention of threats from external actors and leadership 
turnover. Political elite cooperation is the working together of the political elites towards a common 
goal of holding power within the incumbent party. High cooperation signifies high political elite 
cohesion while low cooperation indicates low political elite cohesion. Factionalism is the 
disagreement among different political elite groups within the incumbent political party. Political elite 




is internal to the incumbent party. Low levels of factionalism imply that there is strong political elite 
cohesion while high levels of factionalism indicate the possibility of low political elite cohesion. The 
prevention of threats from influential actors is the ability of political elites to thwart the likelihood of 
a coup occuring especially from the military (Cassani, 2012: 6). Low military involvement denotes 
high political elite cohesion while high military involvement within the incumbent party signifies 
lower levels of political elite cohesion. Lastly, leadership turnover refers to the rate at which there is 
leadership renewal of the critical institutes of the incumbent party. Low leadership turnover implies 
high levels of political elite cohesion while high leadership turnover is indicative of low levels of 
political elite cohesion.  
 
Political elite cohesion differs significantly from tutelage. While tutelage focuses on an individual or 
group exerting formal or informal influence over elected officials, political elite cohesion focuses on 
the level of agreement between the elected decision-makers. Where tutelage is present, the cohesion 
of the guardians could be worth exploring as this could possibly cause changes in the hybrid regime. 
However, in this study, political elite cohesion of elected officials is an  indicator that is added to the 
traditional hybrid regime conceptual framework. This study proposes that when political elite 
cohesion is high, the hybrid regime could be durable, but when it is weak there could be instability in 
the hybrid regime. The next section pulls the discussion on hybrid regime indicators together and 
proposes a framework to analyse the hybrid regime for this study. 
 
3.5  Hybrid regime conceptual framework for this study 
This study adopts the hybrid regime indicators suggested by Wigell (2008) and Gilbert and Mohseni 
(2011). To analyse the regime more comprehensively, the study adds political elite cohesion of the 
decision-makers to the traditional hybrid regime indicators. A summary of the conceptual framework 
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Source: Author’s compilation (2019), adapted from (Wigell, 2008; Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011) 
 
In analysing the hybrid regime, it is assumed that the above four indicators of elections, civil liberties, 
tutelary interference and political elite cohesion are present. Hence, these indicators will be used to 
analyse the hybrid regime case for this study. This study focuses on Zimbabwe between 1990 and 
2018, and analyses it as a hybrid regime. Gilbert and Mohseni (2011;294), Vukovic (2011: 10–11), 
Cassani (2012: 22) and Morlino (2009: 284) confirm Zimbabwe to have exhibited qualities of a hybrid 
regime. The hybrid regime conceptual framework developed by this study will be applied to 
Zimbabwe in Chapter Four when this study contextualises Zimbabwe as a hybrid regime between 
1990 and 2018. Equally important, these hybrid regime indicators will be used as inputs in the 





3.6 Durability of the Hybrid regime 
The coexistence of democracy and autocracy in one political regime is a paradox because these two 
political regimes are antagonistic and have different sets of priorities, hence the notion by scholars to 
deliberate on the durability of the hybrid regime. Huntington (1991a: 137) argued that ‘half-way 
house’ political contestations, referring to the hybrid scenario, would not stand the test of time. In 
agreement, Levitsky and Way (2002: 58–59), Epstein et al. (2006: 555) and Vukovic (2011: 12) 
disregard the durability of the hybrid regime. They attest that the hybrid regime is volatile and more 
liable to break down due to the incompatible agendas of democracy and autocracy that cause tension 
within the regime. If a hybrid regime collapses, Cassani (2012: 19, 2014: 554) points out that it is 
more probable for it to democratise than to evolve into an authoritarian regime. 
 
On the contrary, Carothers (2002: 3),  Merkel (2004: 50), Morlino (2009: 282) and  Mufti (2018: 115) 
argue that the hybrid regime shows a lot of resilience and ability to endure over an extended period, 
indicating that the regime is durable. Menocal et al. (2008: 31) attest that the stability and 
sustainability of the hybrid regime differs with each state; it is not uniform or constant. The 
aforementioned authors assert that the hybrid regime is durable without it collapsing into an 
authoritarian regime or evolving into a democracy. Morlino (2009: 284) and Gilbert and Mohseni 
(2011: 294), while they do not take a position in the debate of the hybrid regime’s durability, show 
cases of hybrid regimes that persisted over several years. The cases shown include Sri Lanka, 
Madagascar and Nicaragua, which exhibited the hybrid regime for 19 years. This indicates that the 
hybrid regime has capacity to be sustained for a long period.  
 
This study seeks to contribute to literature on the debate about the durability of the hybrid regime. 
This study agrees with the proposition that hybrid regimes are durable. The durability of the hybrid 
regime is mainly accredited to the presence of democratic institutions that are exploited by the 
incumbent to consolidate their hold on power, thereby extending the lifespan of the regime (Cassani, 
2014: 554). It suggests that the incumbent political elites are influential in maintaining the durability 
of the hybrid regime. This study considers the hybrid regime to be durable because the selected case 
study of Zimbabwe is reflective of being a hybrid regime for 28 years, from 1990 to 2018, showing 
that the regime has the capacity to be sustainable. Chapter Four will contextualise Zimbabwe and 
make inferences from the Zimbabwean case of the factors that possibly explain the durability of the 





This section criticised the various hypotheses that were levied on the hybrid regime being a 
diminished democracy and a diminished authoritarian regime. It developed a hybrid regime 
framework from adopting the frameworks of Wigell (2008) and Gilbert and Mohseni (2011) and 
added political elite cohesion as an additional hybrid regime indicator. This study’s hybrid regime 
framework has four indicators which are elections, civil liberties, tutelary interference and political 
elite cohesion. These hybrid regime indicators will be used to construct the political risk framework 
for analysing the hybrid regime. Lastly, this section briefly discussed the durability of the hybrid 
regime. The section discussed the hybrid regime to give a nuanced understanding of it before making 
any analysis between the hybrid regime and political risk. The next section will focus on the 
relationship between political risk and political regimes.  
 
3.7 Relationship between Hybrid Regime and PRA 
This section critically discusses the relationship between the hybrid regime and PRA. The hybrid 
regime became more pronounced after the third wave of democratisation after 1990, as alluded to by 
Huntington (1991a). However, the relationship between the hybrid regime and PRA precedes the 
third wave. The hybrid regime only became pronounced after the third wave, but some states were 
hybrid regimes even before the occurrence of the third wave.  
 
Green (1974) conducted a foundational study on the relationship between political risk and political 
systems using the political risk factor of radical political change. He made four assumptions for this 
research. First, he selected radical political change as the only political risk factor responding to 
different political regimes. Secondly, he assumed that radical political change was detrimental to 
MNC activities (Green, 1974: 29). Thirdly, for his analysis, he assumed that the younger the political 
regime, the less likely it was to adapt to change, leading to a higher possibility of radical political 
change. Lastly, he assumed that economic modernisation put different political systems under stress, 
so the political institutions in modernising states must either be replaced or changed (Green, 1974: 
31). 
 
Green had seven groups of political systems which he categorised as modernised and modernising 
states. Two political systems were classified as modernised; one was called instrumental-adaptive 
while the other was instrumental non-adaptive. The term instrumental specifically described 




to the needs of the polity (Green, 1974:30). The USA and England were examples of instrumental-
adaptive states, whereas France and Italy were classified as examples for instrumental-nonadaptive 
states. Modern political systems were states that had stable political climates, solid political structures 
and institutions, and were economically developed.  
  
Green (1974: 31) claimed that the modernising group of states were politically unstable, with political 
institutions that were not capable of effectively governing. Due to this factor, the possibility of radical 
political change was imminent in this category of political systems. The modernising group had five 
political systems which were: i) instrumental and quasi-instrumental systems attempting adaptive 
politics, ii) military dictatorships, iii) modernising autocracies, iv) mobilising systems and v) newly 
independent states. The instrumental and quasi-instrumental systems attempting adaptive politics 
were states with advanced economic systems, with solid political infrastructure and institutions. 
Turkey, India and Mexico were examples of this political system. Radical policy change was the 
political risk that could possibly affect foreign investors in this political system. Green (1974: 32) 
claimed that this regime type presented the least risk to foreign investors in the modernising group.  
 
Green (1974: 32) noted that military dictatorships were reflective of a society deeply divided, which 
was an avenue for the possibility of radical political change. Although the military as an institution 
could be viewed as highly disciplined, he cautioned foreign investors to make short-term investments 
in states under military rule. As for modernising autocracies, this group represented a highly 
centralised civilian regime, an economy that was developing, but the rate of growth being controlled 
by the political elite. These were considered politically stable, with the exception of cases where 
political succession was not agreed on before-hand and in the event of political radicals causing a 
revolutionary uprising (Green, 1974: 33–34). The fourth group, called mobilising systems, 
represented a political regime that was heavily controlled, with the leadership being devoted to a 
cause.  Lastly, the newly independent states were those that had just acquired independence and had 
inexperienced leadership. Modernising systems and newly independent states were discussed as the 
most politically unstable destinations for foreign investors with political institutions and 
infrastructure which were relatively underdeveloped  (Green, 1974: 34–35).  
 
Green (1974:35) concluded that the instrumental adaptive and non-adaptive political systems 
presented lower risk to foreign investors. Quasi-instructive, modernising autocracies and military 




systems. Mobilising political systems and newly independent states ascribed foreign investors with 
higher political risk than any other political system. This conclusion can be restated as democratic, 
liberal states presented lower risks to foreign investors than any other political regime type. The level 
of economic development of a country was perceived to influence how the political system would 
respond to radical political change. The more economically developed a country was, the less likely 
it was to be a threat to foreign investment.  
 
Regarding the analysis by Green (1974), the author analysed the political risk factor of radical 
political change against the different political regimes. Green (1974) used a political risk factor that 
is most commonly found in the developing world. Suppose he had used the political risk factor of 
sovereign debt or civil disturbances, which are also commonly reflected in developed countries 
(MIGA, 2011: 18–19), the results may have been different. The conclusion that newly independent 
states were the most politically risky investment destinations is persuasive because the study was 
conducted in 1974, when most developing states were acquiring or had recently acquired 
independence and foreign investors were sceptical about how the new governments would treat 
foreign investors. This foundational study examines the relationship between political risk and 
political regimes; the study moves to discuss other empirical works that focused on this relationship 
to analyse their conclusions.  
 
There was the rise of what was termed the ‘event school of thought’ in the 1980s (Jarvis & Griffiths, 
2007: 14). It did not forecast the potential political risk in a specific state; rather, it provided insights 
into events that could be used to pre-empt political instability or events that derailed modernisation 
(Jarvis & Griffiths, 2007: 14). Foreign investment was conceptualised to originate from developed 
and modernised states which were invested in developing states (Bunn & Mustafaoglu, 1978: 1558). 
The event school acted as an early warning system for foreign investors because by analysing political 
events in modernising fragile states, it informed them of the possibility of harm to their investment. 
 
Political risk was assumed to exist along a spectrum that ranged from high to low and corresponded 
with political systems that were under-developed than those that were developed (Jarvis & Griffiths, 
2007: 15). The degree of political risk reflected the capacity of the state and its political system to: i) 
manage political events, ii) manage competing sectional interest, iii) exercise legitimacy, and iv) 
discharge the functions of statehood in a non-violent, stable orderly and democratic manner (Jarvis 




in non-adaptive political systems.  The event school argued that democratic, liberal and capitalist 
countries presented lower risks to foreign investors than any other political regime type (Jarvis & 
Griffiths, 2007: 15).  This conclusion confirmed what Green (1974) hypothesised as the relationship 
existing between political risk and political regimes. Hence, as suggested by these studies that 
democratic countries had low political risk levels, it influenced PRA to be analysed using norms and 
values adopted from democracy. This study questions whether PRA can be adaptable to using the 
principles of a hybrid regime if democracy declines.  
 
Simon (1984: 127) did not offer a different opinion from the prevailing Western liberal inclination of 
democracy presenting lower political risks than any other regime type. Simon (1984: 127–129) 
claimed that the degree of openness and the stage of economic development determined the possible 
risks that MNCs would encounter. He claimed that industrialised societies did not have a negative 
perception of MNCs as exploitative entities, unlike less developed countries. Simon (1984: 127–130) 
asserted that open-industrialised countries were pro-Western in their foreign policy development, 
hence they did not constitute a serious risk to foreign western investment assets than closed-
developing countries. Thus, Simon (1984) confirmed the claims made by Green (1974) and the event 
school of thought. Noteworthy, investment was largely viewed as originating from developed to 
developing countries before the 1990s. However, in contemporary times, emerging markets which 
are non-democracies, for example, China, Russia and Singapore, are recognised as sources of vast 
foreign investment.  
  
Jensen (2008: 1050), who conducted his study 24 years after Simon (1984), concluded that democracy 
was associated with lower levels of political risk. Jensen (2008: 1041) accredits democratic 
institutions as the reason why democratic countries present lower risks to foreign investors. Jensen 
(2008:1041-1050) claims that it is because democracies constrain the executive arm of government 
so that it does not advance policies that are unfavourable to MNCs. In addition, Jensen (2003: 594, 
2008: 1042) asserts that the leaders in a democracy can suffer from audience costs15 if they retract 
their commitments made on foreign investment. Furthermore, Jensen (2008:1041) states that in 
democracies, the political risk is lower because the policies are stable and MNCs have the potential 
to participate in the drafting of policies. Jensen (2008) validates the claims made by Green (1974), 
Simon (1984) and the event school. The findings of the relationship between political risk and 
 
15Audience costs are the costs generated through the domestic political process, where politicians are punished at the polls 




political regimes have not significantly changed over the course of time. Literature shows an 
inclination that perceives political risk to be lower in democratic countries and higher in anything 
dissimilar to democracy.  
 
Sottilotta (2016: 72–74) suggested that political risk was not political regime neutral. By using the 
political risk factors of political violence and expropriation, Sottilotta (2016) validated the existing 
claims of political risk being low, the higher the level of democracy. Furthermore, while the majority 
of studies mostly grouped all non-democracies in one category, Sottilotta (2016) differentiated 
between non-democracies as authoritarian regime and hybrid regime. The study claimed that 
authoritarian regimes were more stable for foreign investment than hybrid regimes which were 
volatile (Sottilotta, 2016: 72). Although Sottilotta (2016) claimed that the hybrid regime was volatile, 
this study questions whether all hybrid regimes are volatile and if foreign investors perceive it as so 
much of a high risk as to avoid these investment destinations.  
 
This study observes that the relationship between political risk and political regimes has been skewed 
in favour of democracies. Although the focus of this study is on the hybrid regime, it is worth noting 
that democracies are not rid of high political risk, contrary to the findings highlighted by the above 
empirical studies. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (Bremmer & Keat, 2009: xi) and the migration 
crisis and civil disturbances in Greece and the UK (MIGA, 2011: 18–19) are examples of events that 
increased political risk in democratic countries. The attempt by Britain to exit the EU which started 
in 2016, the rise of populist leaders, for example, Donald Trump as President of the USA and the 
USA-China trade war are examples of events in democracies that may increase the political risk for 
a particular group of foreign investors in these countries. Contemporary studies could conduct 
research to validate if it is still applicable to regard democracies as presenting lower risk to foreign 
investors. 
 
In conclusion, the findings hypothesised by Green (1974) of the relationship existing between 
political risk and a hybrid regime were validated by Simon (1984:127), Jensen (2008:1050) and 
Sottilotta (2016:74)  and authors that subscribed to the event school of thought (Jarvis & Griffiths, 
2007: 15). The relationship between political risk and political regimes is summarised in Table 3.3. 
Political risk is hypothesised to increase as the political regime’s categories move from left to right 





Table 3.3: Political regimes and the political risk of radical political change 

















(lower-risk)          (higher-risk) 
 Source: Author’s compilation (2019), based on Green (1974). 
 
This study will not dispute that when political regimes are compared for political risk, the hybrid 
regime has been traditionally ascribed to have higher risk. The study seeks to critically assess if the 
traditional conceptual perceptions of political risk for the hybrid regime are still applicable. By 
answering this question, the study intends to find out if PRA is adaptable to using principles of the 
hybrid regime if, in future, democracy declines. This section discussed the relationship between 
political risk and political regimes to understand what literature proposes as the traditional 
relationship of political risk in a hybrid regime. The next section conceptualises PRA. It begins by 
discussing the decision-making and problem-solving theories as these explain PRA from the point of 
view of the foreign investor or MNC. 
 
3.8 PRA Theory: Decision-Making Theory and Problem-Solving Theory 
The traditional theoretical foundations of PRA are the problem-solving theory and the decision-
making theory. These two theories are applied from the perspective of the foreign investor or MNC. 
The problem-solving theory focuses on framing  the challenges, outlining the goals and developing 
new alternative courses of action to be taken, while decision-making concentrates on evaluating the 
different developed courses of action and thereby selecting the most preferred options (Simon et al, 
1987:17). Hence, these two theories work in a complementary manner. The initial focus of problem-
solving is to begin with a large set of possibilities and then narrow down to a specific focus (Simon 
et al., 1987: 17). In relation to PRA, the MNC is faced with an infinite set of possibilities starting 
with where to invest. Should it expand beyond the boundaries of its home country? If so, which 
specific region or country should it focus on? There is also the question of the length of time for the 




solving is to develop the goals for the organisation. This must be done in consideration of the 
organisation’s capabilities (Simon et al., 1987: 21). This step helps the organisation to narrow down 
challenges from an infinite set to a few specific and concise challenges. Conducting PRA assists the 
organisation to focus on what is core and essential to initiate the process of solving these challenges.  
 
The process of identifying practical solutions to problems is not a simple task because this process 
could create new sets of challenges for the organisation (Brink, 2004: 31). If an MNC decides to 
mitigate risk by adopting a joint venture, this prompts new questions, for example, who can be the 
local partner, for how long and what is the financial contribution of the local partner. In addition, 
defining the problem is not an easy task; an ill-defined problem could cause future problems for the 
organisation. In PRA, if expropriation is forecasted in a specific host country, measures could be 
taken by an MNC to manage this risk factor by purchasing political risk insurance. If the MNC does 
not forecast the potential political risk factor of transfer and inconvertibility and this occurs while it 
could have taken measures to mitigate it earlier, this would be explained as an ill-defined problem.  
 
The third step in problem-solving is the development of alternative courses of action. Multiple options 
are available to solve a single problem, however, these alternatives must be in line with the 
organisation’s acceptable risk level (Vertzberger, 1998: 18). Vertzberger (1998:18) defines 
acceptable risk as the level of risk representing the net costs of probable feasible outcomes that the 
decision-makers perceive as sustainable, given the organisation’s human and financial resources, 
goals, experiences and objectives. When conducting PRA in industry-specific sectors, for example, 
petroleum, mining and natural resource extraction, the MNC must decide its acceptable level of risk 
because the risk for these sectors, from inception, is very high (Simon, 1982: 67; Alon & Herbert, 
2009: 129). Furthermore, the process of developing feasible options needs personnel that have a deep 
appreciation of the history, culture and context of the host country (Brink, 2004: 30).  PRA is country 
contextual; an in-depth understanding of the culture, history and religion of the host country will aid 
the development of practical feasible options. Problem-solving can be viewed as the first step in 
decision-making as it points out the challenges and draws up feasible alternatives, while decision-
making evaluates the alternatives and selects the optimal one.  PRA can be viewed as the initial step 
to foreign investment decisions because it makes apparent the possible problems, which aids decision-





The primary concern of decision-making is to select the most optimal alternative among many. The 
assumptions made by this theory are that the decision-maker is rational, risk-averse and concerned 
with minimising uncertainty while maximising utility (Simon, 1979: 496; Bolan, 2009: 29). This 
means that the decision-maker is assumed to select the feasible option that is most logical and 
maximises the benefits after considering the possible losses. PRA is a practical tool which enables 
management to pursue rational decision-making for companies (Poirier, 1997:676). In PRA, some of 
the factors considered to be MNCs’ constraints are the relationships between the MNC parent 
company and the host country, geographic location, natural resource deposits and the human and 
financial capital constraints of the MNC. 
 
The aim is to maximise the achievement of goals under specified constraints, assuming that all 
consequences are known. Simon et al. (1987: 15) claim that because of uncertainty and incomplete 
information, all the consequences of the options cannot be exhaustively known, however, extensively 
increasing the search for information about each developed alternative reduces the chances of 
incomplete information. This enables decision-makers to judge alternatives against the given 
evidence and rank them accordingly.  In PRA, when incomplete information exists after exhausting 
the possible information sources, decision-makers could delay pursuing the desired option or avoid 
investing in either the specific sector or specific host country. In the end, the optimum option that 
maximises the organisation’s utility, given the capabilities and constraints of the organisation, is 
selected for implementation.   
 
The business environment is dynamic. A problem identified today, over time, may not be considered 
a problem. PRA is a dynamic process; a risk report becomes obsolete the day it is presented because 
it can be overtaken by events in the host country or international arena. Alon, Mitchell and Steen 
(2006: 640) and Lambrechts and Blomquist (2016: 14) assert that it is paramount to continuously 
assess PRA at the firm, national and international level throughout the implementation of the project 
in the host country. This study considers problem-solving and decision-making to theoretically 
explain PRA. This is because problem-solving explains the process of assessing and defining the 
feasible investment options by PRA, while decision-making explains the process of selecting the most 






3.9 Political Risk Analysis 
This section deliberates on the conceptualisation of PRA. It is essential to understand what PRA is 
before the study can analyse if PRA is adaptable to the hybrid regime. The term PRA is inconsistently 
used in literature. PRA is defined as a combination of political risk assessment and political risk 
management (Howell, 1998; Brink, 2004). Mshelia and Anchor (2018) ascribe PRA as equivalent to 
political risk assessment only.  Political risk assessment is concerned with measuring the current and 
future level of political risk in a  host-country or a specific industry16 (Howell, 2014: 308). In addition, 
political risk management are the measures taken to minimise the adverse impact of political risk 
(Bremmer & Keat, 2009: 192). This study agrees with the first conceptualisation of PRA that denotes 
it as the combination of assessment and management of political risk. 
 
Several definitions of what political risk is and should encompass have been coined from the 1960s 
to contemporary times. Literature has two identifiable approaches to grouping the definitions of 
political risk. First,  Lambrechts and Blomquist (2016: 1320–1321) group political risk definitions 
into three categories which are: i) the relationship between government and MNCs (Kobrin, 1979: 
67; Fitzpatrick, 1983: 249; Howell, 1998: 3); ii) the events that are political acts and restrictions 
forced on companies (Fitzpatrick, 1983: 249; De la Torre & Neckar, 1988: 224); and iii) considering 
the whole environment, rather than a single isolated event (Robock, 1971: 7–8). This is the first 
manner of defining political risk. 
 
Secondly, Sottilotta (2016: 7–9) makes reference to five categories which define political risk: i) non-
economic risk (Sethi & Luther, 1986:58);  ii) unwarranted government interference with business 
operations (Chermak, 1992:168); iii) the probability of disruption of MNC operations by political 
events (Brewer, 1981; MIGA, 2011: 21);  iv) discontinuities in the business environment deriving 
from political change, which have the potential to affect the profit or objectives of the firm (Robock, 
1971: 7–8); and v) as equated to political instability and radical political change in the host country 
(Green, 1974: 35). The above definitions have influenced the traditional conceptualisation of political 
risk factors which include confiscation, expropriation, operational restrictions, loss of transfer 
freedom, breach of contract, discrimination of taxes, coups, riots, civil wars, (Robock, 1971: 7–12; 
 
16Macro-political risks are politically motivated changes that affect all foreign firms and domestic firms in a particular 
country (Sethi & Luther, 1986:60). These changes are often sporadic and make changes that are usually more permanent 
(Robock, 1971:9–10). On the other hand, micro-political risks are those that are explicitly focused on a single or few 
firms in a specific industry so that the targeted firm(s) contribute to some national programme or socio-economic activity 




Lloyd, 1974; Bunn & Mustafaoglu, 1978: 1558). The traditional conceptualisation of political risk is 
correct; however, political risk has evolved to be more complex, making the traditional 
conceptualisation alone limiting. Before this study conceptualises how it regards PRA, the following 
section will discuss the factors that influenced the traditional conceptualisation of PRA. Thereafter, 
the subsequent section discusses the factors that have influenced changes in PRA conceptualisation 
in contemporary times. 
 
3.9.1 Factors that influenced the traditional conceptualisation of Political Risk Analysis 
PRA research historically began in the period between 1960 and the early 1970s. In 1973, OPEC 
implemented an oil embargo limiting its supply of crude oil, which increased the market price of oil. 
OPEC used the embargo to leverage political interests (Simon, 1982: 65). As a result, investors 
realised that political factors had an impact on market performance. Furthermore, the massive 
expropriations and nationalisation of foreign investments in Cuba (1959), Chile (1972) and the 
Iranian revolution (1978-9) were caused by political factors (Kobrin, 1981: 252; Simon, 1982: 63; 
Sethi & Luther, 1986: 58; De la Torre & Neckar, 1988: 221; Alon & Martin, 1998: 10; Jarvis & 
Griffiths, 2007: 7). These events were the key drivers for the initial research and interest in political 
risk and PRA insurance coverage. These events influenced the conceptualisation of political risk 
factors such as expropriation, nationalisation, transfer and convertibility restrictions, and breach of 
contract. This conceptualisation was relevant in this period. 
 
The events covered by political risk insurance are argued by this study to have shaped the traditional 
conceptualisation of PRA. There was an increase in private and public companies providing 
coverage17 for political risk after the oil crisis and the Iranian revolution (Simon, 1982: 66). Lloyd 
(1974:31) and MIGA (2010: 19) stipulate that political risk insurance covers: i) expropriation, 
nationalisation and confiscation; ii) political violence, war, and revolution; iii) breach of contract and 
violations of any contractual agreements with the contractor of licences and concessions; and iv) 
transfer risks, and either the prevention of, or the delay in repatriation of capital. During the period 
1960-1979, 560 foreign assets were expropriated in developing states, which was 4.4% of the 
developing states’ FDI stock (MIGA, 2011: 30). In addition,  an estimated 15.2% of the value of USA 
FDI abroad was nationalised (MIGA, 2011: 30). Therefore, it was persuasive to conceptualise PRA 
 
17Political risk insurance is a type of insurance that can be taken out by businesses of any size against political risk in the 
event of any politically motivated risk. Examples of insurance companies that provide political risk cover are American 
International Group (AIG), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) of WB, Overseas Private Investment 




as the effects covered by insurance companies. This conceptualisation was applicable during this era. 
It is, however, acute, narrow and limiting to only consider this conceptualisation in contemporary 
times. 
 
This study contends that the ‘event school of thought’ was a factor that shaped the traditional  
conceptualisations of PRA (Jarvis & Griffiths, 2007: 14). The event school was not a forecasting tool, 
but it analysed how certain events could potentially cause political instability. Bunn and Mustafaoglu 
(1978: 1558), who subscribed to the event school, developed ten event categories that were assumed 
to have significant implications for foreign investment originating from developed and modernised 
states who invested in developing states. The ten political risk events were: sudden expropriation, 
creeping expropriation, adverse tax changes, civil disorder, war, production restrictions, repatriation 
limitations, domestic price controls, devaluation risk and export restrictions. These events were then 
linked to the probability of certain political risk factors occurring and were suggested to be derived 
from modernising fragile states. The event school and the events covered by political risk insurance 
had a similar impact on PRA conceptualisation. 
 
When PRA started, trade was overwhelmingly perceived to flow in one direction, from the developed 
to developing and underdeveloped states. Developing states were a source of primary raw materials, 
for example, crude oil and minerals, whereas developed countries were the suppliers of finished 
products and services. This led to the perception that PRA was demanded by Western MNCs 
conducting business in overseas developing countries (Robock 1971:6; Lloyd 1974:24; Desta 1985).  
Developing countries with abundant natural resources needed more PRA than countries with less 
factor endowment. This influenced political risk factors such as nationalisation, transfer and 
convertibility restrictions and civil unrest, which caused the destruction of plant and oil pipelines 
which was applicable in this period. This conceptualisation implied that developed states were a safe 
destination for capital.  
 
PRA was influenced by liberal democratic principles which caused it to be analysed using a Western 
liberal democratic lens. The Economist Intelligent Unit (EIU), Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence (BERI) and Political Risk Services (PRS)18 were among the leading political risk 
forecasting companies at the time political risk gained relevance. In their PRA forecasts, the risk 
factors included reflected how PRA was inclined to have democratic elements. Factors given by the 
 




EIU were, for example, generals in power, authoritarian tendencies, staleness, religious 
fundamentalism and illegitimacy; if these were present in a country, the political risk ascribed would 
be high (Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 76–78). Nevertheless, authoritarianism and staleness could 
probably provide a predictable environment for foreign investors for a lengthy period. The EIU 
perceived the lack of democracy in a state as undesirable, which increased the political risk rating of 
a country (Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 76). Countries with higher democratic levels received  more 
positive scores from BERI (Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 80–81). Thus, states with strong institutions 
had minimum possibilities of violence occurring, had no military involved in politics or dependant 
on a perceived hostile power and were perceived to have less political risk and better for foreign 
investors. These countries typified democracies. Studies conducted in this era validated that 
democratic liberal states were perceived as presenting lower risks to foreign investors than any other 
political regime (Green, 1974: 35; Simon, 1984: 128). It also implied that non-democratic regimes 
needed more PRA analysis than democracies. 
 
The inception of PRA was also contextualised during the Cold war19 period between the USA and 
the Soviet Union, which were the two global super-powers. The Soviet Union stood for communism 
and its expansion in the Eastern bloc of Europe, while the USA stood for democracy and capitalism 
(Huntington, 1991b: 22–23). The USA and Western Europe were strategically aligned to curb the 
expansion of communism globally. Geo-politically, the world was strategically divided into aligning 
with the USA or Soviet Union. Newly independent states commonly aligned with their former 
colonisers. The effect of the Cold war on PRA was that an analyst, in conducting PRA for a host 
country, had to consider alliances. If the foreign investor was not strategically aligned with the super-
power that the host country was aligned to, the investor could be exposed to a higher level of political 
risk.  
 
Most developing states had acquired independence by 1970 (United States of America State 
Department, 2018), which impacted on PRA conceptualisation. Newly independent states exhibited 
similar characteristics- they had developing economies and faced internal problems that were the 
result of their colonial past (United States of America State Department, 2018). A few developing 
states were still under colonial rule during the 1970s. This backdrop influenced political risk in newly 
independent states to include political risk factors such as war, civil strife, riots, political instability, 
 
19Cold war is a state of political hostility between countries, characterised by threats, propaganda and other measures 
short of open warfare. It was dependent on the military industrial complex of each super-power, the aggressive 




potential radical political change and unfavourable policies for foreign investment (Green, 1974: 35). 
The forecasting of PRA for newly independent states followed a precautious trajectory in this period.  
 
This section discussed the context in which PRA emerged and the major factors that influenced its 
traditional conceptualisation. Nevertheless, this traditional conceptualisation cannot fully explain 
PRA in contemporary times. The next section suggests factors that need to be considered to have a 
better understanding of PRA in contemporary times. 
 
3.9.2 Factors that influenced changes in PRA conceptualisation in contemporary times 
The environment shaping PRA in contemporary times is significantly different from when PRA was 
traditionally conceptualised. Developing states have become less protectionist, so as to compete for 
FDI  (Bremmer & Keat, 2009: 124). Furthermore, the perception that political risk is demanded by 
foreign investors from developing states is heavily contestable as some states that were developing 
in the 1980s are now emerging markets and sources of FDI, for example, Singapore, China and Brazil. 
In addition, cases of open hostility resulting in war have reduced in contemporary times compared to 
the 1970s when colonisation was ending, which is a shift in the environment that shaped PRA 
conceptualisation. Also, the number of countries that are administered under military rule has 
significantly reduced from the 1980s.  
 
PRA studies declined between the early 1980s and the end of the 1990s, then increased in the 21st 
century (Venter, 1999). In the 1980s,  there were few studies of political risk; government intervention  
was perceived to be the major political risk that could negatively impact on foreign investment 
(Chermak, 1992: 167). The demand for PRA declined, possibly because foreign investors became 
more cautious in the 1980s after the expropriations that occurred during the 1970s20. Lambrechts, 
Weldon and Boshoff (2011: 108) claim that PRA declined due to the narrow conceptualisation of 
PRA which had not transformed with globalisation and the changing needs of the world, as well as 
the inaccurate PRA forecasts that had occurred. Notably, geo-politically, the cold war ended, which 
meant that after the 1990s, the USA was the only global super-power. The terrorist attacks on the 
 
20Expropriation and nationalisation of foreign assets in developing countries, 1960-1979 were 560; 1980-1986 only 16; 




USA of September 11, 200121 increased uncertainty and insecurity globally and acted as the main 
catalyst in reviving the interest and need for PRA studies.  
 
Terrorism was not included in the traditional conceptualisations of PRA. Traditionally, government 
actions and policies were perceived as the major drivers of political risk. The 2001 September 11 
terrorist attacks in the USA significantly changed the conventional business risks and the perception 
that government was the main actor of political risk in the 21st century. The influence of non-state 
actors, either as individuals or groups, as significant agents of political risk must be included in 
political risk conceptualisation. Boko Haram, ISIL, Al-Shabaab and Taliban have been the four 
deadliest terrorist groups between 1998 and 2017 (Institute for Economics and Peace, (2018: 15). 
There has been a rise in politically motivated terrorism, which has impacted on political risk 
(Bremmer & Keat, 2009).  The USA and Western European countries were the initial targets for 
terrorist attacks, nevertheless, these attacks have spread to other states that are perceived to be allies 
of the West. Terrorist attacks have occurred in Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and 
Somalia (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2017).  
 
Terrorist attacks may not be as devastating as adverse government policy on MNCs operations, but 
if an attack occurs, it could potentially be costly for the MNCs. Unlike states, MNCs and foreign 
investors cannot organise counter-terrorism methods, however, they can prepare for the possibility of 
terrorist attacks by ensuring they have proper evacuation procedures. In addition, foreign investors 
operating in possible terrorist hot spots can get advice before commencing work in these regions. 
Thus, in contemporary times, PRA must consider the political risk factor of terrorism and how it 
affects foreign investors for their businesses to prosper. Terrorist attacks disrupt business operations, 
destroy infrastructure and at times involve kidnapping of  key personnel (Bremmer & Keat, 2009: 
10).  Terrorism has been listed as one of the top ten political risk factors for foreign investors in 
developing countries (MIGA, 2012: 27). 
 
Another factor that has changed political risk conceptualisation is the rise of China in attempting to 
provide global leadership. After the cold war, the USA was the only global super-power. The USA 
 
21The terrorist attacks are commonly known as 9/11. This was a series of coordinated terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda in the 
USA. The attacks focused on crashing airplanes into the World trade centre, the twin towers, the pentagon and one targeted 
at Washington D.C but crashed at Stonycreek Township. The 9/11 attacks cost damages worth over USD2 trillion of 
infrastructure, lives and production. In addition, 2996 people were killed and over 6000 injured (Institute for the Analysis 




has lacked political will and has been reluctant to provide global leadership that ensures global 
security (Bremmer & Keat, 2009: xiii). This has created a vacuum in global leadership. The USA, 
under the Trump administration in 2017, sought to focus on an independent ‘America first’ policy, 
which further deteriorated its will to provide global leadership (Bremmer & Kupchan, 2017: 3). This 
deterioration of the USA’s influence globally has given China an opportunity to rise and attempt to 
competently offer global leadership. 
 
China economically sought to assert its presence regionally first and then globally (Bremmer & 
Kupchan, 2017: 2). China developed the Silk Road Economic Belt, known as the One Belt, One Road 
initiative, which started in 2013. The initiative builds railways connecting China by land to Asia, 
Europe and Africa. The project involves 65 countries, covering approximately 4.4 billion people of 
the world’s population. This shows the strides China has been taking in connecting itself globally 
(Tunningley, Eva, Trickett & Lin, 2018: 4). In 2017, after asserting its presence economically, China 
was bold in proclaiming its intentions to provide an alternative development model for states and 
offering global leadership. China has grown to a level comparable to the USA in trade and artificial 
intelligence, however, the USA exceeds China in its investment in security  (Bremmer & Kupchan, 
2018: 4–5). The USA has responded by attempting to curb Chinese influence globally. In 2019, the 
USA introduced tariffs exclusively for Chinese goods and services and China retaliated by also 
introducing tariffs for USA products22. Although this is still unfolding, the USA-China trade war 
potentially affects the political risk of MNCs that originate from these two countries and are 
geographically operating in the other’s country. 
  
The rise of China as an alternative leader is significant to political risk conceptualisation. China and 
the USA operate on different sets of rules and there is a high possibility of conflict occurring between 
them, which is not linked to artificial intelligence or trade. The Chinese model significantly 
challenges how conventional business has been conducted. The democracy-capitalist model 
demanded economic and political reforms to be implemented in countries that sought trade with 
developed countries. In contrast, the Chinese state-led model emphasises non-interference with other 
states’ affairs, which is appealing to some states (Bremmer & Kupchan, 2018: 3–4). The conflict 
between the USA and China may spill over to countries that are aligned to these two countries in 
Asia. Japan, India and South Korea are aligned to the democracy-capitalist model  offered by the 
 
22US-China trade war: Total USA tariffs applied exclusively to Chinese goods: USD250 billion. Total Chinese tariffs 




USA (Bremmer & Kupchan, 2018: 4). However, the ‘America first’ policy adversely impacts on the 
USA’s Asian allies to either continue to be aligned or to shift and be aligned to China for their 
security.  Globally, states will, in times to come, be forced to align with either the USA (democracy-
capitalist model) or with China (state-led capitalism). Foreign investors must be cognisant of this 
USA-China conflict as it impacts on decisions of where to invest, how much to invest and for how 
long.  PRA will have to consider the nationality of the investor and factor in which super-power the 
host country is aligned to, to best advise foreign investors. 
 
The threats posed to foreign investors due to the growth in Information, Communication and 
Technology (ICT) and the use of the internet should be included in PRA conceptualisations. 
Fundamental operations are linked to cyberspace, for example, marketing, communication, aviation, 
tourism, broadcasting  and critical infrastructure such as energy, public transport, electricity and water 
networks (Sottilotta, 2016:129). Cybercrime, cyber terrorism and cyber warfare23 conducted by 
governments, organised non-state actors24 and individuals pose challenges to MNCs of any size. Risk 
management companies, for example, WorldAware, EIU and S-RM, offer foreign investors a detailed 
cybersecurity risk assessment for a fee. For a cyber-attack to be classified as a political risk, it should 
be politically motivated25. MNCs should consider the political risk of cyber-attacks and take pro-
active measures that insulate it from these attacks. This can be achieved by having an up to date 
antivirus, data protection methods, as well as imposing tighter controls over access and storage of 
information, which limits the loss of classified information, trade secrets and hacking. Traditional 
conceptualisation of PRA did not consider cyber threats. 
 
PRA traditionally did not consider the threat of foreign investment caused by health pandemics 
because for a factor to qualify as a political risk, the action or decision must be politically motivated 
(Lax, 1983: 9), while the effect of the decision or actions could be experienced in any sector. 
Infectious diseases, for example, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis (TB), Ebola and the Zika Virus pose 
 
23Cyber relates to electronic communication networks and virtual reality. Cyber-crime are criminal activities conducted 
using the internet (which include hacking, phishing, spamming); specifically, MNCs are more protective of losing 
personal information, fraud and business trade secrets. Cyber terrorism is the use of ICT to propagate fear and violence 
to achieve a political objective. Cyber warfare is the use of computer technology to disrupt the activities of a country, 
especially the deliberate attacking of information systems for strategic or military purposes. 
24Examples of cyber acts in history are the Panama paper leaks, NSA document leaks by Edward Snowden, Russia 
attacking Estonia following the removal of a Soviet-era memorial from Tallinn, Israel and USA derailing the Iran nuclear 
programme, NASDAQ financial attack, Qatar oil and gas attack; in 2002 Saudi Arabia oil company Aramco was hacked 
for Saudi Arabia’s misdeeds in Syria and Bahrain (Sottilotta, 2016:129). 
25 Cyberattacks to critical infrastructure may be conducted for non-political reasons. However, for it to qualify under 




serious threats to MNCs in the areas that these diseases have a high prevalence rate. A health 
pandemic becomes a possible political risk factor when the host-government affected by the pandemic 
does not adequately contain the disease when it has the capacity to do so. This leads to the possibility 
of the pandemic spreading within the host-country and across the country’s borders. Hence, in such 
cases, conceptualising PRA could include the threat of health pandemics. Depending on the disease 
prevalence rate, the MNC could be forced to implement measures that assist in mitigating the burden 
of the health pandemic in the host country.  
 
Extreme weather patterns in the form of cyclones, earthquakes, droughts and forest fires are factors 
that have not been considered in PRA conceptualisation.  Extreme weather patterns are not politically 
motivated, however, when they occur, the costs of interrupted production, distribution, sales and 
travel are very high (Control Risks, 2019). Extreme weather patterns were forecasted by Control 
Risks as the third highest risk for 2019.  Each country has an early warning system to detect the 
occurrence of extreme weather patterns, for example, a cyclone. For this factor to qualify as a political 
risk, the host government, after detecting the possible harsh weather condition, fails to either 
implement an evacuation of the site that could be most affected, or fails to look for assistance 
beforehand in order to preserve lives and infrastructure. At times, MNCs could be compelled to assist 
the host-state in recovering from a devastating natural disaster. For example, an MNC could assist in 
road construction after a cyclone to restore accessibility to its plant. Therefore, PRA 
conceptualisation, according to this study, should consider natural disasters. 
 
The use of cryptocurrency26 is a development that could impact on PRA conceptualisation. 
Cryptocurrency is a decentralised system, independent of any central bank, which uses blockchain 
technology. The system is secure, allows for anonymity, is easily accessible and available, and the 
transactions bypass state-mandated transfer systems (Till, Peters, Afshar & Meara, 2017: 2; Yu, 2018: 
8). Blockchain technology is being tested by various industries which include banking, minerals, 
mining and food procurement27, and is still being considered as a healthy financing method  (Till et 
al., 2017: 1). A total of 75 major banks participated in a project that was embracing this technology 
because it potentially reduces intra-organisation transaction costs and increases efficiency (Niforos, 
 
26Cryptocurrency is digital money that uses encryption techniques. It uses a peer-to-peer network where users interact 
directly with no intermediary and every transaction is recorded. Bitcoin was the first cryptocurrency created in 2009, 
several others have since been created, for example, Ethereum, Litecoin, Ripple (Niforos, 2017: 1; Petraitis, 2017: 5–7; 
Till et al., 2017). 
27The World Food Programme conducted a pilot test of blockchain financial transfers to 10 000 Syrian refugees which 




2017: 2). Different governments have responded differently to cryptocurrencies as this financial 
system has no central coordination28. 
 
There are various evolving political risks due to the usage of cryptocurrency. First, there is a high 
possibility of hacking that could lead MNCs to be defrauded. Secondly, the use of digital money, 
which the government cannot control or apply regulations to, could potentially reduce the amount of 
revenue available for the government to tax. As a result, there is the potential for the host country to 
increase the amount of tax they collect from MNCs to make up for the low tax revenues. Thirdly, the 
coin prices are driven by speculation; negative speculation lowers the price of the coin. This could 
potentially lead to instability in the states with many cryptocurrency investors in times when the coin 
prices are depressed. The impact of cryptocurrencies on the political risk of foreign investment is an 
evolving concept, one that could influence PRA conceptualisation in the future.  
 
This section discussed changes in the contextual environment of PRA because the changes have 
influenced the contemporary conceptualisation of PRA.  
 
3.9.3 Conceptualisation of Political risk, PRA and Political risk factors 
This section conceptualises the terms political risk and PRA as they will be regarded by this study. It 
also discusses a few political risk factors that will be used in the construction of the political risk 
conceptual framework for analysing hybrid regimes. Political risk is a concept rooted in risk analysis.  
Kobrin (1979:70), Friedmann and Kim (1988:64), Frynas and Mellahi (2003:545), and Bremmer and 
Keat (2009:5) define a ‘risk’ as the probability of incurring a loss. This definition implies that risk is 
measurable because the probability of the outcomes occurring is calculated. Risk is generally 
negatively perceived. Nevertheless, the outcomes of the risk could have a positive impact on an 
investment. Therefore, investors must have a neutral position on risk because the outcomes from risk 
could, in some cases, end up being either positive or negative (De la Torre & Neckar, 1988: 168; 
Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 72; Alon & Herbert, 2009: 130). This study focuses on one type of risk, 
political risk. 
 
28The Indian government legalised cryptocurrency usage, but the Ministry of Finance and the Central bank contested the 
move (Niforos, 2017: 2). Russia is considering using cryptocurrencies. The UK tasked the monetary system to monitor 
how the development affects them (The UK News, 2014). China banned Bitcoin in 2017, but maintains a positive outlook 
on how to regulate the cryptocurrency(Yu, 2018). Venezuela is considering having an oil-based cryptocurrency to 




Simon (1982:68) defines political risk as, “governmental or societal actions and policies originating 
from either within or outside the host country and negatively affecting either a select group of, or the 
majority of, foreign business operations and investments.” This definition demarcates the difference 
between micro-political risk (a select group of) and macro-political risk (the majority of). The 
definition also recognises that different actors within the society, for example, minority, separatist 
and terrorist groups have a bearing on influencing the political risk of a country. Another definition 
by Sottilotta (2016: 10) defines political risk as: 
The probability that the profitability of an investment will be negatively affected by 
circumstances ascribable either to adverse unforeseen changes (e.g. revolutions, even when 
linked to democratisation processes, or the outbreak of tribal ethnic conflict) in the domestic 
or international political arena, or to governmental policy choices affecting the international 
investor’s property rights. 
This definition acknowledges that adverse unforeseen changes could potentially affect foreign 
investors property rights. In addition, Sottilotta (2016: 10) regards political risk as quantifiable when 
calculating risk as a probability of an event occuring. This study considers the comprehensive 
conceptualisation of Simon (1982: 68) and Sottilotta (2017: 10) and conceptualises political risk as 
the probability that government decisions and diverse societal actions, emanating in the domestic or 
international environment affect a foreign investment with respect to a specific project, firm, industry 
or the whole country. 
 
Political risk actors can be the governments, individuals and organised or unorganised non-state 
groups. Due to globalisation, growth in ICTs and migration, governments are no longer the only major 
actors that can make decisions or take actions that induce political risks. Although political risk is 
negative, there are opportunities that could arise from political risks. For example, suppose the 
government imposes a politically induced high tax threshold for foreign investors and MNCs 
operating in that host-country, some investors may decide to leave, while others continue operations. 
The investors that stay could have an increased market share. 
 
Traditionally, political risk was perceived to be calculated for foreign investors and MNCs operating 
in a host country (Kobrin, 1979: 71; Simon, 1982: 66; Sethi & Luther, 1986: 60; De la Torre & 
Neckar, 1988).. Regarding domestic firms, this study recognises that domestic firms get preferential 
treatment by their governments, hence the potential political risks could be minimal. Nevertheless, 
domestic firms are not  exempted from experiencing political risk factors, for example, riots, 




Blomquist, 2016: 1).  This study focuses only on the political risk to foreign investors and excludes 
domestic firms in analysing political risk in a hybrid regime.  
 
In conceptualising PRA, it is pertinent to understand risk analysis. Howell (1998: 5) and Parsons 
Transportation Group, Touran & Golder Associates (2004: 10) assert that risk analysis is the 
identification and evaluation of possible threats and opportunities and the effective management 
thereof. Brink (2002: 25) proposes that an analysis denotes historic, current and future investigations 
aimed at interpreting something in terms of its effects. Based on these two definitions of risk analysis, 
this study conceptualises PRA as the forecasting and management of how government decisions and 
diverse societal actions, emanating from the domestic or international environment, affect a foreign 
investment with respect to a specific project, firm, industry or the whole country. 
 
Poirier (1997: 676) claims that PRA is a practical tool which enables management to pursue rational 
decision-making for companies.  This study agrees with the claims made by Poirier (1997) because 
PRA, identifies current and, possibly, future political risks. By identifying these political risks, MNCs 
and foreign investors can develop strategies of how to solve or manage these risks. After strategies 
are developed, they can be ranked, then management can select the optimal option. PRA is an analysis 
tool that gives a snapshot of the current of the political threats and opportunities that arise form a 
given case. PRA allows a company to map out a strategy that provides an overview of what 
management can expect and how to overcome the challenges. This shows that PRA is a practical tool 
that assists management.   
 
Scenario analysis, prediction, political prophecy and forecasting are concepts that are used within the 
context of forecasting PRA. Scenario analysis is the formulation of possible political and economic 
pathways that a country can take over a long period. Scenario analysis assists decision makers to 
anticipate problems, formulate their solutions, uncover strategic options and opportunities which they 
may not have imagined (Bremmer & Keat, 2009: 26). It allows decision makers to understand the 
key drivers and underlying motives between cause and effect which causes shifts in the business 
environment (Sottilotta, 2017: 100). However, the input process is highly subjective to the initial 
information given. This study will not be undertaking a scenario analysis of political risk in 






Predict and forecast both imply future perspectives however, they are not interchangeably used in 
risk analysis. A prediction is foretelling and prescribing with finality that a certain future event will 
happen (Brink, 2002: 25). The basis of coming up with a prediction is vague, and the statement is 
issued with certainty that what is said will happen. Predicting is similar to political prophecy, which 
is when one foretells possible political outcomes.   On the other hand, a forecast is probable in nature 
and is estimated based on a rational foundation before coming up with the projected likelihood of an 
event happening (Brink, 2002: 25). A forecast is not final, it is provisional and fallible nevertheless, 
it is estimated and derived using far better methods than a prediction (Sottilotta, 2017: 39). A 
prediction is much easier to discard than a forecast. This study is not conducting a forecast or future 
study analysis, rather it aims to analyse PRA in Zimbabwe. This will result in giving an analysis of 
PRA as a snapshot of the given period.  
 
PRA is analysed using political risk factors. Political risk factors are important because these are 
some of the ways political risk is experienced by foreign investors. Bunn and Mustafaoglu (1978: 
1558-9) define a political risk factor as any set of circumstances that, if they occur, influence a foreign 
venture negatively. MIGA (2012: 21;27) shortlists ten political risk factors29 of most concern to 
investors in developing countries in order of greatest to least concern as: adverse regulatory changes, 
breach of contract, transfer and convertibility restrictions, civil disturbances, non-honouring 
government guarantees, expropriation/nationalisation, terrorism and war. From this list by MIGA 
(2012), this study selects the following political risk factors: adverse regulatory changes, breach of 
contract, transfer and convertibility restrictions, expropriation, creeping expropriation,30 and 
nationalisation. This study proposes that these political risk factors may have been of more concern 
to foreign investors in the relevant case study of Zimbabwe, hence the reason for choosing to 
conceptualise them31. These political risk factors will also be included in the political risk framework 
for this study, discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
Adverse regulatory changes are defined by MIGA (2011: 21) as, “Risk of losses for foreign investors 
stemming from arbitrary changes to regulations.” These regulatory changes include sector-specific 
 
29Traditional political risk factors include confiscation, expropriation, operational restrictions, loss of transfer freedom, 
breach of contract, discrimination of taxes, coups, riots, civil wars (Robock, 1971: 7–12; Lloyd, 1974; Bunn & 
Mustafaoglu, 1978: 1558). 
30Creeping expropriation is not stated explicitly in the MIGA 2012 report, but it is important to define as it is a type of 
expropriation that has been on the increase worldwide (Bremmer & Keat, 2009: 125). 
31Terrorism was excluded because Zimbabwe has a low Global terrorism index, with a lowest of 0.2 in 2016 and a highest 
of 3.74 in 2002 on a scale of 0-10, with 10 being a high threat (Trading Economics, 2019c).The last war in Zimbabwe 




regulatory pressures, new regulations, frequent changes in regulations, and new regulatory oversight 
bodies which are specifically aimed at foreign entities. This factor is motivated by the need for the 
host government to have control over strategic sectors, as well as the need to increase revenue 
collected from foreign investors.  
 
The political risk factor contract repudiation32 is defined by  Howell (1998: 4) and (Lloyd, 1974: 14) 
as a loss that results from the government unilaterally terminating or revising a contract without 
compensation for existing investment in the project or service. Contract repudiation is possible if the 
goals of the host government have changed and possibly when there is a new government in power 
(Lloyd, 1974: 14). It is a technique for the government to increase revenue, especially in the case of 
depletable natural resources. Breach of contract is covered by political risk insurance from public, 
private and multilateral insurers. 
 
Comeaux and Kinsella  (1997: 3) define the political risk of expropriation as “the taking by a host 
state of property owned by an investor and located in the host state ostensibly for a public purpose”. 
It is legal under international law, to expropriate foreign-owned businesses, given three conditions 
are satisfied: non-discrimination of foreign enterprises, public usage of the expropriated property and 
full compensation by the host government; however, if one of these conditions is not satisfied, the 
expropriation is illegal (Lloyd, 1974:27; Brink, 2004:18). International law grants legality of 
expropriation only to foreign-owned businesses, however, if a host government expropriates against 
its domestic firms, international law is silent.  
 
The political risk factor of creeping expropriation is a subtle type of expropriation. Robock (1971:13) 
and Comeaux and Kinsella (1997: 8) define creeping expropriation as restrictive government actions 
that steadily and gradually curtail the freedom of management operations in a foreign investment, 
making it difficult to continue in business operating at a profit. Creeping expropriation cases are more 
prevalent after 2000 than the direct seizure of companies (Brink, 2004; Bremmer & Keat, 2009). Not 
every regulation can be classified as creeping33 expropriation. It must substantially be discriminatory 
against foreign businesses, be difficult to anticipate and constrain their profitability to qualify as 
indirect expropriation under political risk (Robock, 1971: 8). Comeaux and  Kinsella (1997: 8), 
 
32‘Breach of contract’ is also referred to as ‘contract frustration’ or ‘contract repudiation’ or ‘unilateral revisions in 
contracts and agreements’ 
33It can include harsh regulation increases in tax, a high minimum wage, price controls, import and export restrictions, 




Bremmer and Keat (2009: 124) and Sottilotta (2016: 14) argue that creeping expropriation is 
specifically targeted at foreign enterprises because host governments seek to increase the revenue 
they receive from a foreign entity while allowing it to continue operating without damaging the 
economy. In extreme cases, the aim of creeping expropriation is to force the foreign-owned company 
to sell or abandon the project to the government or to domestic private investment.  
 
Transfer and convertibility restrictions is another political risk factor that the study will discuss. These 
are losses resulting from a host government preventing the conversion of the local currency to some 
form of foreign exchange for transfer outside the host country due to foreign exchange regulations or 
physical barriers (Howell, 1998: 4). However, devaluation of the local currency is not accounted for 
under this type of political risk factor (MIGA, 2011: 21). Jensen (2008: 4) notes that foreign exchange 
restrictions are usually implemented after the initial capital outlay of major projects have been 
invested in a host country. This can be implemented to address capital flight within a country or to 
solve some macroeconomic challenges of the host government. 
 
Lastly, this section discusses the political risk factor of nationalisation. Lloyd (1974: 24) and 
Comeaux and Kinsella (1997: 8) define nationalisation as a general policy which brings a whole 
sector of the economy under state ownership to advance social or economic reforms, usually without 
compensation. Nationalisation involves a whole industry becoming the sole prerogative of the 
government to provide, for example, oil and gas, banking, and the power supply sectors being under 
public management. Recorded nationalisations have significantly reduced; however, resource 
nationalisation is more observable. Resource nationalisation is the tendency of host governments to 
exert control over the natural resources endowed in its location. Resource nationalisation is more 
prevalent in the oil and gas, mining and natural resource extraction sectors (Simon, 1982; Alon & 
Herbert, 2009: 129; MIGA, 2011).   
 
This section highlighted factors that were traditionally not accounted for in PRA conceptualisation. 
It discussed the need to include the threat of terrorism, the rise of China as a potential super-power, 
the increased dependency and usage of ICTs which are prone to cyber-attacks, the threat of infectious 
diseases and the devastation caused by extreme weather patterns as factors that should be considered 
in the contemporary conceptualisation of PRA. The use of cryptocurrencies was highlighted as a 
possible future potential political risk factor. Political risk, PRA and six political risk factors were 
conceptualised. The political risk factors of adverse regulatory changes, breach of contract, transfer 




discussed. These political risk factors will be used in the construction of the political risk framework 
for analysing hybrid regimes that is presented in the next section.  
 
3.10 Political risk conceptual framework for the hybrid regime  
This section develops a political risk conceptual framework that will be used to analyse PRA in a 
hybrid regime. This study will hypothesise as literature has stated that the relationship between 
political risk and a hybrid regime is inversely correlated. Thus, being a hybrid regime increases the 
potential political risk. To construct the conceptual framework to analyse this hypothesis, this study 
will draw on factors highlighted by Green (1974), Jensen (2003, 2008), Berlin et al. (2004) and Jarvis 
and Griffiths (2007).  The indicators of the hybrid regime framework discussed in Section 3.5 and 
some of the political risk factors typically identified for hybrid regimes are discussed in Section 3.9 
are also used as inputs in the construction of this framework.  
 
The political risk framework for the hybrid regime has three categories: i) political structure and 
political institutions, ii) political stability, and iii) economic development. Political structure and 
institutions focus on the governance within the hybrid regime. First, the hybrid regime indicator of 
elections is selected by this study. Elections will be analysed with regards to how they are conducted, 
the political environment and the outcomes in relation to political risk. Elections that are not free, not 
fair, uncompetitive, irregular, violent and contested are expected to increase the potential political 
risk to foreign investment and vice versa. Secondly, the political risk factor of legitimacy is 
considered in this framework under political structure and institutions. Legitimacy is the wilful 
acceptance of the government by the citizens, thus the government exercises authority over the 
citizens through mutual consent and not through coercion (Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 78). The 
legitimacy of the leadership of the state is considered as paramount to influencing political risk as 
alluded to by Berlin et al., (2004: 4) and Jarvis and Griffiths (2007: 15). Illegitimacy of a regime 
points towards problems of accepting a government's position in power (Venter, 1999: 75). 
Illegitimacy of the state’s leadership is expected to increase the associated political risk to foreign 
investors. Thirdly, the degree to which state institutions can effectively discharge their duties without 
political influence is another factor that will be included in the construction of the conceptual 
framework. It is expected that weak state institutions increase PRA. Strict adherence to the law is the 
last factor that is considered under political structure and institutions. A judiciary that is partial and 





Political stability is the second category in the conceptual framework. It measures the extent to which 
a predictable political environment could have a bearing on PRA. Factors that could cause instability 
in the political environment are selected in this category. The level of corruption in a society is one 
element this study selects to include, as suggested by Berlin et al. (2004: 4). This is because foreign 
investors are also concerned about the level of public corruption as corruption increases delays and 
costs. It is expected that a high level of public corruption increases PRA. The second element under 
political stability is the hybrid indicator of political elite cohesion. It is selected because, as 
highlighted in Section 3.4.4, in most cases the political elite in a hybrid regime effect changes that 
are more permanent than the changes from the masses (Mufti, 2018: 116). If there is disagreement 
among the political elite, it is hypothesised that it could cause political instability, leading to higher 
levels of political risk. Tutelary interference, a hybrid regime indicator discussed in Section 3.4.3, is 
the last factor to be considered under political stability. It is expected that interference by any guardian 
increases PRA for foreign investors.  
 
The last category in the conceptual framework is economic development. The first factor in this 
category is the participation of government in the economy. The extent to which the government 
participates in the economy is of interest to foreign investors in a host country (Chermak, 1992). High 
government involvement, which increases the potential political risk, is not preferable to foreign 
investors. Adverse government policies on foreign investment is another factor that is added under 
economic development. This factor is expected to increase the political risk of foreign investors. 
Thirdly, the economic performance of the country is considered. The less developed the economy of 
a country is, the more it is expected to potentially increase PRA for foreign investors. Lastly, 
international perception of the host government in relation to other states could have an impact on the 
PRA. It is hypothesised that negative perception about the host state could increase the impact of 




Table 3.4: Political risk framework for the hybrid regime  
Source: Author’s compilation (2019) 




and institutions  
Elections Uncompetitive, not free and fair 
elections increase PRA 
 
Free and fair elections, disputed and 
violent elections, election environment, 
media openness. 
Legitimacy Illegitimacy increases PRA The acceptability or not of the 
government, domestically and 
internationally 
State institutions Weak institutions increase PRA 
 
Independence from politics of state 
institutions, for example, parastatals, the 
parliament, the police, army. 
Horizontal accountability or not 
Rule of law Weak rule of law increases PRA The judiciary system’s integrity,  
Application of the law 
Political  
Stability 
Corruption Corruption increases PRA Corruption 
Tutelary interference Interference by a guardian increases 
PRA 
If tutelage exists, by whom and possible 
impact on political risk  
Political elite cohesion Weak political elite cohesion within 
the incumbent party’s instability 
increases PRA 
The strength of the incumbent party’s 
political elite, staleness, succession. 
Economic 
Development 
Government’s participation in 
the economy 
High participation increases PRA 
 
Tax as a percentage of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) to measure 
participation, 
Policy consistency 
Adverse government policies 
and actions 
Adverse government regulations 
increase PRA 
Which policies have been adverse for 
foreign investors? 
Economic performance An economically underdeveloped state 
increases PRA 
Liquidity situation, external debt,  
history of expropriation and 
nationalisation   
Health pandemics Health pandemics increase PRA Health  
International relations Strained relationships increase 
political risk 
Home-host relationships 
Geographic location and natural 
disasters 
Natural disasters/extreme weather 
patterns increase political risk 
Geographic location and natural 




This political risk framework will be applied to the case of Zimbabwe. Each indicator of the 
framework will be analysed, discussing whether its presence or absence influences political risk. The 
framework is not intended to forecast PRA in Zimbabwe, rather it will be used for analysis. Also, the 
framework will demonstrate the political risks over the period 1990 to 2018 in Zimbabwe and be used 
analyse whether the traditional conceptual perceptions of political risk in a hybrid regime are still 
applicable. The application of this framework will also assist the study to critically assess if PRA 
could be adaptable to the principles of the hybrid regime. 
 
3.11 Conclusion 
Before this study could analyse the relationship between political risk and a hybrid regime, this 
chapter needed to discuss and unpack these two concepts. Hence, this chapter provided the theoretical 
foundations for political risk and for the hybrid regime. It discussed how political risk is 
conceptualised in the different political regimes to understand political risk in a hybrid regime. The 
study revisited the concept of the hybrid regime and in turn developed a hybrid regime framework 
that will be applied to the case of Zimbabwe. Political risk conceptualisation included concepts of 
how the discipline has changed from the traditional to the contemporary environment and discussed 
a few political risk factors. Equally important, this chapter concluded by developing a political risk 
conceptual framework. This framework will be applied to Zimbabwe to answer if the traditional 














Chapter 4: Contextualisation of Zimbabwe as a Hybrid Regime  
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to contextualise Zimbabwe as a hybrid regime for 28 years. It intends to show the 
different forms of Zimbabwe’s hybrid development between 1990 and 2018. The chapter answers 
why the hybrid regime was durable for 28 years without disintegrating into an outright authoritarian 
regime or maturing into a consolidated democracy. The chapter does not seek to criticise or make a 
moral judgement of the correctness or incorrectness of the hybrid political regime exhibited in 
Zimbabwe. Additionally, the chapter does not prescribe how Zimbabwe could transition from being 
a hybrid regime to another political regime. A contextualisation of Zimbabwe as a hybrid regime aids 
better understanding of the hybrid regime before the study can critically assess PRA in a hybrid 
regime.  
 
The chapter begins with a brief historical background of Zimbabwe34 to create an appreciation of the 
country’s political system. Thereafter, a historical contextualisation will be given in this chapter.  The 
chapter discusses Zimbabwe’s pre-hybrid phase and the hybrid regime development using six distinct 
periods which are: 1978 to 1990, 1990 to February 2000, March 2000 to 2008, 2009 to June 2013, 
July 2013 to October 2017 and lastly November 2017 to 2018. These periods are discussed and named 
according to the most observable hybrid regime indicators which were discussed in Chapter Three as 
elections, civil liberties, tutelary interference and political elite cohesion. In conclusion, the chapter 
discusses why the Zimbabwean hybrid regime has been durable for 28 years. 
 
4.2 Historical overview of Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe derives its name from one of its historic large stone monuments called Great Zimbabwe35 
(Mlambo, 2014: 1). It is a former British colony, which was known as Southern Rhodesia from 1923 
to 1965. Thereafter, it was known as Rhodesia36 until it gained independence on the 18th of April 
1980. Independence was attained after a civil war between a small white settler minority favoured by 
the government against the black indigenous majority. The Zimbabwe African National Union 
 
34A detailed chronology of Zimbabwe’s history is given in Appendix A. 
35Great Zimbabwe is situated in the southern part of the country near Masvingo town. It is the largest monument in which 
only stone was used in construction between 1270-1550 AD.  
36Southern Rhodesia joined Northern Rhodesian (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) to be the Federation of Rhodesia and 




(ZANU), predominately compromising the Shona ethnic group and the Zimbabwe African People’s 
Union (ZAPU), made up mostly of the Ndebele people, were the two major groups fighting against 
white supremacy in Zimbabwe. ZANU broke away from ZAPU in 1963, due to differences in 
ideology, ethnic composition and, at that time, the unsuccessful constitutional negotiations in London 
(Mtisi, Nyakudya & Barnes, 2009: 119). 
 
ZANU and ZAPU collaborated as the Patriotic Front (PF) in 1976 as an initiative of the Front-Line 
States (FLS). The two political parties were effectively renamed ZANU-PF, led by Robert Mugabe37, 
and Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People’s Union (PF-ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo. However, 
ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU operated separately and occasionally took different political positions and 
fought against each other (Bratton and Masunungure 2008:43). This occasionally resulted in 
weakening their combined efforts to fight against the Rhodesian army. ZANU-PF had a military wing 
called Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), while Zimbabwe People’s 
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) was the military wing for PF-ZAPU. ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU 
political leadership both had alliances with their military leadership to cooperate in resolving internal 
and external threats. This interdependence between political and military leadership was a culture that 
began during the liberation struggle and continued after independence to 2018. There was an attempt 
in 1976 to merge ZANLA and ZIPRA into Zimbabwean Peoples Party (ZIPA), but the ethnic 
divisions and rivalry between the two military groups were too entrenched, resulting in the project 
being unsuccessful38.  
 
 Zimbabwe has three arms of government which are the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. 
This chapter will demonstrate how horizontal accountability between these arms of government has 
varied in practice. The president is the head of state and head of government. Robert Mugabe was the 
prime minister from 1980 to1987. After the constitution was amended in 1987, he became the 
executive president from 22 December 1987 to 21 November 2017. The military exerted pressure for 
him to resign; if he had not resigned, his party, ZANU-PF had planned to remove him through an 
impeachment process. Emmerson Mnangagwa was elected in the 2018 election as the head of state, 
having served in this capacity following Mr Mugabe’s resignation. Presidential, parliamentary and 
 
37Robert Mugabe died on the 6th of September 2019, four weeks before the submission of this thesis on the 9th of October 
2019, therefore any references to Robert Mugabe in this thesis will be made as if he is still alive.  





local government elections were synchronised to be conducted at the same time every five-years 
effective from 2008.  
 
ZANU-PF was the dominant political party in Zimbabwe from 1980 to 2018, therefore an explanation 
of how the party is organised is paramount to understanding the hybrid nature of Zimbabwe. The 
presidium is the executive arm of the party which consists of the first secretary and president, two 
vice-secretaries and the national chairperson of the party (LeBas, 2016: 9). ZANU-PF’s highest 
decision-making body is the congress which is a meeting attended by representatives from all 
structural levels, conducted every four years. The politburo, which is a 49-member organisation, is 
the second most important decision-making organ of the party. It meets frequently and makes 
decisions on behalf of the party. The presidium, ZANU-PF government ministers and other appointed 
committee members are privileged to be a part of this elite group. The central committee, comprising 
of 330 members, is the third level of leadership; it meets quarterly or for special meetings. Bratton 
and Masunungure (2008:43) claim that praise of war veterans is repeated in presidential speeches, 
street names, public holidays, political education and state media to serve as a reminder of the 
country’s indebtedness to ZANU-PF. When this study refers to political elite cohesion, which is the 
strong sense of unity within the political elite of the ruling party, it will be referring to the presidium, 
the politburo and the central committee.  
 
The Joint Operations Command (JOC), which was created in 1999, executed operations for the 
benefit of ZANU-PF. The JOC originated in the colonial era as a counterinsurgency-coordination 
organ chaired by the Rhodesian Army Commander. The role of the JOC after independence was to 
coordinate rapid responses to threats on national security; however, the scope of the threats have at 
times included the economy, politics and elections (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 48). It comprised 
of the heads of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF)39, the police, prison services and the Central 
Intelligence Organisation (CIO) (Moyo, 2016: 354). Notably, the security40 sector leaders were ex-
guerrillas (Sorenson, 2010: 4). Positions in the JOC were also filled by strategic civilian members. 
Emmerson Mnangagwa was once the chairperson of JOC, while Gideon Gono, the former governor 
of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) financed JOC activities (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 
48; Marongwe, 2012: 269). Mangongera (2014: 72) argues that Mugabe relied on the JOC to provide 
tactical direction, human resources and logistical support, revealing Mugabe’s increased dependency 
 
39ZDF is made up of the ZNA and the Airforce of Zimbabwe. 
40The security sector in this thesis will refer to the combined security service providers, that is, ZDF, the police, the air 




on the security sector. Moyo (2016: 361) claims that the JOC autonomously carried out several 
operations which were not discussed in parliament but were approved by the office of the president 
and cabinet. JOC operations will be discussed in detail in the subsequent sections.  
 
This section provided a brief historical and governance overview of Zimbabwe. It also discussed the 
roles of ZANU-PF and JOC, as these actors were key in influencing the hybrid development of 
Zimbabwe. The next section focuses on Zimbabwe between 1978 and 1990 as the pre-hybrid regime 
phase. 
  
4.3 Authoritarian regime: 1978 to 1990 
In this section, Zimbabwe is characterised as a socialist, one party and authoritarian regime from 1980 
to 1989. This study contends that the hybrid nature of Zimbabwe is more evident between 1990 and 
2018. The discussion is centred on elections, civil liberties, tutelary interference and political elite 
cohesion from 1978 until 1990. The subsequent sections follow the same outline. 
 
The first election that the black majority participated in was in 197941. This was after Ian Smith and 
African traditionalists Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole and Jeremiah Chirau agreed to the 
Internal Settlement of 1978. The country was renamed Zimbabwe-Rhodesia after the 1979 elections. 
The results of the 1979 elections were disregarded by the international community because Mugabe 
and Nkomo did not participate in this election. The election procedures that Zimbabwe practised over 
the years have their grounding in the 1979 election procedures. The election procedures included:  
reserved seats for whites only42, allowing international observers, voter education, an electoral 
commission and polling procedures (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997: 125). Notable changes took place 
over the 39-year period, but the inception of these ideas was traced to this election. 
 
The parliamentary elections of 1980 took place under a proportional representation system43. ZANU-
PF led the polls by 63%, PF-ZAPU was second with 24%, United African National Council (UANC) 
led by Abel Muzorewa was third with 8% of the popular votes, and minority parties collectively 
captured 5% of the votes (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997: 127). As a result of ZANU-PF winning the 
 
41In order to vote, the black person had to satisfy the preconditions set of property, income and education. 
42There were 20 reserved seats for the Rhodesian Front in the 1980 and 1985 election, but this was abolished by an 
amendment to the constitution in 1987 (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997: 124–125). 




polls, the prime minister position was filled by its party leader, Robert Mugabe. The results were 
accepted both domestically and internationally. Mugabe preached the message of peace and formed 
a government with representatives from the major opposition parties PF-ZAPU and Rhodesian Front 
(RF) (Thomas-Greenfield & Wharton, 2019: 6). In the 1985 parliamentary elections, ZANU-PF 
consolidated power as the dominant party and extended its lead to 77%. PF-ZAPU reduced from 24% 
to 19%, and a break-away faction from ZANU-PF called Zimbabwe African National Union-Ndonga 
(ZANU-Ndonga) led by Sithole got 1%. UANC won no seats in this election (Sithole & Makumbe, 
1997: 129). The election was deemed credible by the domestic and international community.  
 
From 1985, ZANU-PF aggressively pushed for the adoption of a one-party state position. In 1987, a 
Unity Accord joining ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU into one party under the name ZANU-PF was agreed 
upon. The Zimbabwean Constitution was amended, introducing an executive president, thereby 
abolishing the prime minister position that Mugabe held. The president would, in turn, select two 
vice-presidents. Mugabe became the first executive president as well as the first secretary of ZANU-
PF, while Joshua Nkomo and Simon Muzenda were appointed as vice-presidents44 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
2012: 25). The Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ), formerly known as RF, was weak and 
appealed mostly to the white minority population, most of whom had left the country at independence, 
fearing black majority rule (Mlambo, 2014). This study suggests that the Unity Accord was a strategic 
tool used by ZANU-PF to eradicate PF-ZAPU, its only challenger.  
 
In the 1990 presidential and parliamentary elections held in March, ZANU-PF emerged victorious in 
both. In this election, the size of parliament increased from 100 to 120 seats due to a constitutional 
amendment made prior to elections (Kriger, 2005: 13). For the parliamentary elections, ZANU-PF 
got 117 seats, Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) gained two seats and ZANU-Ndonga retained its 
one seat. Mugabe triumphed over Tekere, his only challenger by 83% in the presidential election 
(Sithole & Makumbe, 1997: 129). ZUM was a political party that was started in 1989 by former 
ZANU-PF secretary-general Edgar Tekere. Tekere was expelled from ZANU-PF because he 
criticised senior party officials for corruption, rent-seeking tendencies, greed and disagreed with the 
formation of a one-party state (Kriger, 2005: 14; Muzondidya, 2009: 181). The election results 
indicated the investment by ZANU-PF in building a one-party state. Diamond (2002: 32) and 
 
44Simon Muzenda was Mugabe’s deputy in ZANU-PF from 1977. He became Deputy Prime Minister in 1980 and co-




Levitsky and Way (2002: 55) assert that election results of above 70% point to an authoritarian state, 
which was the direction Zimbabwe was leaning towards.  
 
ZUM appealed mostly to the urban population, but this was not reflected in the votes cast. ZUM 
candidates were subjected to violence, intimidation, harassment and torture, which this section 
discusses under civil liberties. Markedly, voter turnout dropped from 84% in 1985 to 54% in the 1990 
elections (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997: 129). The 1990 elections were perceived as choiceless and 
skewed in the favour of ZANU-PF (Kriger, 2005: 14–20). The 1990 election results were 
domestically and internationally accepted. The first decade’s elections consolidated ZANU-PFs 
power, while PF-ZAPU, CAZ, UANC were not competitive. 
 
Regarding civil liberties, the black population’s political space rapidly increased. One distinctive 
feature was the adoption of universal adult suffrage which began in the 1980 election. Electoral 
integrity45 was practised consistently in every election after Zimbabwe’s independence. The 1980 
election was not discriminatory in terms of race, education or wealth of contestants, unlike the 
election conducted in 1979 which laid out such preconditions. The black majority enjoyed freedom 
in spaces reserved only for the white minority before independence. Social service delivery, education 
and employment indicators significantly improved for the black majority (Mlambo, 2014). In his 
inauguration speech in 1980, Mugabe reassured the white minority of protection from any black 
intimidation or victimisation (Mlambo, 2014). 
 
There was no ethnic related conflict, however, between 1982 and 1987 there was state-sponsored 
violence and intimidation in the Matabeleland region, comprising mostly of the Ndebele people, 
which was known as the Gukurahundi era46. The government deployed the Fifth Brigade in the 
Matabeleland region to quell suspected dissidents. The destabilisation in the Matabeleland region 
originated from disgruntled PF-ZAPU supporters and people suspected to be sponsored by the 
apartheid Republic of South Africa to cause destabilisation in the region47 (Mashingaidze, 2005: 85; 
Mlambo, 2014: 196). During Gukurahundi, the Fifth Brigade used strategies that grossly violated 
human rights which included killing, torturing, raping, beating and making people disappear (Bratton 
 
45Electoral integrity is defined as one person’s vote accounted for as one, and not subjected to a weighting system. 
46Gukurahundi is a Shona term describing a storm that destroys everything, thus establishing a new ecological order. This 
term was used by ZANU-PF, pre-independence, as a policy of annihilating white supremacy and blacks that supported it. 
47The South African apartheid government’s foreign policy was to destabilise Zimbabwe. It set up a base to train bandits 




& Masunungure, 2008: 50). An estimated 20 000 innocent civilians who were not part of the 
dissidents’ activities lost their lives due to the brutality of the Fifth Brigade’s operations 
(Mashingaidze, 2005: 84). The magnitude of force used by the government to curb civil unrest in the 
Matabeleland region was considerably disproportional.  
 
The Matabeleland provinces were the epicentre of PF-ZAPU support. Joshua Nkomo exiled himself 
in 1983, although he had been invited by Prime Minister Mugabe at independence to be part of the 
cabinet as Minister of Home Affairs (Mlambo, 2014:  xxvi,197). The international community did 
not speak against this state-sponsored violence. It was not widely reported in media. The Unity 
Accord between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU ended Gukurahundi. This study asserts that Gukurahundi 
was a strategic move by ZANU-PF to either dissipate PF-ZAPU totally or an attempt to force it to 
join ZANU-PF, thus creating the one-party state that ZANU-PF was pushing for. 
 
ZANU-PF employed strategies that weakened and discredited opposition political parties, which is 
expected under authoritarian rule. Joshua Nkomo was persecuted and accused of organising a coup 
(Mlambo, 2014). The attacks on his life and the party’s supporters led him into exile; he only returned 
when the Unity Accord was being negotiated. Bishop Muzorewa, leader of UANC, was detained for 
ten months from 1983-1984 for allegedly making derogatory remarks about the government and he 
was suspected of funding the dissidents in Matabeleland (Dorman, 2005: 158). Internally ZANU-PF 
officials had to abide by the party’s position; diverging from this was a punishable offence. In 1989, 
Tekere was expelled from ZANU-PF, as an example of what could happen if officials did not 
conform. Tekere was accused of attempting to assassinate ZANU-PF leadership and intending to 
incite a coup if ZUM lost (Kriger, 2005: 15). Tekere’s formation of ZUM angered ZANU-PF’s 
leadership because they had eliminated PF-ZAPU and did not anticipate any opposition, especially 
originating from within the party.  
 
ZUM was heavily ridiculed and shamed in state media as puppets of CAZ. ZUM was routinely denied 
opportunities to conduct public rallies, emergency regulations being cited. ZUM supporters were 
physically beaten, killed, harassed, had their property destroyed; government officials were 
threatened with the possibility of losing their jobs and some were denied food aid from government-
funded programmes (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997: 135; Kriger, 2005: 14–19). The victimisation of 
ZUM supporters continued even after the 1990 elections and only ceased when senior ZANU-PF 




when prosecuted by the courts, defied court orders because their attacks on ZUM supporters were a 
state-sponsored project and ZANU-PF guaranteed their protection. The political environment in this 
period was skewed in favour of ZANU-PF. 
 
Political elite cohesion before 1990 was strong. Political elite cooperation was high and leadership 
turnover was low48. Those who opposed the majority elite voice in ZANU-PF were expelled from the 
party and harassed (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997: 135). The worst penalty for diverging from the elite 
view was death, for example, Patrick Kombayi, an ex-ZANU-PF mayor for Gweru, who chose to be 
a candidate for ZUM, was shot before the 1990 election in which he was contesting against Simon 
Muzenda (Dorman, 2005: 154). In terms of tutelary, ZANU-PF, as the incumbent party, was an 
informal domain of power. This was because there were blurred boundaries between government and 
ZANU-PF, which led informal practices to occasionally take precedence over formal ones. 
 
Zimbabwe was characterised as an authoritarian regime, socialist, one-party state in this period. It 
conducted regular elections and observed universal adult suffrage as the only two tenets that depicted 
democracy. Zimbabwe did not exhibit the other minimum requirements of democracy which are:  
free, fair and competitive elections, multiple political parties and an independent media (Morlino, 
2009: 277). In addition,  after 1980 the election results were above 70% in favour of ZANU-PF, 
which points to authoritarian rule (Diamond, 2002: 32; Levitsky & Way, 2002: 55). Furthermore, the 
state was aggressively pushing to limit freedom of association and expression. The state also 
discriminated based on ethnicity and political party affiliation. In a hybrid regime, there is a deliberate 
alteration between democracy and autocracy features; in this period, Zimbabwe was mostly 
autocratic. The features of the authoritarian regime between 1980 to 1990 were: 
▪ Regular non-competitive elections 
▪ Defacto one-party state after 1987 
▪ State-sponsored violence in Matabeleland provinces 
▪ Violence and intimidation used to suppress opposition political party members  
▪ The government was perceived as domestically and internationally legitimate 
▪ ZANU-PF was the visible tutelage over elected officials 
 





▪ High political elite cohesion 
 
ZANU-PF abandoned the one-party state rhetoric in September 1990 and embraced more democratic 
institutions (Kriger, 2005: 20). Adopting more democratic tendencies was probably motivated by two 
reasons. First, the cold war, which Zimbabwe had followed for ten years was no longer applicable, 
and the fall of socialism. Zimbabwe had to consider adopting liberal democracy (Huntington, 1991b: 
15; Plattner, 2014: 5). Secondly, for economic reasons, it was necessary for Zimbabwe to adopt the 
IMF Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) to curb its foreign debt and deteriorating 
social conditions (Zhou & Masunungure, 2006: 18). The implementation of  ESAP required several 
reforms which included: trade liberalisation, tax, labour market, public enterprise, domestic 
deregulation, financial sectors and monetary reforms (Mumvuma et al., 2004: 32; Plattner, 2014: 17). 
The ESAP reforms reinforced the adoption of democratic institutions.  
 
Therefore, the source of Zimbabwe’s hybrid political regime can be categorised under the decay of 
an authoritarian regime paving the way for democratic institutions due to economic and international 
pressure.49 As a newly independent state, the projected political risk was expected to be high (Green, 
1974); however, the political risk in Zimbabwe was substantially low. The government adopted 
measures that ensured the continued flow of foreign investors into the country.  
 
This section discussed the political style that Zimbabwe adhered to before shifting towards the hybrid 
regime. The next section will focus on 1990 to February 2000 as the first hybrid nature exhibited by 
Zimbabwe. 
 
4.4 Liberal hybrid regime 1990 to February 2000 
The period 1990 to February 2000 marks the beginning of when Zimbabwe became a hybrid regime. 
This period was reflective of a liberal hybrid regime. Parliamentary elections were in 1995, while 
local government and presidential elections were conducted in 1996. The outcomes confirmed 
ZANU-PF’s dominance, even though the number of political parties formed after 1990 had increased. 
Six political parties contested in the parliamentary elections and ZANU-PF, ZANU-Ndonga and 
independent candidates won 117 seats, two seats and one seat respectively. Mugabe contested as the 
 




only candidate in the presidential race because the other candidates withdrew from the election, citing 
an uneven playing field50 (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997: 130-131). ZANU-PF was poised to win the 
election even before it started because, in 55 out of 120 constituencies, opposition parties failed to 
put contesting candidates (Dorman, 2005: 157). Voter turnout and citizen participation in the election 
decreased from the previous period (Dorman, 2005: 157). This study argues that the low voter turn-
out was as a result of a lack of political alternatives; the same candidates and party were poised to 
win the election. Remarkably, the parliamentary election was competitive for ZANU-PF in the 
primary elections, which is when candidates at party level are chosen to represent a constituency. 
Those who were unsuccessful stood as independent candidates. Elections in this decade largely 
reinforced ZANU-PF’s dominance despite the formation of new political parties. 
 
Pertaining to civil liberties, during the 1995 and 1996 elections, the incumbent ZANU-PF resorted to 
intimidation of opposition political parties. Indicative of a hybrid regime, the incumbent uses subtler 
forms of persecuting opposition political parties. Some of the methods used in persecuting the 
opposition were attempting to bribe and co-opting opposition members, using tax authorities, the 
judiciary and other state agencies to legally harass and persecute critics and opposition party members 
so as to force cooperative behaviour from them (Levitsky & Way, 2002: 53). In this period, 
intimidation strategies used included: verbally harassing the opponents, threatening civil servants 
who supported the opposition party with loss of employment, physically preventing opposition rallies 
and branding the opposition as unpatriotic and puppets for Ian Smith (Kriger, 2005: 20–25). The main 
opposition parties argued that the environment was skewed to favour ZANU-PF (Sithole & 
Makumbe, 1997: 131) and that the state’s resources and regulations were used to give ZANU-PF the 
advantage (Kriger, 2005: 20). Ndabaningi Sithole, ZANU-Ndonga’s opposition leader, was charged 
with treason and sentenced to one year in jail (Dorman 2005:159) and David Coltart from FORUM 
was also taken to court (Kriger, 2005: 21). These two cases were used as an attempt to politically 
weaken their parties before the election. Prior to 1990, ZANU-PF had employed far more punitive 
measures to harass the opposition, for example, death, which was not as visible in this period. Hence, 
this study argues that in this period, democratic space in terms of freedom of expression, association 
and multiple choices for political candidates had increased from the previous period.  
 
 
50Muzorewa and Tekere withdrew days before the election, but their names remained on the ballot paper (Sithole & 




In a hybrid regime, informal practices regularly take precedence over formal practices. In 1996, the 
war veterans51 demanded compensation for their participation in the liberation struggle. A war victims 
compensation fund was set up in 1980 for those deserving compensation. High ranking political elites 
had privileged access and benefitted from this fund, unbeknown to most members of the Zimbabwe 
National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) until it was exposed by a local newspaper 
(Mlambo, 2014: 201). This was known as the war victim’s compensation scandal. In 1997, War 
Veterans held regular protests and even looted the ZANU-PF headquarters; the police did not interfere 
with these protests (Dorman, 2001: 118). This reveals the preferential treatment given to this group 
by the state. Dr Chengerai Hunzvi52, leader of ZNLWVA, put immense pressure on President Mugabe 
to pay a war veteran’s gratuity. Moore (2018: 4) claims that war veterans held some senior ZANU-
PF officials under house arrest while their leadership was negotiating a gratuity with President 
Mugabe. The government approved an unbudgeted war veteran’s gratuity, which was a one-off lump 
sum payment and a subsequent monthly allowance of Zimbabwean Dollar (ZW$)50 000 (USD2 000) 
and ZW$2 000 (USD200) respectively, to cater for their health and children’s education (Moore & 
Raftopoulos, 2012: 248–250). The government did not have the necessary resources to finance this 
informal request, but the ZANU-PF government approved the gratuity53. This was done so that the 
ZANU-PF leadership could strengthen its cordial relations with the ZNLWVA to ensure that the 
patron-client relationship continued for strategic reasons. 
 
Hybrid regimes subscribe to the notion of multiple political parties and civil society can occasionally 
influence public policy. The formation of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), a civil society 
organisation in 1998 (Moore & Raftopoulos, 2012: 252), and the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC)54, an opposition political party founded in 1999 (Mangongera, 2014: 69) changed the political 
landscape of Zimbabwe. NCA called for a redrafting of the Zimbabwean constitution using a 
consultative and participatory approach. The government initially ignored the NCA but eventually 
set up a Constitution Commission in March 1999 to conduct constitutional reforms (Raftopoulos, 
2009: 206–209). In 2000, a referendum rejected the government-led draft constitution as campaigned 
for by the NCA and MDC. Raftopoulos (2009: 210) and Ncube (2013: 101) assert that this 
 
51At independence, some comrades were integrated into the ZNA and those with the necessary skills were absorbed into 
the civil service. War veterans faced many socio-economic challenges of failing to integrate into the society, being 
uneducated and some had health challenges. In 1989 they established an association, the ZNLWVA (Mlambo, 2014: 201). 
52When he initially discovered that the fund was for a privileged few, he falsified documents claiming injuries that allowed 
war veterans to claim compensation, however, when it was discovered, war veterans lost their legitimacy socially (Moore 
& Raftopoulos, 2012: 248–250). 
53The economy could not cope, the ZW$ lost its value by dropping 73% in relation to the USD in one day on the 13 th of 
November 1997, known as black Thursday.  
54MDC was formed from a broad base of civil society organisations, women’s groups, students’ unions, churches and 




constitutional defeat was the ZANU-PF-led government’s first major defeat from any opposition 
party since independence. MDC became the first political party in 20 years to challenge the hegemony 
of ZANU-PF. The referendum ‘no vote’ was respected and upheld, demonstrating adherence to some 
democratic institutions in this period. 
 
Citizens can protest to make their opinions heard to influence public policy and to exercise their 
freedom of expression and association; however, in a hybrid regime, this could be done on a 
discriminatory basis. ESAP reforms resulted in: privatisation, deregulation of prices, removal of 
subsidies, liberalisation of trade, and mass retrenchment of workers from public entities (Mumvuma 
et al., 2004: 32). The removal of subsidies increased prices of basic commodities and approximately 
30 000 people were retrenched, increasing the unemployment rate to 40% between 1990 and 1994 
(Muzondidya, 2009: 188–189). All economic indicators reveal that Zimbabwe was worse off in 1993 
than in 1989 (Mlambo, 1995: 81). Zimbabwe assisted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
war in 1998, as a Southern African Development Community (SADC) attempt to stabilise security in 
the region (Moore & Raftopoulos, 2012: 248–250). The cost of the DRC war was estimated to be 
ZW$1million dollars of taxpayer’s money a day. Participating in the war enriched military generals 
and politically connected individuals who received concessions for mining, agriculture and 
transportation (Thomas-Greenfield & Wharton, 2019: 8).  
 
The cost of participating in the DRC war, coupled with the inefficiencies of ESAP, the unbudgeted 
war veteran’s gratuities and the droughts which caused poor yields, strained the Zimbabwean 
economy. This deterioration in social conditions and decline in real wages led to the Zimbabwe 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the largest labour union, organising a series of public and private 
sector protests from 1996-200055. Bratton and Masunungure (2008) argue that these protests had a 
significant impact of shutting down urban centres. Although protestors could exercise their rights, the 
government occasionally responded by calling the protest’s illegal and deployed the police to disrupt 
the protestors. In addition, labour union leaders were regularly detained and harassed, which was 
indicative of a hybrid regime. In this period, Muzondidya (2009: 212) argues that civil society became 
more assertive in questioning the government’s commitment to fighting poverty and ZANU-PF’s 
growing intolerance of the opposition. This feature was more pronounced from 1996 to 1999. 
 
55There was a massive public-sector eight-week strike from August to September 1996, with approximately 160 000 
employees participating in the strike (Saunders, 1997: 18). The ZCTU organised a public and private sector strike in 
December 1997, motivated by the declining  economy and this strike was successful in that it stopped the government 




Public corruption was at times unprosecuted, which is a key feature of hybrid regimes. Between 1980 
and 1999, corruption in the private, public and civic sectors was widespread. The Transparency 
International Corruption Index of 1998 was 4.2 on a scale of 10; with 0 indicating that most public 
officials were dishonest and requested bribes in conducting their duties, while 10 indicated low levels 
of dishonesty among public officials (Trading Economics, 2018). Mumvuma et al. (2004: 49) note 
that there was a rise in corruption cases by senior government officials from 1990-2000. A few 
corruption cases that tainted the political leadership include the Willowvale motor scandal56, the War 
victims compensation fund57 and the VIP housing scandal58. Mumvuma et al. (2004:49) assert that 
cabinet ministers interfered with the tendering processes, which resulted in enriching those politically 
connected to ZANU-PF and senior government officials. The DRC war created avenues for the 
political elite and military generals to be corrupt (Thomas-Greenfield & Wharton, 2019: 8). 
Remarkably, in most corruption cases the key perpetrators of corruption did not resign nor were they 
prosecuted but were reassigned to other government posts. Therefore, because public corruption was 
overlooked, it became more attractive to be corrupt and more people became bold in being corrupt. 
Furthermore, the corrupt officials became more loyal to ZANU-PF because it was guaranteeing their 
protection, thus ensuring the continuation of the patron-client relationship.  
 
The judicial system in 1995 was observed to be independent. Several cases were taken to the courts 
to contest the 1995 parliamentary and 1996 local government election outcomes and the courts ruled 
unbiasedly. The case of Margaret Dongo, an ex-CIO and ZANU-PF parliamentary member in 1990-
1995, was one example. As the incumbent candidate, she was not nominated by the politburo to 
represent ZANU-PF in her constituency in 1995. This propelled her to participate as an independent 
candidate (Dorman, 2001: 98). She petitioned the court for foul play and the court ordered a by-
election to be conducted in which she won convincingly (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997: 135). The 
judiciary decided on disputed mayoral outcomes with the majority of the cases being raised from 
ZANU-PF (Dorman, 2005: 159). Chikwanha-Dzenga, Masunungure & Madingira (1999: 6) assert 
that before 1999 Zimbabwe enjoyed democratic institutions, notably, a pluralistic media, an 
 
56Senior government officials and politicians used their political power to obtain vehicles which were in short supply in 
the country from Willowvale motor industries, a government owned company and sold these at high prices for personal 
gain (Mumvuma et al., 2004: 15). 
57A war victims compensation fund to benefit war veterans was looted by senior politicians and government officials 
(Mlambo, 2014: 201). When it was revealed, war veterans’ pensions were stopped and a commission was set up to 
investigate (Dorman, 2001: 92). 





independent court system, growth in political parties, parliament and regular conducting of elections. 
The environment did not result in fairer competition. 
 
Regarding tutelary interference, ZANU-PF’s objectives were observed to influence the decisions of 
elected officials. The ZANU-PF ideology was influenced mainly by the presidium, senior security 
sector officials, senior government officials, war veterans and politically connected businesspeople. 
JOC was resuscitated in 1999, however, the effect of JOC as an unelected body influencing policy is 
not visible in this period, but the subsequent periods that follow. The boundaries between the state 
and ZANU-PF in this period increasingly became blurred. The state’s resources were occasionally 
used for ZANU-PF purposes. This overlap of government and ZANU-PF continued into the next 
period.  
 
Lastly, political elite cohesion within ZANU-PF was strong, but it was relatively starting to  
fragmenting. Moore (2018: 3) asserts that in 1997, Mugabe gave in to the demands of the war veterans 
because he needed to make new allies as these had reduced.   The politburo-imposed candidates in 
some constituencies who were not the incumbent Members of Parliament (MP) for these 
constituencies. This action had the effect of weakening political elite cooperation. Some ZANU-PF 
MPs were expelled from the party, for example, Dongo in 1995 and Mudehwe in 1996 (Sithole & 
Makumbe, 1997: 135). Diverting from being a ZANU-PF loyalist resulted in harassment and 
victimisation by other party members. An example is Fidelis Mhashu, an ex-ZANU-PF member who 
was beaten up by ZANU-PF supporters when he contested as an independent mayoral candidate for 
Chitungwiza (Dorman, 2005: 154). Moreover, political elites were able to manage external threats in 
this period resulting in relatively strong political elite cohesion. There was a failed coup attempt in 
Zimbabwe by a group of soldiers who had not favoured the country’s involvement in the DRC war 
in 1999 (Moore, 2018: 4). At the level of the presidium, politburo and central committee there was 
relatively low leadership turnover.  
 
Disgruntled ZANU-PF members who contested as independent candidates in the 1995 parliamentary 
elections created a political party in 1996 called Zimbabwe Union for Democrats (ZUD), led by 
Dongo. Dorman (2001: 98; 117) states that Dongo was instrumental in exposing electoral process 
irregularities and exposed the war victim’s compensation scandal in parliament. Opposition political 
parties were hampered by factional battles which weakened them. After the 1990 elections, ZUM 




expected to be the main opposition party in the 2000 parliamentary elections, had a splinter group 
called Transparency Front by mid-1999. Dorman (2005: 156–157) argues that the interference from 
ZANU-PF supporters and CIO agents, as well as personality differences, accounted for the divisions 
in opposition political parties. Although political elite cohesion was relatively strong; hence the 
hybrid regime was stable. 
 
The period 1990 to February 2000 shows the initial period that Zimbabwe became a hybrid regime. 
Democratic and autocratic features were both observed in this period. The political risk for Zimbabwe 
during this period appeared to be low. When the hybrid regime framework was applied to Zimbabwe, 
the first hybrid nature that is evident is the liberal hybrid regime which has been discussed in this 
section. The next section focuses on the competitive illiberal hybrid regime from March 2000-2008. 
The features of the liberal hybrid regime shown in this period include: 
▪ Multiple political parties formed, however there were regular non-competitive elections 
▪ Increase in political freedom 
▪ Parliament dominated by ZANU-PF 
▪ Intimidation and harassment used to silence opponents 
▪ Judiciary independent 
▪ Occasional clamp-down on protestors 
▪ Property rights secure 
▪ The government is seen as legitimate domestically and internationally 
▪ Public corruption increasing 
▪ Strong ZANU-PF top-level political elite cohesion 
▪ People with different opinions expelled from ZANU-PF 
▪ Civil society active towards the end 






4.5 Competitive illiberal hybrid regime March 2000 to 2008 
Between March 2000 and 2008 Zimbabwe was conceptualised as a competitive illiberal hybrid 
regime. The incumbent in a hybrid regime can implement unorthodox policies to regain political 
support. ZANU-PF support was dwindling towards the end of the 1990-2000 period, therefore, as a 
strategy for political survival, ZANU-PF implemented the Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
(FTLRP) in early 2000. The FTLRP resulted in massive land seizures from white commercial farmers 
without compensation. Implementing the FTLRP had significant impact on the nature of the hybrid 
regime as well as diplomatic relations and the economy.  
 
The factor of land had been a rallying point, especially around elections in the 1990s. After 1990, the 
Lancaster House provisions on land with regards to the willing buyer and willing seller and many 
others were no longer binding. The Land Acquisition Act of 1992 empowered the government to 
expropriate land but with full compensation. Prior land invasions had taken place in 1997 and 1998, 
citing that the government’s official Land Reform Programme phase 2 was slow (Thomas, 2003: 
700). Dorman (2001:116) argues that land invasions prior to 2000 were conducted on a non-racial 
basis because there were land invasions carried out on farms owned by black senior government 
officials. In 1998 the government held an International Donor Conference in a bid to raise ZW$1.5 
billion to resettle 150 000 families on five million hectares of land over a five-year period 
(Raftopoulos, 2009: 212). Unfortunately, the conference failed to secure any funds for the 
resettlement programme. In February 2000, a people’s referendum rejected the government-led draft 
new Zimbabwean constitution. The draft had provisions empowering the government to expropriate 
white-owned commercial land without compensation (Mlambo, 2014: 234). In early 2000, ZANU-
PF, seeking to revive political relevance, organised its supporters and war veterans to invade and evict 
white commercial farmers off their land. The land invaders called the process the Third 
Chimurenga59. On 17 March 2000, Justice Paddington Garwe of the High Court gave the first verdict 
on the matter; he declared land invasions illegal and ordered the police to enforce the removal of the 
invaders within 24hours, but the police did not comply (Human Rights Watch, 2008). In May 2000, 
an amendment to the constitution was issued, giving the government the right to expropriate white 
commercial land without compensation, thereby legalising the FTLRP. This constitutional 
amendment was passed by the ZANU-PF led parliament a month before the June parliamentary 
elections.  
 





The FTLRP displaced approximately 4 000 white commercial farmers (Raftopoulos, 2009: 212) and 
approximately 450 000 farm labourers  (Mlambo, 2014: 235). The FTLRP had ripple effects on the 
economy, mainly on agriculture, manufacturing and tourism sectors. Thomas-Greenfield and 
Wharton (2019: 8) assert that Mugabe implemented the FTLRP because he was angry that white 
commercial farmers were sponsoring the new opposition party MDC. Moore and Raftopoulos (2012: 
216) argue that the FTLRP violated property rights, dehumanised white commercial farmers and 
members of the opposition MDC. Bratton and Masunungure (2008: 46) and Ncube (2013: 100) argue 
that the major beneficiaries of the white-owned expropriated farms were the senior security sector 
officers, cabinet ministers, government permanent secretaries, senior judges and senior ZANU-PF 
officials and not ordinary Zimbabweans. This study argues that the FTLRP was a political tool used 
by ZANU-PF to regain support to avoid a defeat in the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential 
elections. 
 
Focusing on the hybrid regime indicator of elections, there were five rounds of elections between 
2000 and 2008. These elections were conducted as follows: parliamentary elections in 2000, 2005 
and 2008, presidential elections in 2002 and 2008 and lastly, local government elections in 2003 and 
2008. The constitutional terms were pegged at five years for parliamentary and six years for the 
presidential. In 2007 all three major elections were synchronised to be conducted together with effect 
from March 2008, which was termed the harmonisation of elections.  The parliamentarian’s terms 
were shortened by two years. EU, the USA and the UK election observer missions were prohibited 
from participating by the government from 2002 (Mathlosa, 2002: 149) until 2018 when Mnangagwa 
became the interim president. This was because natives from the UK and the EU were affected by the 
FTLRP which resulted in hostile diplomatic relations between Zimbabwe and the Western countries 
in this period. 
 
A hybrid regime is marked by conducting competitive elections. The previous period elections were 
mostly competitive within ZANU-PF primary elections. In this period, the MDC, which was formed 
in 1999, contested in the 2000 parliamentary elections and received 47% of the votes while ZANU-
PF received 49% of the votes (Pottie, 2001: 69). Although the MDC received almost half the votes, 
ZANU-PF continued to dominate parliament because only 120 out of 150 seats were contested on a 
constituency basis and there were 30 appointments to parliament made by the President60. Having 
 
60The 30 appointments were12 non-constituency MPs appointed by the president, 10 chiefs and 8 governors (Pottie, 2002: 




MDC in parliament was adequate to stop amendments to the constitution but it was insufficient to 
stop legislation from being passed by the incumbent ZANU-PF. In the presidential elections of 2002, 
MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai lost by a slight margin when he received 42% of the votes while the 
ZANU-PF candidate, Robert Mugabe obtained 56% of the votes (Raftopoulos, 2009: 215). The 2005 
parliamentary elections remained competitive with ZANU-PF, MDC and an independent receiving 
60%, 39% and 1% respectively of the votes cast. To cater for strategic ZANU-PF MPs that had lost 
their seats to MDC and to weaken the influence of MDC in parliament, ZANU-PF pushed for the 
adoption of two measures. First, the size of parliament was increased from 120 to 150 seats to be 
contested on a constituency basis61. Secondly, a 66-member Senate62 was re-introduced in November 
2005 which had been abolished in 1985. The argument for reintroducing Senate was to have 
representation for marginalised groups, for example, women, youth and the disabled. Marginalised 
groups representation could have been done in an alternative manner than increasing the size of the 
cabinet. Representation could have been catered for by giving quotas for marginalised groups during 
the parliamentary elections. 
 
In 2008, under the March harmonised elections, Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai 
(MDC-T) and Movement for Democratic Change-Mutambara (MDC-M)63 combined together had 
the majority in the parliamentary elections (Ncube, 2013: 100). Historically, it was the first time since 
independence that opposition parties had the majority in parliament. The presidential results were 
published in May 2008, five weeks after the election. This raised much concern over the credibility 
of the presidential results (Moore & Raftopoulos, 2012: 242). A clear 50% plus 1 majority win was 
not obtained by any candidate, therefore, an election run-off was conducted. This showed the level 
of competitiveness of the presidential election. Nonetheless, preceding the June presidential run-off, 
there was considerable violence directed at MDC members which caused Tsvangirai to pull out of 
the race. The violence was implemented under the programme operation Mavhoterepi64 (whom did 
you vote for) (Raftopoulos, 2009: 229; Mangongera, 2014: 73). This operation will be discussed in 
greater detail when discussing the hybrid regime indicator of civil liberties. 
 
61Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 17 of 2007 increased the size of parliament from 150 to 210, who were all 
elected with no appointments (Volllan, 2008: 8). 
62The 66-member Senate was composed of 50 elected members, that is 5 elected from each province, 6 presidential 
appointments and 10 traditional chiefs. 20 had to be elected women, while 1 was appointed. Constitution of Zimbabwe 
Amendment No. 18 of 2007 provided for the further expansion of the Senate to 93 seats. 
63MDC split into two factions known as MDC-T and MDC-M. These factions were differentiated by the different leader’s 
surnames. The split occurred during the senatorial elections, but was caused by divisions in the executive with regards to 
structure, tribal issues and accountability  (Moore & Raftopoulos, 2012: 257). After Mutambara’s leadership term, 
Welshman Ncube became the leader and the party became Movement for Democratic Change-Ncube (MDC-N).  
64Operation Mavhoterepi was organised by JOC to question the electorate who they had voted for in the March 2008 




The FTLRP, the economic crisis, the 2008 electoral violence, pressure from SADC, and the domestic 
and international legitimacy crisis that ZANU-PF was experiencing, forced it to negotiate a coalition 
government with the combined MDC. SADC65, through Thabo Mbeki, facilitated the mediation 
process between ZANU-PF and MDC which resulted in the Government of National Unity (GNU). 
The GNU was agreed upon and signed on 15 September 2008, however, the implementation only 
occurred between February 2009 and July 2013 (Eppel, 2009: 1). While elections since independence 
served to confirm ZANU-PF’s dominance, between March 2000 and 2008 this status quo was 
challenged. MDC provided stiff competition to the incumbent ZANU-PF, which was consistent with 
the character of hybrid regimes, that elections can be competitive.  
 
Regarding civil liberties, the period 2000 to 2008 marked the decline in freedom of association, 
freedom of speech and limited independent media sources. ZANU-PF had enjoyed dominating the 
political environment; therefore, the rise of MDC was extremely unwelcome. Hybrid regimes are 
known to mostly use subtler forms of intimidation against opposition members (Schedler, 2002: 44), 
however, in this period during elections, ZANU-PF resorted to both subtle and violent forms of 
intimidation. Raftopoulos (2009: 215) emphasises that the state organised widespread violence on 
opposition members which included murdering, attempted murder, torturing, raping, conducting 
disappearances and issuing death threats. These acts of violence were mostly carried out by ZANU-
PF’s militia. ZANU-PF also resorted to labelling, embarrassing and victimising those strongly 
affiliated to the MDC leadership, supporters and white commercial farmers. State media was used in 
propagating the rhetoric that MDC members were not nationalistic, were traitors, sell-outs and 
puppets acting on behalf of the whims of Western countries. Although the elections were competitive, 
the election environment and regulations favoured ZANU-PF.  
 
The apex of politically motivated violence against the opposition was in 2008 under operation 
Mavhoterepi (whom did you vote for). LeBas (2014: 54), Bratton and Masunungure (2008: 50) and 
Mangongera (2014: 73) argue that this was an operation headed by JOC, aimed at averting a ZANU-
PF presidential runoff loss, especially in the rural areas where Mugabe had lost popularity. Under this 
operation, organs of the state, that is, the ZDF, the CIO and the police, as well as ZANU-PF supporters 
and youth militia, conducted acts of massive violence. The violence included harassing, raping, 
torturing, beating as well as implementing the ‘short-sleeve’ treatment which meant cutting the 
 
65The SADC initiative began in 2007, when MDC and ZANU-PF had to agree to the conditions that necessitated free, 




victim’s whole arm while others received the ‘long-sleeve’ treatment which was chopping off the 
victims’ hands (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 54; Mangongera, 2014: 73). These violent acts 
exhibited an autocratic hand. This was consistent with the conceptualisation of a hybrid regime, that 
democratic and autocratic features were co-existent in one political style. 
 
The incumbent in a hybrid regime could use legislation that has the effect of giving it an advantage 
over its opponents. In 2002 the ZANU-PF government passed two pieces of legislation that limited 
citizens’ freedoms, these were Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and 
Public Order and Security Act (POSA). AIPPA imposed limitations on information available to the 
public and registration of publishing houses (Freedom House, 2013a: 417). POSA imposed 
cumbersome procedures that had to be followed for political parties gathering. A clearance was 
needed from the police for a meeting of more than 12 people. These two pieces of legislation 
significantly constrained freedom of association and speech and limited alternative media forms. 
AIPPA and POSA made it difficult for MDC to operate, especially in rural areas. In 2007, Tsvangirai 
was severely beaten when the police suppressed a prayer meeting that had been organised by civil 
society citing POSA (Mangongera, 2014: 71). Raftopoulos (2009: 214) argues that POSA was the 
most commonly cited Act by the police in the arrest of citizens trying to hold public meetings. POSA 
was used as a selective tool of intimidation because ZANU-PF rallies and meetings were not denied, 
unlike opposition party meetings. There was access to mostly state-owned media, which was 
revamped to air 75% local content and routinely flighted liberation war songs. The propaganda had 
the effect of intimidating citizens. During elections, the ruling ZANU-PF enjoyed mass media 
coverage over all competitors and assembled freely unlike the opposition. This selective use of 
legislation and media to favour the incumbent is consistent with how a hybrid regime operates. 
 
In this period, the judiciary was observed to be increasingly biased towards ZANU-PF. There was a 
significant decrease in horizontal accountability. With reference to land reform, the initial judgments 
made by the High Court and subsequently the Supreme Court declared the land invasions illegal and 
violating the Zimbabwean Constitution (Human Rights Watch, 2008). The government responded by 
refusing to adhere to court orders of evicting land invaders. Furthermore, the state labelled and 
attacked the judges who did not rule in its favour and issued amnesties to people who committed 
violence on behalf of ZANU-PF66 (Human Rights Watch, 2008; Raftopoulos, 2009: 213). Chief 
 
66On November 24, 2000, war veterans forcibly entered the Supreme Court building where judges were about to hear a 
constitutional application brought by the Commercial Farmers Union with regards to farm invasions. The war veterans 




Justice Gubbay of the Supreme Court resigned in 2001 before his term expired due to pressure from 
ZANU-PF and he was replaced by a more malleable and compliant judge, Chief Justice Chidyausiku, 
who had served as the Deputy Minister of Justice and was also a recipient of the FTLRP (Magaisa, 
2016, 2019a). Several judges who resigned in 2001 and other senior jurists were forced into early 
retirement as part of the judiciary restructuring process (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 46). This 
process led to mistrust of the judiciary system and its ability to administer justice locally and 
internationally. The initial land judgments were overturned by the new Chief Justice and the new 
judges endorsed and legitimised the government’s FTLRP (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 46). A 
subservient judiciary which is not effective in holding the executive accountable is one of the features 
of a hybrid regime. 
 
There was a huge exodus of skilled labour from Zimbabwe following the FTLRP and economic 
recession which started in the late 1990s (Moyo, 2016: 361). FTLRP infringed on human and property 
rights, especially of the white commercial farmers. Natives from the UK and the EU were greatly 
affected by the FTLRP and this severed Zimbabwe’s diplomatic relations with the Western states. In 
2001, the USA passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA)67 and in 
2002, the UK and the EU imposed smart and targeted sanctions68 on Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe shifted 
to a Look East foreign policy that embraced Asian countries as allies, while taking Western states as 
adversaries. Zimbabwe implemented drastic untoward measures aimed at disengaging from the 
western community. Presidential speeches in 2000, were a platform to attack the UK and USA 
(Ncube, 2013). Zimbabwe refused to pay multilateral debts and after being suspended from the 
Commonwealth for human rights violations, it withdrew from the organisation. It maintained friendly 
relations with SADC, the African Union (AU) and Asian countries, especially China. Zimbabwe’s 
participation in SADC helped the country immensely, especially in 2008 when Zimbabwe 
experienced a political and economic crisis. Thus, regarding civil liberties, the political environment 
in this period was skewed in favour of the incumbent ZANU-PF. 
 
 
67Smart and targeted sanctions were on travel bans, arms embargoes and commodity boycotts. ZDERA instructed 
international financial institutions to deny loans and credit to Zimbabwe. Further sanctions were imposed in 2003 on 
Mugabe and 72 senior government officials. USA companies were prohibited from signing contracts with Zimbabwe and 
there was freezing of assets of these senior government officials in USA banks (Mlambo, 2014: 246). 
68Travel bans and freezing of assets owned by the president, cabinet ministers and other officials to any of the 15 EU 
nations; an arms embargo on Zimbabwe; and suspension of bilateral contacts and consultations between diplomats of EU 




In terms of tutelage, most elected representatives completed their formal terms. Election 
empowerment69 and election sovereignty70 were occasionally disregarded. The informal domains of 
power in this period were identified as JOC, war veterans and senior influential ZANU-PF leaders. 
Significant JOC operations in this period were: Operation Maguta71 (feed the nation) (2005), 
Operation Murambatsvina72 (clean the filth out) (2005), Operation Dzikisai Mutengo73 (reduce the 
prices) (2008) and Operation Mavhoterepi (whom did you vote for) (2008). Maguta was done to 
cushion the officers’ standards of living during the economic recession. Moyo (2016: 361) notes that 
4000 soldiers of the army were absorbed by the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), while the National 
Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) absorbed 2 000. Murambatsvina was implemented after the defeat of 
ZANU-PF in the March parliamentary elections in urban areas. This operation could have been an 
attempt to destroy the support MDC enjoyed in urban centres. Operation Mavhoterepi was 
implemented to prevent a Mugabe defeat in the 2008 presidential run-off. Timberg (2008) argues that 
Mugabe informed his security chiefs that he would concede and surrender power to Tsvangirai, but 
ZDF commander Constantine Chiwenga, backed by the other chiefs, vetoed his proposal. They 
insisted that Mugabe would stay in office and they would guarantee his run-off victory. It was also 
alleged that a pact was made that Mugabe would be succeeded by military personnel, called the 
‘succession handshake’ (Magaisa, 2018). Moore (2018: 17) claims that it was agreed that Emmerson 
Mnangagwa would succeed Mugabe for one term and hand over to Constantine Chiwenga in 2023. 
Mavhoterepi and the succession handshake directly interfered with democratic processes and 
manipulated the will of the people. Mangongera (2014: 72) argues that these operations have been 
used to circumvent bureaucrats, to silence opposition parties and to create rent-seeking opportunities 
for senior security sector officers. 
 
Bratton and Masunungure (2008: 50) observe that in the period 2000 to 2008 all state institutions, 
especially the judiciary and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), were biased towards ZANU-PF 
instead of being neutral. Moyo (2016: 352) argues that the security sector was ZANU-PF’s most loyal 
supporter and was occasionally deployed strategically to ensure ZANU-PF’s survival. During the 
 
69The right to complete a constitutional term without being subordinated to any formal enclave of power (Schedler, 
2002:39). 
70Elected officials, through informal channels, are not subjected to broad tutelage powers by actors outside the democratic 
process (Wigell, 2008: 239–240). 
71For Operation Maguta, the military deployed officers to be absorbed by government and state-owned enterprises, hence 
the officers received two salaries, from the army as well as from the government (Bratton & Masunungure, 2018: 49). 
72Operation Murambatsvina was implemented in May/June 2005. It was the demolition of informal vending sites and 
other informal housing premises in urban areas. Ndlovu (2012: 100) claims that approximately 650 000 -700 000 people 
were directly affected by becoming homeless and losing their sources of livelihood. 
73Operation Maguta instructed shops to reduce the prices of goods and services; nevertheless, this led to massive shortages 




FTLRP, the police, CIO and ZNLWVA participated in the successful intimidation, harassment and 
displacement of white farmers. The ZRP commissioner Augustine Chihuri defied a court order to 
enforce the eviction of farm invaders, stating that someone more powerful had instructed him not to 
interfere with the land invasions (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Vitalis Zvinavashe, the late ZDF 
leader and member of JOC, ahead of the 2002 presidential election, issued a public statement stating 
that the ZDF would not accept Tsvangirai to rule (Mangongera, 2014: 67). These sentiments were 
again reiterated by the ZRP, ZDF and air force commissioners prior to the 2008 harmonised elections, 
pledging their allegiance to President Robert Mugabe and their unwillingness to be governed by a 
non-liberation war candidate (Volllan, 2008: 1). ZANU-PF increased its reliance on the security 
sector in this period by co-opting retired and serving military officers into the party’s central 
committee and politburo (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 49). Retired and serving security officers 
were increasingly deployed in state enterprises as shareholders, directors, as part of management, as 
well as employees 74. Moyo (2016: 353–356) contends that this was done to financially reward the 
high-ranking security sector personnel, to appease them politically and to have an avenue to 
circumvent normal accounting procedures to finance ZANU-PF party activities. The Transparency 
Corruption Perception Index dropped from 4.2 in 1999 to 1.8 in 2008 (Trading Economics, 2018). 
This meant that Zimbabwe had increased in the number of cases in which public officers had become 
more fraudulent and requested bribes. Ncube (2013: 103) asserts that corruption linked to top military 
and ZANU-PF officials increased, especially in the mining and agriculture sectors.  
 
The security sector was actively becoming involved in politics in this period. JOC was an unregulated 
autonomous body which could implement binding operations which were not discussed in parliament 
or cabinet. In addition, the security sector falls under institutions of government. Security institutions 
should administer law and order and defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zimbabwe, 
irrespective of which political party is in control. Nevertheless, JOC influenced the outcomes of 
electoral processes, motivated by the need to safeguard their own interests and those of the ZANU-
PF political elites. The relationship between top ZANU-PF leadership and security sector leadership 
was interdependent, where both relied on each other for personal gain, political relevance and 
survival. 
 
As the liberal hybrid regime pointed out, political elite cohesion was slowly fragmenting. The 
fragmentation continued in this period due to factionalism as different groups sought to succeed 
 
74President Mugabe put military personnel to head strategic state-owned enterprises which include the Zimbabwe 
Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA), GMB, NRZ, Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), Department of Parks and 




President Mugabe. The succession issue was further amplified by the death of Vice-President Simon 
Muzenda in 2003, who was the first candidate in line to succeed him. In 2004 there were two dominant 
factions within ZANU-PF, one led by retired general Solomon Mujuru and the other by Emmerson 
Mnangagwa (Mangongera, 2014: 75). Solomon Mujuru was the first ZNA general; he had the respect 
and backing of senior ZANU-PF and senior military officers. Mnangagwa also had significant support 
from the same groups, but from different actors.  
 
The battle between the two factions escalated the period preceding the ZANU-PF 2004 December 
National Congress. Prior to the National Congress, Mnangagwa was endorsed as the potential vice-
president by six out of eight provinces (Moyo, 2004). His nomination indicated that he was the 
preferred candidate. Meanwhile, Mujuru’s faction, through the ZANU-PF Women’s League, pushed 
for the amendment of the party’s constitution to reserve one vice-president position for a woman. 
Their preferred candidate was Joice Mujuru, the wife of Solomon Mujuru. The ‘Tsholotsho 
declaration’ a few months prior to the ZANU-PF congress by the Mnangagwa faction, was interpreted 
by Mugabe as a move to prevent the nomination of Joice Mujuru to the post of Vice-President (Moore, 
2018: 5). At the National Congress, Joice Mujuru was appointed as Vice-President of ZANU-PF and 
subsequently of Zimbabwe. This was a blow to Mnangagwa who had assumed that the provincial 
endorsements signalled an obvious victory. There was low leadership turnover and political elites 
managed the possibility of any external threats taking overpower.  
 
In 2008, as was discussed under elections and civil liberties, Mugabe did not win significant votes to 
endorse him as the winner. A presidential run-off was conducted. It was the Mnangagwa faction that 
implemented Operation Mavhoterepi to ensure a Mugabe victory. Mugabe had the ‘succession 
handshake’ with the Mnangagwa faction. This succession pact was made while Joice Mujuru was the 
incumbent first vice-president, meaning that ZANU-PF was still hampered by factionalism which 
hampered strong political elite cohesion. Although, there were divisions within ZANU-PF it exhibited 
high political elite cooperation in relation to external opposition.  
 
Lastly, in this period, the economy was in distress with inflation pegged at approximately 79.6 billion 
per cent in November 200875 (Hanke & Kwok, 2009: 361). There were serious shortages of basic 
commodities in the country. The government adopted the Indigenisation Economic and 
Empowerment Act (IEEA) of 2007, which mandated that 51% of shares of any public or private 
 
75Hyper-inflation is when there are rapid price increases which erode the purchasing power of money. The RBZ stopped 




company in all sectors of the economy should be owned by indigenous76  Zimbabweans (Government 
of Zimbabwe, 2008: 4). The IEEA was argued to be a tool to empower Zimbabweans economically. 
This Act led to foreign investors becoming more risk-averse about investing in Zimbabwe. The 
political risk of Zimbabwe during the competitive illiberal hybrid regime was considerably higher 
than the liberal hybrid regime period. The FTLRP and the 2008 election violence were observed as 
the very high political risk phases within this period. 
  
This section illustrated a competitive but illiberal hybrid regime which was the second hybrid type 
that was observed in the case of Zimbabwe. The next section will focus on unpacking the hybrid 
regime from 2009 to June 2013. The features highlighted of a competitive illiberal hybrid include: 
▪ Regular, competitive multi-party elections 
▪ Political environment tilted to favour ZANU-PF 
▪ State-sponsored violence towards opposition political party members 
▪ Legislature dominated by ZANU-PF 
▪ Compliant judiciary 
▪ Strong opposition political parties and active civil society 
▪ Media alternatives limited 
▪ The legitimacy of the government questioned domestically and internationally 
▪ Strained diplomatic relations with Western countries 
▪ White commercial farmers land expropriated without compensation 
▪ Restrictive legislation passed: AIPPA, POSA, IEEA, FTLRP 
▪ Property rights not secure 
▪ Fragmenting ZANU-PF political elite cohesion caused by factionalism, fuelled by the 
succession issue 
▪ Increased security-sector influence in politics 
▪ Hyper-inflation and economic recession 
 
 
76Indigenous Zimbabweans included all ethnic black groups; mixed race, Indians and Asians are included in the Act, but 




4.6 Competitive hybrid regime 2009 to June 2013 
The coalition government between MDC and ZANU-PF was operational from 13 February 2009 to 
July 201377. This period was termed competitive hybrid because the 2008 election had been marked 
by stiff competition. There were no other elections conducted in this period, hence elections are not 
discussed in this section. 
 
With reference to civil liberties, ZANU-PF routinely undermined formal institutions under the GNU 
period. Parliament and the office of the prime minister were occasionally excluded or circumvented 
in decision-making. 2008 to 2013 was the only period in Zimbabwe’s history that the opposition 
formed a majority in the legislature (Vollan, 2013: 28). As a result, policies were discussed, thus 
ZANU-PF could not impose policies that favoured it as in times past. Horizontal accountability was 
considerably high because of the presence of MDC in co-governing the country. ZANU-PF 
occasionally bullied MDC and treated it as a junior partner in the agreement. The Human Rights 
Commission was established in 2012 but its application was progressive, which meant that 
perpetrators of past acts of violence could not be questioned. MDC exposed scandals in the diamond 
mining sector that did not follow the proper tendering process and was not discussed in cabinet, 
indicating that few individuals would benefit at the expense of the state (Moyo, 2016: 357–358). 
MDC also exposed the salary gate scandal where directors of state-owned enterprises paid themselves 
exorbitant salaries using public funds when their enterprises were not making a profit (Moyo, 2016: 
359). However, after MDC exposed these scandals, no one was prosecuted. The opposition was vital 
in questioning ZANU-PF and was a source of new ideas in parliament. 
 
The greatest achievement of the GNU was the participatory drafting of a new Zimbabwean 
Constitution. It was initially accepted by a citizen’s referendum vote and then it was also adopted by 
parliament. The 2013 new Zimbabwean Constitution contained provisions guaranteeing the 
protection of human rights and reinstating the citizenship of thousands of Zimbabweans who had their 
citizenship revoked by the amendments made to the Citizens Act in 2001 and 2003 (Freedom House, 
2017: 29). AIPPA and POSA were renegotiated under the coalition government, resulting in the 




77The GNU was agreed upon and signed on 15 September 2008, but implementation only began in February 2009 to mid-




Regarding political elite cohesion, the GNU was not welcomed by some senior ZANU-PF members 
and military personnel, but due to pressure from SADC and Zimbabwe’s economic turmoil, they 
agreed. In addition, ZANU-PF enjoyed the relatively good publicity that the GNU received from the 
international community. During the GNU period ZANU-PF got an opportunity to reformulate 
strategies to regain support and strengthen political elite cooperation. ZANU-PF united and worked 
collectively to ensure that at the end of the GNU it would have the majority, thereby, eliminating the 
possibility of another coalition government. The top ZANU-PF structures remained the same 
resulting in low turnover in leadership which meant there was no significant change in the direction 
of the party.  
  
In terms of tutelary interference, senior ZANU-PF members, war veterans and senior members of the 
security sector continued exerting tutelage over elected officials, as was observed in the competitive 
illiberal hybrid regime. JOC and President Mugabe continued to conduct their weekly meetings 
without inviting Mr Tsvangirai, who was then prime minister, to the meetings (Mangongera, 2014: 
74). MDC also showed tendencies that the officials had to agree on a party position to vote in 
parliament before going to discuss an issue. Elected officials when in parliament represent the people 
who elected them and not the political party they belong to. The constituency’s needs must be 
prioritised over the political party’s position.   
 
The economy was stable during this period. Zimbabwe adopted a multi-currency system in 2009 
which restored confidence in the market and ended hyper-inflation. Economist Intelligence Unit 
(2016) notes that sound economic policies were implemented between 2009 and 2013 and economic 
growth was at 10% per annum. They accredited having MDC as the majority in government as the 
reason for economic stability. The political risk for foreign investors in Zimbabwe in this period was 
considerably lower than in the competitive illiberal hybrid regime. This section was important as it 
discussed the third hybrid regime that is observable after applying the hybrid regime framework in 
Zimbabwe. The next section will focus on the illiberal hybrid regime exhibited by Zimbabwe. The 
features of the competitive hybrid observed in this period include: 
▪ A coalition government between ZANU-PF and MDC 
▪ Opposition the majority in parliament from 2009 to 2013 
▪ The GNU perceived as legitimate domestically and internationally 
▪ Judiciary partial and increased freedom of association and expression 




▪ New Zimbabwean Constitution adopted 
▪ Economy stable and growing 
▪ Increase in corruption cases e.g. salary gate scandal 
▪ ZANU-PF political elite cohesion relatively strong 
 
4.7 Illiberal hybrid regime July 2013 to October 2017 
The July 2013 harmonised election ushered in the beginning of the illiberal hybrid regime. With 
reference to elections, in the 2013 presidential election, President Mugabe won 61.9% of the votes 
against his major rival MDC-T candidate Tsvangirai who received 33.9% of the votes (Ncube, 2013: 
100). ZANU-PF retained a two-thirds majority in the 2013 parliamentary election; it received 159 
seats which was an increase from 99 seats in 2008. MDC-T dropped from 99seats in 2008 to secure 
only 49 seats. MDC-N received no seats, whereas it had received 10 seats in 2008. Independent 
candidates gained one extra seat in 2013 against a previous record of one seat in 2008 (Ncube, 2013: 
100). Voter turnout increased from 32% in 2008 to 59% in 2013 (Kanyinga, 2018: 148). The 2013 
harmonised election lacked the level of competitiveness that had marked the parliamentary and 
presidential elections since 2000.  
 
In terms of civil liberties, the election results were disputed by civil society, opposition political 
parties, and the international community (Ncube, 2013: 100). MDC-T contested the election results 
claiming that ZANU-PF had hired Nikuv International Projects and paid them USD13 million to 
manipulate the voters roll by using names of deceased voters and double counting to ensure a Mugabe 
victory (Mambo, 2013: 23; Mangongera, 2014: 74). Mangongera (2014: 74) claims that some African 
heads of state were allegedly bribed to endorse Mugabe as the victor. MDC reacted by calling for 
fresh elections and sought justice from the courts, but it withdrew its case sighting that the judiciary 
was biased towards ZANU-PF (Magaisa, 2019b: 154). The 2013 election environment was tilted 
towards ZANU-PF as in previous periods. ZANU-PF received more state media coverage compared 
to other political parties. Although MDC was in government, it did not have as much media coverage 
as ZANU-PF. 
 
The election was devoid of large-scale violence as opposed to the competitive illiberal hybrid regime. 
However, it was alleged that ZANU-PF used soft intimidation by reminding the electorate of the 2008 




reduced by the end of the GNU (LeBas, 2014: 61). This was because MDC concentrated on pushing 
for reforms and the drafting of the new constitution. MDC’s human capacity was overstretched, it 
failed to actively maintain grassroot structures at a party level while being actively involved in 
government (LeBas, 2014: 61). In this period, horizontal accountability was minimal. The country 
adopted a new constitution as highlighted under Section 4.6. However, the government did not make 
significant efforts to ensure that the old laws were aligned to the 2013 constitution. Freedom House 
(2017: 4) asserts that this contradiction in the laws had severe implications for effective governance 
and the protecting and promoting of human rights. 
 
ZANU-PF resorted to squashing politics, which of intimidating, harassing, victimising political 
opposition party members and denying political space for gathering. There was a marked decrease in 
freedom of association and speech that citizens had enjoyed in the competitive hybrid period. 
Sporadic planned and unplanned urban protests increased in this period. The government occasionally 
responded by using excessive force to disrupt protestors. One example was Itai Dzamara, a journalist 
who continuously called on the resignation of Robert Mugabe. He used the Africa Unity square 
opposite parliament as his podium for his anti-government protests. He was abducted in a local 
barbershop in 2015 and was never found (Mlambo & Zimunya, 2016: 153). Another example was 
Pastor Evan Mawarire who started the #ThisFlag movement, which he operated by sending videos 
on social media platforms. Mawarire called for a non-violent voluntary stay-away for formal and 
informal workers on the 6th July 2016, which was successful (Muchacha & Moyo, 2017: 234). The 
succeeding calls to stay away were not as successful, as the police arrested him and charged him for 
inciting public disorder. He was, however, acquitted of all charges in November 2017. Social media 
platforms, for example, WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter, became the alternative sources of 
information and were used as mediums to convey the various dates and locations for protests or stay-
aways.  
 
MDC fragmented following their defeat in the 2013 elections. Influential and disgruntled members 
were expelled from the party in 2014. Notably, Tendai Biti and Elton Mangoma, who were the former 
Minister of Finance and Minister of Economic Planning and Investment Promotion respectively, were 
among those dismissed. Biti formed Movement for Democratic Change-Renewal (MDC-Renewal), 
which later reformed to be called the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Mangoma, in turn, formed 






Regarding political elite cohesion, ZANU-PF political elite cohesion fragmented the most between 
2013 and 2017. The preceding sections have highlighted the different reasons for divisions within 
ZANU-PF, the changes made to the presidium and the different factions within ZANU-PF. Between 
2009 and 2013 factionalism was minimal because ZANU-PF focused on retaining majority power in 
parliament and reducing any chance of another coalition government. The succession of President 
Mugabe was the root cause of factionalism within ZANU-PF. It was temporarily resolved in 2004 by 
appointing Joice Mujuru as vice-president. However, the succession pact made between Mugabe and 
the Mnangagwa faction in 2008 meant that the succession issue would need to be revisited. 
 
In 2013, there were two major factions within ZANU-PF, one led by Joice Mujuru, referred to as 
‘Gamatox’ and the other by Emmerson Mnangagwa, which was called ‘Weevil’. In later years 
‘Weevil’ was referred to as ‘Lacoste’ (Mangongera, 2014: 64; Magaisa, 2018). Retired General 
Solomon Mujuru died in 2011; he had been the backbone of the Mujuru faction. In 2014, a few days 
before the ZANU-PF national congress, Joice Mujuru was dismissed as the vice-president because 
there were reports that she was plotting against the President. It was suggested that President Mugabe 
was involved in removing Mujuru because he sought to replace her with Orpah Muchinguri (Magaisa, 
2018). Her vacancy was filled by Emmerson Mnangagwa a long time-rival. Mujuru was expelled 
from ZANU-PF in 2015, as well as cabinet ministers78 suspected to be aligned to Gamatox resulting 
in relatively high leadership turnover. Remarkably, these members were dismissed with no 
disciplinary action or hearing as stipulated in the party’s constitution. Disgruntled after her dismissal, 
Mujuru formed a political party called the Zimbabwe People First (ZPF) 79. 
 
The dismissal of Mujuru did not solve ZANU-PF’s succession issue. There began another battle 
between Lacoste and a group called Generation Forty (G-40) which gained momentum after the 
dissolution of Gamatox. The Lacoste camp was more inclined to the military, war veterans and senior 
ZANU-PF officials. The G-40 group was more inclined to the educated, young and enterprising 
ZANU-PF officials (Mandaza & Reeler, 2018: 20). Jonathan Moyo, Patrick Zhuwao Saviour 
Kasukuwere, and Grace Mugabe were among the top officials of G-40 (Moore, 2018: 9). Grace 
 
78The list of influential people expelled in 2015 includes: Didymus Mutasa- Minister of Presidential Affairs, Webster 
Shamu- Minister of Information Communication Technologies, Postal and Courier Services, Francis Nhema- Minister of 
Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment, Olivia Muchena- Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education, Science 
and Technology Development, Dzikamai Mavhaire- Minister of Energy and Power Development, Nicholas Goche- 
Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, Simbaneuta Mudarikwa- Minister of State for Mashonaland East 
Province and Munacho Mutezo- Deputy Minister of Energy and Power Development (Moyo, 2016: 357).  
79In 2017, Mujuru expelled seven senior members of ZPF who were challenging her within the party. Mujuru changed 




Mugabe’s political career started in 2014 when she became the leader of the ZANU-PF Women’s 
league80. Her appointment enabled her to be a decisive member of the ZANU-PF leadership. The 
battle between G-40 and Lacoste intensified between 2016 and 2017. A bomb exploded on the 
Mugabe dairy farm, and Grace Mugabe blamed the Lacoste faction for the incident (Moore, 2018: 9). 
If the allegations were true, it revealed how relations had deteriorated between the long-time allies. 
During the 2016 to 2017 ZANU-PF campaign rallies, Grace Mugabe publicly humiliated and 
harassed Vice-President Mnangagwa. Initially, the harassment was not explicit but, towards the end 
of 2017, Grace explicitly mentioned Mnangagwa in her mockery (International Crisis Group, 2017: 
3). In August 2017, Mnangagwa claimed he had been poisoned at a ZANU-PF rally in Gweru. He 
was airlifted from the rally to South Africa, seeking medical treatment (Moore, 2018: 10). President 
Robert Mugabe, on two occasions between December 2015 and 2017, rebuked the military to stay 
out of politics (International Crisis Group, 2017: 4). By saying these statements, he was implicitly 
aligning himself with the G-40 faction. The battle between G-40 and Lacoste escalated by the end of 
the illiberal hybrid regime. The period was marked by low political elite cooperation, high 
factionalism, relatively high leadership turnover and increasing military involvement which resulted 
in weakening political elite cohesion. 
 
The last hybrid regime indicator this section discusses is tutelary interference. It will be discussed 
briefly; an extensive discussion is reserved for Section 4.8 on a military hybrid. Elected candidates 
from ZANU-PF failed to complete their constitutional terms. Joice Mujuru, cabinet ministers and 
MPs aligned to Gamatox were dismissed and could not finish their constitutional terms. As was 
highlighted under political elite cohesion, these members were dismissed from ZANU-PF without 
proper disciplinary procedures being followed. ZANU-PF was observed to have dispensed itself from 
all protocol of legality. The autocratic features shown in times past towards opposition members, 
turned inward. The security sector and senior ZANU-PF elites continued to exert informal influence 
on elected officials in this period. 
 
The economy was hampered by a liquidity crisis. The government introduced bond notes in 2016 to 
solve the liquidity crisis. The bond note was used as local tender only, it was pegged at a one is to 
one exchange rate with the USD (USD/Bond 1:1) (KPMG, 2017). KPMG (2017: 3) notes that the 
bond note, upon release, was subjected to a ten per cent discount on the parallel market, meaning that, 
 
80Grace Mugabe had been instrumental in the dismissal of Mujuru. In the run up to the 2014 ZANU-PF National Congress, 




the bond note was of less value than the USD. In addition, the government introduced Statutory 
Instrument 64 of 2016 (SI 64/2016) which imposed import restrictions. In this period, the government 
aggressively implemented the IEEA of 2007 that mandated companies to have majority shareholding 
from indigenous Zimbabweans. The political risk of Zimbabwe in this period was higher than the 
competitive hybrid regime but lower than the competitive illiberal hybrid regime.  
 
This section focused on discussing the illiberal hybrid regime as the fourth type of hybrid regime that 
is exhibited by Zimbabwe. The next section will discuss the military hybrid regime which was 
between November 2017 and 2018. The features of an illiberal hybrid regime include: 
▪ Non-competitive elections 
▪ Intimidation measures employed prior to the 2013 election 
▪ ZANU-PF formed the majority in parliament 
▪ Minimum horizontal accountability 
▪ The legitimacy of the government questioned internationally 
▪ Elected officials failed to complete their terms 
▪ Factionalism experienced within ZANU-PF  
▪ Social media platforms as alternative sources of information 
▪ Key ZANU-PF members expelled without a disciplinary process 
▪ MDC fragmented; splinter groups formed 
▪ Sporadic urban protests which are clamped down by the government using force 
▪ IEEA implemented aggressively 
▪ Bond note introduced due to liquidity constraints and economic recession 
 
4.8 Military hybrid regime November 2017 to 2018 
The weak political elite cohesion within ZANU-PF between 2013 and 2017 was a catalyst which led 
the party to transform into a military hybrid regime from November 2017. This section first discusses 
the hybrid regime indicator of political elite cohesion. During this period, factionalism within ZANU-
PF was high. As was discussed in Section 4.6, there were two factions within ZANU-PF, one was 




included ZDF commander Constantine Chiwenga, Ambassador Chris Mutsvangwa and the leader of 
the war veterans, General Sibusiso Moyo. The other faction was G-40 whose prominent elites 
included Grace Mugabe, Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere and Patrick Zhuwao (Moore, 2018: 
9). Mnangagwa was expelled from ZANU-PF on the 6th of November 2017, in a similar manner to 
that of former vice-president Mujuru, citing reasons of disloyalty, disrespect, deceitfulness and 
unreliability (African Confidential, 2017). This gave the indication that Lacoste was defeated. It was 
suggested that President Mugabe dismissed him because his faction had booed down Grace Mugabe 
at a ZANU-PF rally on the 4th of November 2017 (Moore, 2018: 10). Chiwenga was in China when 
Mnangagwa was dismissed. Chiwenga and other senior army officers’ contracts were pending 
renewal and President Mugabe was contemplating renewing them and asking them to resign (African 
Confidential, 2017). Upon his return from China, at the airport, the police failed an attempt to arrest 
Chiwenga because the military was dressed in civilian clothing and outnumbered the police and 
stopped the attempted arrest (Moore, 2018: 12). On the 13th of November 2017, Chiwenga, backed 
by 90 senior security sector officers, issued a press statement warning that it was going to be actively 
involved in ZANU-PF’s political affairs as the party was infiltrated by non-revolutionary elements 
(International Crisis Group, 2017: 4). State media was prohibited from airing the ZDF press 
statement, the footage was circulated using social media (International Crisis Group, 2017: 4). This 
was a clear warning to G40 from the Lacoste faction.  
 
On the 14th of November 2017, the military launched Operation Restore Legacy, aimed at restoring 
good governance and economic stability. On this day the military disabled the presidential guard, the 
military wing that protected the president, which was suspected to be aligned to G40 (African 
Confidential, 2017). It proceeded to take control of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) 
and issued a press statement that it had launched Operation Restore Legacy. The military 
spokesperson, General Sibusiso Moyo, assured the country and the international community that it 
was only targeting the criminals around President Mugabe and guaranteed the president’s safety. 
Operation Restore Legacy was referred to as a military intervention by the instigators because any 
indication of a coup would not have been supported by SADC and the AU. SADC sent a mediation 
team from South Africa to negotiate between the military and Mugabe. During these negotiations, the 
military and some senior ZANU-PF officials tried persuading Mugabe to resign (Moore, 2018: 13). 
On the18th of November 2017, scores of people marched on the streets demanding the resignation of 
President Mugabe. This was because the military opened space and allowed people to do so. On the 
19th of November 2017, the ZANU-PF central committee fired Robert Mugabe as the first secretary 




intervention. A list was compiled of people aligned to G40 that were effectively banned from ZANU-
PF81. These people were dismissed without a disciplinary hearing, as had been executed to Mujuru, 
her allies and Mnangagwa.  
 
The ZANU-PF central committee endorsed Mnangagwa, who was in self-exile, as the first secretary 
of ZANU-PF. On the 21st of November 2017, President Mugabe called for a cabinet meeting, but few 
people attended (International Crisis Group, 2017: 5). Due to mounting pressure from the military 
and the possibility of being impeached, President Mugabe resigned on the 21st of November 2017. 
Mnangagwa became the interim president, thus claiming victory over his G-40 rivals. Many 
supporters pledged allegiance to Mnangagwa over Mugabe for fear of being expelled from the party. 
Between November 2017 and 2018, there was significantly high leadership turnover at all leadership 
levels within ZANU-PF, high military participation and lower levels of political elite cooperation. 
ZANU-PF was unlikely to disintegrate because of weak political elite cohesion, but the ideology of 
the party had noticeable changes. 
 
This study argues that the military intervention was a military assisted change of government in which 
power remained within ZANU-PF. In addition, this study asserts that the military intervention was 
unconstitutional; it led to the overthrowing of an existing government due to factional differences 
within ZANU-PF82. The military assisted change in government was endorsed by the Zimbabwe high 
court, which claimed that the intervention by the army was not unconstitutional (Thomas-Greenfield 
& Wharton, 2019: 14). The Zimbabwean constitution did not contain any provisions empowering the 
military to effect a constitutional change in government. SADC, AU, EU, UK, USA and China did 
not openly condemn the military intervention (International Crisis Group, 2017: 11). This could be 
because Mugabe had made many foes in his 37-year reign. ZANU-PF leadership significantly 
changed to exhibit a military hybrid style, which this section discusses under tutelary interference. 
 
With reference to tutelary interference, the military was the main actor that exerted tutelage. 
Operation Restore Legacy by ZDF was the military implementing an unconstitutional change in 
government. The military deemed that Mugabe was unable to protect their key interests because he 
 
81Mugabe Robert was reduced to an ordinary member. Key ZANU-PF members banned for life were Mugabe Grace- 
First Lady, Mphoko- Vice-President, Moyo- Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education, Kasukuwere- Minister of Local 
Government, Chombo- Minister of Finance, Zhuwao- Minister of Public Services, Mzembi- Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
82 This unconstitutional change of government can be argued to be a military coup. Other types of coups are guardian, 
veto and break though. This study will not delve into the discussion of these types of coups, it will focus on how PRA 




openly backed the G-40 faction. To that effect, the military applied pressure on Mugabe to resign and 
installed a candidate whom they believed could safeguard their interests. Mugabe failed to complete 
his Presidential term because of the military’s involvement. Between November 2017 and the end of 
2018, the ZANU-PF led government was inclined towards the military hybrid style. First, Operation 
Restore Legacy was successful because the organisers had the capacity to deal with any opposition 
using ammunition. If the operation had been executed by civilians with no artillery, it would have 
failed dismally. 
 
Secondly, Mnangagwa’s two vice-presidents were former military servicemen. Constantine 
Chiwenga was the former commander of the ZDF and the chief architect of Operation Restore 
Legacy, while Kembo Mohadi was a retired colonel. Furthermore, in this period, several retired army 
generals and security sector officers were appointed to key ministerial and ambassadorship posts. 
Notable appointees included retired General Sibusiso Moyo, who read the press statement on the 14th 
of November 2017, who was appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Perence Shiri, who was 
the retired Air Chief Marshal of the Air Force of Zimbabwe, was appointed the Minister of Lands, 
Agriculture, Water, Climate and Rural Resettlement. These appointments could be viewed as military 
officers being rewarded for their involvement in the successful overthrowing of Mugabe. Thirdly, 
Mnangagwa’s administration was more reliant on the military than that of Mugabe. Mnangagwa’s 
presidential guard appeared in public wearing army clothing, as opposed to that of Mugabe. This 
could have served as a constant reminder to the citizens of the power backing Mnangagwa’s 
administration. The International Crisis Group (2017:2) notes that the military patrolled the streets 
instead of the police for five weeks from the 14th of November 2017. In the military hybrid regime, 
the military, which had been an overt player in the political affairs of Zimbabwe from 1980, became 
the major stakeholder driving the political direction of the country. 
 
ZDF claimed that Operation Restore Legacy was an operation targeted at corrupt criminals around 
President Mugabe. However, from November 2017 to the end of 2018, no one from within ZANU-
PF or the G-40 expelled members was prosecuted or convicted of any criminal acts as grave as the 
ZDF had purported. Ignatius Chombo, former Minister of Finance, was accused of having USD15 
million in his house when Operation Restore Legacy was executed in November 2017 (Moore, 2018: 
13). Nevertheless, by the end of 2018, he had not been prosecuted for any major charges. This 
indicates that the military intervention was not executed for the reasons stated, but was the military 





Regarding elections, harmonised elections were conducted on the 30th of July 2018. ZANU-PF 
retained a two-thirds majority in the parliamentary elections (Beardsworth et al., 2019: 12). It was 
the first time that Mugabe and Tsvangirai were not contesting as presidential candidates in 38 and 18 
years respectively. Tsvangirai died in February 2018 after battling with colon cancer, while Mugabe 
resigned on the 21st of November 2017. Nelson Chamisa succeeded Tsvangirai as the MDC leader. 
Movement for Democratic Change- Alliance (MDC-A) was the major contender against ZANU-PF 
from a pool of 23 presidential candidates. MDC-A was an amalgamation of seven political parties83 
created on the 6th of August 2017. There was consensus within MDC-A that Tsvangirai would be the 
presidential candidate while MP candidates were equitably shared. Emmerson Mnangagwa narrowly 
won the election by 50.8% over his major opponent Nelson Chamisa who received 44.3% 
(Beardsworth et al., 2019: 12). The presidential election was highly competitive as opposed to the 
parliamentary election. This election was marked by a high voter turn-out of 70% as compared to 
52% and 32% in the 2013 and 2008 presidential elections respectively (Kanyinga, 2018: 147). The 
high voter turnout could be accredited to the new generation of first-time voters and the euphoria of 
Mugabe’s ouster in the previous year. Elections in a hybrid regime are expected to be competitive, as 
was evident in the presidential election. MDC-A provided stiff competition for ZANU-PF. 
 
Lastly, this section discusses civil liberties. Civil society, opposition political leaders, churches, 
student groups, trade unions and the international community did not condemn the unconstitutional 
military assisted change in government (International Crisis Group, 2017: 11). Opposition parties 
expected the government to implement election reforms and to conduct early elections. Mnangagwa 
sought legitimacy as the head of state because his rise to the presidency was facilitated by the military. 
Mnangagwa pursued re-engagement with Western countries where his predecessor Mugabe had 
pursued disengagement. In the run-up to the July 2018 election, there was increased political space 
and tolerance of opposition parties. There were minimum restrictions placed on political gatherings 
and freedom of speech in comparing 2000 and 2017 (Magaisa, 2019b: 145). Soft intimidation was 
reported in rural areas, but the massive violent acts reported in previous elections were absent 
(Kanyinga, 2018: 148). State media coverage was skewed in favour of ZANU-PF. ZANU-PF was 
observed to have the advantage over its rivals because it used state resources in facilitating its 
campaign (Magaisa, 2019b: 148–149). International election observers from Britain and the EU who 
had been banned from 2002 were welcomed to participate in the election process (Magaisa, 2019b: 
149). In the run-up to the July 30 2018 elections, a grenade exploded at a ZANU-PF rally in 
 
83Mostly MDC splinter groups formed this Alliance. MDC-Alliance included MDC-Ncube, MDC-T, PDP, Transform 




Bulawayo, aimed at ZANU-PF’s top leadership (Beardsworth, Cheeseman & Tinhu, 2019: 9). 
Although Lacoste had prevailed over their G-40 rivals, ZANU-PF was still experiencing divisions. 
 
The open and politically tolerant environment that existed before and during the election changed 
after the election. Two days after the election, on the 1st of August 2018, the military fired live bullets 
at protesters who were marching towards ZEC offices demanding the release of the presidential 
election results. This military intervention resulted in six people dying and several civilians being 
injured (Kanyinga,  2018: 147). Following this encounter soldiers were alleged to have harassed and 
beaten up opposition supporters in urban centres with the aim of discouraging them from protesting 
(Magaisa, 2019b: 153). This event marked an increased reliance on the military to maintain law and 
order among civilians, which should be the role of the police. A commission of enquiry was set up to 
investigate the military shootings that occurred on the first of August 2018. Magaisa (2019: 153) 
notes that the people selected to represent the commission were partisan and were aligned to ZANU-
PF, thus compromising the impartiality and purpose of the inquiry. 
 
MDC-A challenged the presidential results before the highest court in Zimbabwe, the Constitutional 
Court. Beardsworth et al. (2019: 13) note that MDC-A failed to provide enough evidence in 
challenging the election outcome. As a result, the Constitutional court confirmed the election results 
that ZEC had announced, thus making Mnangagwa the legitimate winner. International observers 
noted that the environment, although peaceful, was not level among all participants; it was tilted in 
favour of ZANU-PF. In addition, they noted that state resources benefitted ZANU-PF more and that 
the media and traditional leaders behaviour was biased in favour of ZANU-PF (Beardsworth et al., 
2019: 13; Magaisa, 2019b: 149). The post-election urban violence, international observers’ 
comments, disputed electoral process and outcome resulted in the international community 
questioning the election outcomes. Hence the legitimacy crisis that Mugabe encountered was also 
experienced by Mnangagwa. 
 
MDC had succession battles that were comparable to ZANU-PF; it too did not have a proper 
succession plan. Thokozani Khupe, Elias Mudzuri and Nelson Chamisa, as vice-presidents of the 
party, were vying to succeed Tsvangirai. Nelson Chamisa succeeded Tsvangirai following his death 
in February 2018. Mudzuri conceded to Chamisa’s win, while Khupe refused. As a result, Khupe left 
MDC-A with some followers and contested in the harmonised elections as MDC. This further 
disenfranchised the party by splitting votes in the elections. These divisions in MDC made it lose 
some seats to ZANU-PF in constituencies where it nominated multiple candidates.The economic 




of the country was observed to have reduced when Mugabe resigned until the July 2018 elections. 
After the military clampdown on protestors on the 1st of August 2018, political risk was observed to 
steadily increase until the end of 2018. This section described the military hybrid regime. This was 
because when the hybrid regime framework was applied to Zimbabwe, the military hybrid was the 
last to be observed between 1990 and 2018. The next section discusses the different forms of hybridity 
as exhibited by Zimbabwe. The key features of the military hybrid are as follows: 
▪ Regular, competitive multi-party elections 
▪ Political environment tilted in favour of ZANU-PF 
▪ ZANU-PF majority in parliament 
▪ Judiciary partial 
▪ Before 2018 elections:  
Increased political freedoms, opposition clampdown minimal  
International election observers allowed 
Efforts to re-engage the international community  
▪ After 2018 elections: 
6 people killed on 1 August by the military at a protest over election results 
Clampdown on opponents, violence deployed to force acceptance of the government 
Increased military reliance by the new government 
▪ Factional disputes in ZANU-PF heightened  
▪ President Mugabe resigns before his term ends due to military pressure 
▪ Some ZANU-PF officials fail to complete their terms as Ministers and MP's 
▪ Operation Restore Legacy implemented, which was a military assisted change in government 
▪ Key government positions filled by retired security officers who were the organisers of 
Operation Restore Legacy 
 
To conclude on Zimbabwe’s hybrid development, this study notes that there were five types of hybrid 
regimes exhibited. The first hybrid regime was the liberal hybrid from 1990 to February 2000. The 
hybrid transitioned into the competitive illiberal hybrid regime from March 2000 to 2008. Thereafter, 




regime was not illiberal it could not be referred to as having the same liberal standards as the liberal 
hybrid regime because between 2009 and 2013, the judiciary was perceived as partial, horizontal 
accountability was average and corruption was very high. In comparison, in the liberal hybrid regime, 
the judiciary was perceived as independent, horizontal accountability was higher and the perception 
of corruption was not as high. The illiberal hybrid regime between July 2013 and October 2017 was 
observed to be the fourth distinct hybrid regime type. Lastly, Zimbabwe transitioned into the military 
hybrid regime from November 2017 to 2018. 
 
ZANU-PF, especially the political elites, were the main actors that dictated the trajectory of 
Zimbabwe’s hybrid development. Other key actors were JOC, the military, politically connected 
businesspeople and the MDC. International pressure, especially from the Western countries and 
regional integration in the form of SADC and to some extent AU, was pivotal in Zimbabwe’s hybrid 
development. Changing from one hybrid type to another was motivated by ZANU-PF’s need to 
survive. It was also because the political elites of the party, the politically connected, and the security 
sectors continued having unlimited access to the state’s resources and opportunities for personal gain. 
For example, the shift from the liberal hybrid to the competitive illiberal was necessitated by ZANU-
PF’s need to limit MDCs influence. In addition, the transition from the competitive illiberal hybrid 
to the competitive hybrid was necessitated by ZANU-PF’s need for international recognition which 
was lacking in the former. Furthermore, the military assisted change in government was necessitated 
by divisions within ZANU-PF between Lacoste and G40. The hybrid thus transformed into a military 
hybrid regime.  
 
This section discussed the hybrid development in Zimbabwe, thereby revealing how the hybrid 
transitioned into different forms. This was undertaken to understand how a hybrid regime operates 
when applied to a case study. The next section will provide reasons for the durability of the hybrid 
regime in Zimbabwe. 
 
4.9 Why the Zimbabwean hybrid regime was durable 
Carothers (2002: 3), Merkel (2004: 50), Morlino (2009: 282) and Mufti (2018: 115) argue that hybrid 
regimes are durable. In contrast, Levitsky & Way (2002: 59) claim that hybrid regimes are prone to 
break down because of the instability caused by the democratic and autocratic features co-existing in 




probable for it to democratise than for it to evolve into an authoritarian regime. The question is: Are 
hybrid regimes durable? The durability of the hybrid is contentious in literature as such this study 
seeks to contribute to this debate. This study asserts that the hybrid regime is durable as observed in 
the case of Zimbabwe. 
 
The Zimbabwean hybrid regime could have consolidated into a democracy or disintegrated into 
authoritarian tyranny between 1990 and 2018, but it did not. Zimbabwe transformed into five different 
hybrid regimes in 28 years, indicating its durability. There are two broad hypotheses to explain why 
it has been durable for 28years. The first hypothesis is, ZANU-PF the party and the actors inhibited 
the hybrid from maturing into a democracy and, if left unchallenged, could have progressively turned 
it into an authoritarian regime. The other hypothesis is that opposition political parties, labour unions 
and international norms and practices applied pressure on ZANU-PF to abide by democratic 
principles, thereby denying it the opportunity to recede into an authoritarian regime. The resultant 
effect of applying both hypotheses was the creation and maintenance of a hybrid system.  
 
To expand on the first hypothesis, the dominant political actors in ZANU-PF have, to a great extent, 
consistently been the same, explaining the durability of the hybrid regime. Some strategic politicians 
within ZANU-PF retired from politics, passed away, and succumbed to sickness. While other key 
stakeholders disowned ZANU-PF completely to start their own political parties, for example, Edgar 
Tekere formed ZUM and Joice Mujuru formed ZPF. President Mugabe was the one directing the 
strategic decisions of the country from 1980 to 2017. Mugabe retained and recycled mostly the same 
key ZANU-PF actors to hold different portfolios at different times within cabinet and politburo. There 
are many examples in ZANU-PF’s history. One strategic example is Emmerson Mnangagwa who 
was a ZANU-PF politburo member from 1980 to 2018. He held different ministerial and strategic 
government portfolios, the highest being the vice-president and president posts between December 
2014 and 6 November 2017, and 21 November 2017 and 2018 respectively. Section 4.9 showed that 
the ZANU-PF political elite cohesion of the top-level leadership varied in different periods. Despite 
the factionalism challenges experienced in ZANU-PF, the ultimate collective goal of each faction 
was for power to remain within the political party. Having an elite group of actors presiding over 
Zimbabwe’s political affairs for an extensive period impacted on the minimal development of 






In addition to the first hypothesis, ZANU-PF’s political elites did not actively develop democratic 
institutions and maintained the hybrid political system for their personal gain. ZANU-PF members, 
ZANU-PF youth, war veterans, businessmen linked to political leaders and strategic members of the 
security sector have enjoyed unquestionable access to resources of the state. In addition, these actors 
had preferential access to business opportunities, loans and access to the vast natural resources of the 
state. During the land reform, white-owned expropriated farms were given to the senior military, 
ZANU-PF members, war veterans, senior judges, senior civil servants and ZANU-PF loyalists 
(Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 46; Ncube 2013: 100). ZANU-PF loyalists were the major 
beneficiaries of the IEEA, which required foreigners to cede 51% of their shareholding to indigenous 
Zimbabweans. ZANU-PF, at all levels of leadership, was dependent on the party’s influence and 
control over state resources. Political elites, by creating patron-client relationships, encouraged a lack 
of rule of law and spiralling corruption in the country. The liberal hybrid regime discussed the 
Willowvale motor scandal, the war victim’s compensation fund scandal and the VIP housing scandal; 
these examples showed how political elites abused their offices for personal gain. The need for 
personal gain by political elites undermined the development of strong institutions of the state that 
were necessary for supporting democratisation. ZANU-PF political elites lacked motivation in 
developing democratic institutions, for example, a well-resourced independent anti-corruption 
commission represented by non-partisan individuals, a strong and credible judiciary and equality 
before the law. This was because if these institutions became strong and effective, it would hamper 
their personal privileges of unquestionably syphoning the state’s resources. Thus, Zimbabwe did not 
mature as a democracy, but maintained a hybrid political regime. 
 
Between 1980 and 2018, Zimbabwe was characterised by strong personalities dominating weak 
institutions, which is another factor explaining the first hypothesis. Mugabe was a politically strong 
leader and his personal bias influenced how the country was governed. His strong personality 
undermined the development of independent and strong institutions. He could have used his influence 
to develop strong institutions, but his leadership lacked the political will to do so. His leadership 
adhered to democratic principles and norms in most cases, if the result of doing so would be 
advantageous to ZANU-PF and its loyalists, for example, conducting elections. The competitive 
illiberal and illiberal hybrid regime have shown that the motive for conducting elections was to gain 
domestic and international legitimacy. Therefore, the result of strong personalities in Zimbabwe’s 
governance issues hampered the development of strong institutions and influenced the continued 





With reference to the second hypothesis, MDC was one actor that applied significant pressure on 
ZANU-PF to adhere to democratic principles. Elections between 2000 and 2018 did not serve the 
purpose of confirming ZANU-PF’s dominance, unlike between 1980 and 2000. This was because 
MDC provided stiff competition for ZANU-PF. Diamond (2002: 32) and Levitsky and Way (2002: 
55) assert that election results of above 70% point to an authoritarian state. ZANU-PF did not receive 
a percentage above 70% between 2000 and 2018 for the presidential election results.84 To protect the 
interests of ZANU-PF the state used violence and intimidation in responding to MDC’s challenge to 
ZANU-PF’s hegemony, with the climax of violence being in 2008. These actions reveal the autocratic 
nature within the hybrid. MDC did not fracture, especially during the competitive illiberal hybrid 
regime. MDC formed the majority in parliament in the 2008 elections, which compelled ZANU-PF 
to consider negotiating a coalition government. Thus, having a competitive opposition party was 
instrumental in pushing ZANU-PF to occasionally abide by democratic principles. Perhaps if MDC 
had not provided enough stiff competition, ZANU-PF, left unchallenged, could have evolved into an 
authoritarian regime. 
 
Regional integration was critical in compelling ZANU-PF to adopt and practice democratic 
principles. When there was a political stalemate between MDC and ZANU-PF and high levels of 
political violence unleashed by the state during the competitive illiberal hybrid regime, SADC 
facilitated the dialogue between the rival parties. ZANU-PF was more open to the negotiations 
because SADC was mediating. The dialogue resulted in a coalition government. SADC’s influence 
in Zimbabwe’s political crisis of 2008 compelled ZANU-PF to consider democratic principles. In 
addition, SADC principles influenced the military under Operation Restore Legacy to not implement 
a predictable and apparent coup. The military understood that coups were not supported in SADC 
and the AU, hence the military resorted to applying pressure on President Mugabe to resign. In the 
absence of SADC guidelines, a bloody coup could have occurred. Therefore, regional integration 
compelled ZANU-PF to consider adopting and applying democratic principles. 
 
The hybrid regime in Zimbabwe is observed to show much resilience and the ability to endure. The 
case of Zimbabwe confirms the claims made by Carothers (2002: 3), Merkel (2004: 50), Morlino 
(2009: 282) and Mufti (2018: 115) that the hybrid regime is durable. It contradicts the claims that the 
hybrid is prone to break down due to the incompatible agendas of democracy and autocracy that cause 
tension within the same regime (Levitsky & Way, 2002: 58–59; Epstein et al., 2006: 555; Vukovic, 
 




2011: 12). The factors drawn from the case of Zimbabwe to ensure the durability of a hybrid regime 
are: 
• An incumbent political party that has been prolonged 
• High elite political elite cohesion within the incumbent political party 
• A strong stateman 
• Low turnover in political office 
• A competitive opposition political party 
The Zimbabwean hybrid could have evolved into an authoritarian regime or a democracy as suggested 
by Cassani (2012: 19, 2014: 554). However, this study claims that the Zimbabwean hybrid regime 
transformed into various multifaceted hybrid regimes. It did not evolve into anything other than a 
hybrid regime.   
 
4.10 Conclusion  
This chapter contextualised Zimbabwe as a hybrid regime. Four hybrid regime indicators were chosen 
to analyse the hybrid regime in Zimbabwe; there were elections, civil liberties, tutelary interference 
and political elite cohesion of ZANU-PF. This chapter demonstrated that Zimbabwe exhibited five 
types of the hybrid political system from 1990 to 2018. The liberal hybrid from 1990 to February 
2000 was the first type. It was characterised by non-competitive elections, liberal norms practised, 
relatively high political elite cohesion and ZANU-PF exerted tutelage. The political risk of Zimbabwe 
in this period was relatively low. Second, was the competitive illiberal hybrid regime from March 
2000 to 2008. The period had competitive elections, was illiberal in practice, had weakening political 
elite cohesion and JOC, ZANU-PF and war veterans were the informal reserves of power. 
Subsequently, the political risk of Zimbabwe increased in this period.  
 
The third type was the competitive hybrid regime from 2009 to June 2013. The major opposition 
MDC had the majority in parliament which compelled ZANU-PF to negotiate a coalition government 
with the opposition. JOC exerted overt tutelary interference and the political elite cohesion within 
ZANU-PF was not as strong as in the 1980’s period. The political risk decreased from the previous 
period’s high levels. The illiberal hybrid regime from July 2013 to October 2017 was the fourth type 
of hybrid. The period was marked by non-competitive elections, the denying of freedoms and low 




was increasing. The military hybrid was the last type of hybrid regime exhibited in Zimbabwe 
between November 2017 and 2018. Competitive elections, a mixture of illiberal and liberal behaviour 
and low political elite cohesion were the characteristics shown by this hybrid. The security sector, 
especially the military, moved from being an informal actor to a formal actor in governance issues. It 
forced the resignation of President Mugabe. Political risk fluctuated between increasing and 
decreasing in this period.  
 
Lastly, this chapter argued that hybrid regimes were durable using Zimbabwe as the referent case 
study from 1990 to 2018. The Zimbabwe hybrid regime did not mature as a democracy or collapse to 
be authoritarian regime. It consistently showed the co-existence of both political styles. One 
hypothesis suggested that ZANU-PF the party, and the actors inhibited the hybrid from maturing into 
a democracy and, if left unchallenged, could have transformed into an authoritarian regime. This was 
because the key actors within ZANU-PF were the same over an extensive period. In addition to this, 
strong personalities within ZANU-PF overshadowed the state’s weak institutions. There was a lack 
of political will to develop strong institutions by ZANU-PF political elites from 1990 to 2018 because 
this could have infringed on their unquestioned access to the state’s resources for personal gain. The 
second hypothesis suggested that the MDC and influence from regional integration, especially SADC, 
inhibited ZANU-PF from deteriorating into authoritarian tyranny. As a result of these two hypotheses 
concurrently working together, the hybrid regime system was created and practised for a long period 
in Zimbabwe, showing its durability.  
 
This chapter finds that there are five factors that are required for the hybrid regime to be durable. The 
hybrid should have an incumbent political party that has been in government for a lengthy period, 
which has high political elite cohesion and possibly led by a statesman with a strong personality. In 
addition, there should be low turnover in political office-bearers and a very competitive opposition 
that forces the incumbent not to degenerate into authoritarian rule. This chapter provided the context 
that was necessary to understand Zimbabwe as a hybrid regime. It was pivotal for this study to 
understand the hybrid regime before attempting to critically assess PRA in hybrid regimes. The next 








Chapter 5: Political Risk in Zimbabwe 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This study intends to find out if PRA can be conducted using principles different from democracy. 
Although democracy is the preferable and leading political regime, this study observed, from 
academic literature, that democracy could be facing a recession. The recession affects how political 
risk is conducted because PRA is based on democratic norms and values. As a result, this study sought 
to find out if PRA can be undertaken using principles of a less known political regime by taking the 
hybrid regime. The study seeks to find if principles of the hybrid regime could be used to measure 
PRA. The study questions to what extent the traditional conceptual perceptions of political risk in 
hybrid regimes are still applicable.  
This chapter analyses political risk in Zimbabwe. The first section of this chapter applies the political 
risk framework for hybrid regimes to the case study of Zimbabwe. The findings of this case study 
will be discussed under the three categories of the framework which are political structures and 
institutions, political stability and economic development. The discussion of each category is 
followed by a short summary. The second section analyses the main findings of the study. It will 
highlight what this study confirms or contradicts about political risk in a hybrid regime.  Lastly, the 
main research question is answered. 
 
5.2 Political risk framework for the hybrid regime  
The political risk framework for the hybrid regime is applied to the case of Zimbabwe. The Political 
risk framework has three categories: political structure and political institutions, political stability, 
and economic development. The categories are equally important. The relationship postulated in 
literature is that a hybrid regime increases political risk, which led this study to adopt the same 
hypothesis. Each indicator of the PRA and hybrid regime framework will be analysed, whether its 
presence or absence leads to any influence in political risk. The discussion of each indicator will focus 
on what the majority of respondents alluded to as well as relevant observations raise about the 
indicator. Each indicator given could potentially have the effect of increasing or decreasing political 
risk and may possibly have no impact on political risk at all. After applying this framework, the 
analysis drawn from this case study will reveal whether hybrid regimes lead to an increase in political 
risk. A republication of the political risk framework for hybrid regimes for the hybrid regime is given 




Table 5.1:Political risk framework for hybrid regimes 
 Source: Author’s compilation (2019). *This table is taken from Chapter Three  




and institutions  
Elections Uncompetitive, not free and fair 
elections increase PRA 
 
Free and fair elections, disputed and 
violent elections, election environment, 
media openness. 
Legitimacy Illegitimacy increases PRA The acceptability or not of the 
government, domestically and 
internationally 
State institutions Weak institutions increase PRA 
 
Independence from politics of state 
institutions, for example, parastatals, the 
parliament, the police, army. 
Horizontal accountability or not 
Rule of law Weak rule of law increases PRA The judiciary system’s integrity,  
Application of the law 
Political  
Stability 
Corruption Corruption increases PRA Corruption 
Tutelary interference Interference by a guardian increases 
PRA 
If tutelage exists, by whom and possible 
impact on political risk  
Political elite cohesion Weak political elite cohesion within 
the incumbent party’s instability 
increases PRA 
The strength of the incumbent party’s 
political elite, staleness, succession. 
Economic 
Development 
Government’s participation in 
the economy 
High participation increases PRA 
 
Tax as a percentage of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) to measure 
participation, 
Policy consistency 
Adverse government policies 
and actions 
Adverse government regulations 
increase PRA 
Which policies have been adverse for 
foreign investors? 
Economic performance An economically underdeveloped state 
increases PRA 
Liquidity situation, external debt,  
history of expropriation and 
nationalisation   
Health pandemics Health pandemics increase PRA Health  
International relations Strained relationships increase 
political risk 
Home-host relationships 
Geographic location and natural 
disasters 
Natural disasters/extreme weather 
patterns increase political risk 
Geographic location and natural 




5.2.1. Political structure and institutions 
This category in the political risk framework will focus on the following indicators: 
i. Elections  ii. Legitimacy   iii. State institutions  iv. Rule of law 
 
5.2.1.1 Elections  
The indicator of elections overlaps with legitimacy; however, legitimacy is discussed in Section 
5.2.1.2. Elections can be classified as free and fair, contested and there is the possibility of violence 
during an election. Each of these dimensions of elections has a different impact on political risk. 
Zimbabwe, between 1980 and 2018, conducted nine rounds of elections. It was highlighted that 
elections were harmonised in 2008 to cut down on expenses associated with elections (KII 
Government, Respondent 4). The process of conducting elections was observed to have an impact on 
business. The economy was observed to have slowed down during an election because of people’s 
expectations (KII Government, Respondent 3 and KII MNC, Respondent 1 and 5). However, in the 
period after the election, the economy was expected to grow and businesses to be profitable (KII 
MNC, Respondent 1). Elections could also be used as an investment tool, which was observed to be 
implemented by South Africa but not Zimbabwe (KII Embassy, Respondent 1). This indicates that 
electoral outcomes have the potential to either increase or decrease future potential investment due to 
how the markets respond to the individuals selected. 
 
Conducting a free and fair election devoid of major contestations and political violence leads to an 
easier acceptance of the election outcomes domestically and internationally. It was emphasised that 
the election outcomes must be accepted by opposition political parties, civil society, international 
observers, other states and international organisations (KII Political risk company, Respondent 1; KII 
Embassy, Respondent 2). Many respondents pointed out that a free and fair election resulted in the 
results being easily accepted. If an election was perceived as being free and fair, it lowered the 
perception of political risk of the host country (KII Embassy, Respondent 4, 5; KII Government, 
Respondent 4; KII MNC, Respondent 3 and KII NGO, Respondent 3, 5). Also, if an election was 
free, but slightly tilted in favour of the incumbent, the relationship between political risk and elections 
would still be positive (KII Embassy, Respondent 5).  
 
Data for this study was collected from June to October 2018, which coincided with the July 2018 




KII Government, Respondent 4, commenting on Zimbabwe’s election reputation said, “…that is why 
our elections on Monday the 30th of July 2018 must meet that test of being free, fair and credible; 
because we want to get out of the ghost of the past…” This was also reiterated by KII Government, 
Respondent 5 who said, “Our image is very dirty, and we want to spruce it up. It is for that reason 
that we want the international community to say, ‘Zimbabwe had its election and they were clean 
elections, the winner won because he deserved it, he had the support of the people...’” These 
comments indicate that the ZANU-PF government was seeking international recognition from the 
2018 harmonised elections. The 2018 election process was deemed relatively more credible than all 
previous elections (KII Academia, Respondent 1, 5, 6). As a result of election outcomes being 
perceived as unfair between 2000 and 2018 it was mentioned that Zimbabwe experienced political 
isolation and the imposition of sanctions (KII Government, Respondent 4); bilateral and multilateral 
partners withdrew aid (KII MNC, Respondent 3), and investors withheld new potential investment 
projects from Zimbabwe (KII Embassy, Respondent 5 and KII NGO, Respondent 3). This shows that 
a clean and fair election is more likely, in all situations, to reduce the associated political risk of a 
hybrid regime host country. In addition, a free but relatively unfair election also points to reducing 
the associated levels of political risk.  
 
Regarding disputed elections, electoral outcomes could be discredited mainly because of how the 
process was managed or if there are allegations of votes being manipulated. The majority of 
respondents highlighted that Zimbabwe’s electoral outcomes had been contested between 2000 and 
2018. In Zimbabwe, electoral disputes were mainly identified to arise from:  i) political violence on 
opposition members (KII Government, Respondent 4),  ii) ZEC, the independent commission that 
oversees the election processes, being partial and seen as partisan towards ZANU-PF (KII Academia, 
Respondent 1), and iii) and errors in counting and procedural concerns (KII Academia, Respondent 
1, 5, 6). It was clarified that errors in counting and procedural concerns were experienced in other 
countries but did not substantiate a basis to overturn the election outcomes (KII Academia, 
Respondent 5 and KII Embassy, Respondent 2). Electoral outcomes had been overturned when 
contested in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2018. During the liberal hybrid regime, the courts presided 
on many court cases that resulted in changing the election results (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997: 159; 
Dorman, 2005: 135). 
 
Many respondents established the link that contested electoral outcomes increased the level of 
political risk. The respondents emphasised that when contesting electoral outcomes, the whole 




1, 5 and KII NGO, Respondent 2). During the data collection period, MDC-A was challenging the 
election results from the Constitutional Court in August 2018. Remarkably, given that many 
respondents mentioned that contested electoral outcomes increase political risk, the expectation was 
that MNCs would report the same conclusion. On the contrary, KII MNC, Respondent 3 and 4 
highlighted that the process of elections was repetitive, their businesses had to continue operating 
irrespective of the electoral outcomes. They had also adjusted to the environment in Zimbabwe that 
the election process was going to be contested. KII MNC, Respondent 4 made the following 
comments: 
KII MNC, Respondent 4: It has sort of made us grow a fat skin because we were now sort of 
used to it. Elections come, and they are disputed then we go on another 5 years, 2023 we will 
have another election it’s going to be disputed again. 
Researcher: Does it affect your calculations of risk in any way? 
KII MNC, Respondent 4: In the sense that we just know that there is going to be elections, 
there will be an outcome, whatever outcome it is then we still buy it. We are not going to then 
say what if? 
Researcher: So, the Constitutional Court didn’t unsettle you in any way? 
KII MNC, Respondent 4: It just confirmed things as they were, and nothing was changed, and 
we moved on. Of course, I am not sure of the other arguments coming through and what they 
view, it doesn’t in my view. As a business that chapter is done. 
 
This indicates that despite the theoretical expectation that disputed elections increase the level of 
political risk, the MNCs operating in Zimbabwe have adapted to elections being disputed and plan 
the future with this factor in mind. 
 
In terms of electoral violence, it can be categorised as pre-election, during and post-election. Based 
on any of these three occurring, election outcomes could be dismissed. The majority of respondents 
highlighted that Zimbabwe had a history of unleashing violence on political opponents. The height 
of political violence before, during and after an election was mentioned as the 2008 June presidential 
run-off election (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 54; Mangongera, 2014: 73, KII Academia, 
Respondents 1, 4; KII Embassy, Respondents 2, 3; KII Government, Respondent 5 and KII NGO, 
Respondent 3, 6). The state was referred to as the chief architecture of unleashing violence on 
opposition members for the benefit of ZANU-PF (Raftopoulos 2009: 215; KII Academia, Respondent 
4; KII NGO, Respondent 6 and KII Embassy, Respondent 2). The ZANU-PF government used its 





The 2013 and 2018 elections did not exhibit the political violence that was experienced during the 
competitive illiberal hybrid regime. However, it was highlighted that in these elections, ZANU-PF 
exploited the infrastructure of violence that had been set up during the competitive illiberal hybrid 
regime (KII Academia, Respondent 1; KII NGO, Respondent 6). A few respondents mentioned that 
political violence had a direct and negative impact on political risk. It was emphasised that 
international norms and standards condoned violence during an election (KII Government, 
Respondent 4). MNCs were cognizant of the possibility of political violence to disrupt their 
operations. MNCs mentioned that they put adequate security measures for their premises and 
purchased insurance to protect themselves from the consequences of political violence (KII MNC, 
Respondent 1, 5). 
 
For a contested election, MNCs explicitly expressed that they had adapted to the Zimbabwean 
situation and regarding election violence, they spoke about the measures to protect the organisation. 
The notion of violence during an election was perceived very negatively by a majority of respondents. 
Thus, although MNCs could adapt to it, it can be concluded that violence during an election will 
always increase the political risk in a hybrid regime. This shows that regarding elections, the concern 
is not about who wins or how flawed the process is; investors are more concerned about election 
violence erupting because this could result in loss of property, disruption of operations or harm to 
their staff members. 
 
5.2.1.2 Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is the wilful acceptance of the government by the citizens, thus the government exercises 
authority over the citizens through mutual consent and not through coercion (Howell & Chaddick, 
1994: 78). It is closely related to the indicator of elections discussed in Section 5.2.1.1 in that a free 
and fair election leads to the easier acceptability of a political regime and government domestically 
and internationally. Many respondents stated that the legitimacy of the state’s leadership must be 
confirmed domestically and endorsed by other states, regional blocks, international organisations, 
super-powers and international observers that participate in the election process. Without this 
endorsement, the state would be viewed as having an illegitimate leadership.  
 
It was emphasised that Zimbabwe was characterised as having legitimacy deficits after 2000 (Ncube, 




4, 5 and KII NGO, Respondent 1). Two respondents echoed that the government had occasionally 
resorted to the use of force to enforce public acceptance (KII Academia, Respondent 3 and KII 
Embassy, Respondent 5). KII Academia, Respondent 3 put it as follows, “Zimbabwe has been 
haunted by disputed elections under the long-time ruler, Mugabe. A government with weak legitimacy 
posed a serious risk because of its authoritarian tendencies that became the only formula to enforce 
public acceptance of authority.” The perception of the government being illegitimate was more 
amplified in relation to the international community than in the domestic community (KII Academia, 
Respondent 3; KII Embassy, Respondent 1, 2; KII Government, Respondent 4, 5 and KII NGO, 
Respondent 4). 
 
Respondents from government highlighted the major challenges of being perceived as having an 
illegitimate government as the following: i) Since 2002, sanctions were imposed on the country and 
internationally, Zimbabwe experienced political isolation, ii) the inability to attract FDI and 
international donor funding to the government’s treasury, and iii) the inability to secure lines of credit 
internationally. Although the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe were targeted at specific political 
figures, it was mentioned that having sanctions imposed on the president had been detrimental for the 
country because he was the Head of State and the person that represented the country internationally 
(KII Government, Respondent 4). It was mentioned by two government representatives that 
investment was low in countries that were deemed to have illegitimate leaders (KII Government, 
Respondent 3, 5). According to KII Government, Respondent 5, this was because, “A country led by 
an illegitimate leader is a ticking time bomb. You never know when things happen; there is no 
stability.” The views of the respondents indicated that sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe due to the 
perception of the illegitimacy of the government’s leadership internationally had been costly to the 
country’s development. 
 
The link between legitimacy and political risk was established by most of the respondents as negative. 
An illegitimate leader increased the political risk profile of a country (Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 76; 
KII Academia, Respondent 3; KII Embassy, Respondent 1, 2; KII Government, Respondent 4, 5; KII 
NGO, Respondent 4; KII MNC, Respondent 5 and KII Political risk company, Respondent 1). The 
following comments made by KII Government, Respondent 5 emphasised the link between 
legitimacy and political risk:  
Legitimacy is actually the key. For you to be considered worthy of anything, you have to be 
legitimate. If you don’t have legitimacy, then you are there illegally, that’s what it means. And 




Elections have been disputed and the legitimacy question has been there. Once it’s like that, 
it increases the political risk, of course, because anything can happen in a country with no 
legitimacy. Issues of stability are questionable… Should I go there? The leader didn’t even 
win, and these questions affect stability in the country… 
 
Many respondents highlighted that the perception of the illegitimacy of Zimbabwe had resulted in 
low investor confidence. Illegitimacy was observed to have a negative impact on general business 
operations and trading (KII MNC, Respondent 5). It validates that the legitimacy of a government 
has a positive impact that is beyond the political sphere. Additionally, illegitimacy acts as a deterrent 
for potential foreign investors who have been banned by their home country’s government from 
interacting with a host government that is deemed illegitimate. In these instances, the home 
government imposes punitive measures on MNCs if they transact with any business that promotes 
‘an illegitimate host government’ (KII Embassy, Respondent 5). Thus, the perception of illegitimacy 
immeasurably increases the perceived political risk of a potential host nation.  
 
Worth noting, one respondent highlighted that although legitimacy was important, other states 
managed to attract FDI despite elections condemned as flawed and outcomes deemed illegitimate. 
KII Government, Respondent 3, pointed this out by saying, “… and I think in terms of legitimacy, we 
have seen in some countries… Yes, the observers they say this was a flawed process, but sometimes 
you would see that same country having investors coming; so sometimes it’s not really about the 
election, it’s about the deals that can be made….” The observation made by this respondent could be 
in states which have vast natural resources, for example, mineral deposits, crude oil and vast tracks 
of land. It is implied that this had not resulted as such in Zimbabwe; rather, illegitimacy had led to a 
decrease in FDI, a negative impact on businesses and low confidence in the economy. Thus, it could 
be deduced that in a hybrid regime, a legitimate government increases the possibility of attracting 
more FDI and lowering the perception of political risk. 
 
5.2.1.3 State institutions 
This indicator focused on the strength of state institutions and government agencies. State institutions 
are identified as the executive, the legislature and the judiciary; and government agencies include the 
police, parastatals, the army and civil servants. Professionals working in state institutions and 
independent commissions are expected to be impartial, non-partisan, and not to prejudice the lawful 
interests of any political party (Government of Zimbabwe, 2013). This indicator is closely related to 




A handful of respondents echoed that the formal institutions in Zimbabwe were typified as weak. The 
constitution of Zimbabwe of 2013 was argued to be one of the best, not only in Africa, but in the 
world, in relation to the formal institutions of contravening power (KII Academia, Respondent 1, 4). 
However, the respondents emphasised that the empirical reality was contrary to the expectations of 
the Zimbabwean constitution. The informal institutions were highlighted as more powerful than the 
formal institutions (Magaisa, 2019c; KII Academia, Respondent 1, 4; KII Embassy, Respondent 1, 5; 
KII MNC, Respondent 5 and KII Political risk company, Respondent 1). To emphasise this, KII 
Embassy, Respondent 1 said, “If you look at President Mugabe for instance, Mugabe was not just an 
individual, he was an institution and an institution above all other institutions. You wouldn’t have 
checks and balances on the executive.” This comment shows that the informal institutions included 
top-level political elites that used power beyond formal limits. Respondents emphasised that the 
distinction between ZANU-PF and government resources, roles and duties was blurred. However, in 
instances in which there was a distinction, the ZANU-PF position took precedence over government 
positions (KII MNC, Respondent 5). Two respondents pointed out that their companies did not 
finance any political parties; they only interacted with government agencies as their customers (KII 
MNC, Respondent 1, 5). MNCs showed awareness and an adaptation to the behaviour of government 
employees, placing emphasis on the ZANU-PF position over that of the government. 
 
The strengthening of formal institutions was identified by respondents to be hampered by several 
factors. First, independent commissions were identified as underfunded, which compromised their 
performance, making them ineffective (Magaisa, 2019c; KII Academia, Respondent 4). Secondly, 
vacancies in formal institutions were observed to be filled on the basis of patronage and in a partisan 
manner, making these institutions inefficient, partial and weak (Magaisa, 2019c; KII Academia, 
Respondent 1, 4). Thirdly, it was highlighted that some independent commissions did not have the 
enabling legislation for them to be operational and effective (Freedom House, 2017; KII Academia, 
Respondent 4). An additional way that formal institutions have been weakened in Zimbabwe is by 
creating parallel institutions which report to the executive and have the same functions as independent 
commissions (Magaisa, 2019c). An example is, there is the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission 
(ZACC), which derives its mandate from the constitution; there is also the anti-corruption unit, which 
is a department in the president’s office, which was more funded than the ZACC that it was shadowing 
(Magaisa, 2019c). The anti-corruption unit from the president’s office, therefore, lacked autonomy 
from the executive. The measures mentioned above resulted in the weakening and undermining of 
formal institutions in Zimbabwe. Measures could have been implemented to ensure the strengthening 




Parliament and the judiciary, which must make the executive accountable, were highlighted by 
respondents as ineffective. Parliament was described as a ‘rubber-stamping organisation’ which 
lacked innovation and genuine discussion over important issues, regardless of the opposition political 
parties being represented in parliament (KII Embassy, Respondent 5). KII Embassy, Respondent 5 
highlighted that the executive, between 2000 and 2007, was controlled by a few individuals. Cabinet 
meetings should advise the president; however, during the competitive illiberal hybrid regime, cabinet 
routinely met to ‘sanitize decisions’ that would have been agreed upon before by a select group of 
individuals (KII Embassy, Respondent 5). In addition, the respondents indicated that there was 
minimal horizontal accountability between the three arms of government (KII Academia, Respondent 
1, 4; KII Embassy, Respondent 1, 5; KII NGO, Respondent 3 and KII Political risk company, 
Respondent 1). Due to the lack of checks and balances between the three arms of government, there 
was the possibility that the political elites in these institutions could collude on matters of self-interest, 
thus weakening the ability of these institutions to effectively ensure that each arm of government was 
accountable to its mandate. 
 
The weak institutions exhibited in Zimbabwe were discussed by respondents to be associated with 
high levels of political risk (KII Academia, Respondent 1; KII Embassy, Respondent 1, 5; KII NGO, 
Respondent 5 and KII Political risk company, Respondent 1). The impact of weak institutions on 
MNC operations was highlighted to create uncertainty for potential and current foreign investors (KII 
Academia, Respondent 1). In addition, a country with weak institutions was discussed to have porous 
avenues for corruption, was marred by nepotism, patronage and undermined the authority of the law 
(KII Academia, Respondent 1; KII Embassy, Respondent 1, 5 and KII MNC, Respondent 1). One 
respondent said that some policy pronouncements were initially made at ZANU-PF rallies and not 
via formal government platforms (KII MNC, Respondent 3). As a result, the industry had learnt to 
notice how the government behaved and adjust accordingly. Furthermore, some politicians would 
enter business premises in 2008 and reduce the prices of goods and their decisions were binding (KII 
MNC, Respondent 5). These have been the resultant effects of having weak institutions for MNCs.  
 
KII Government, Respondent 3 stated that foreign investors could come if they had the protection of 
the president that their operations would be unharmed. This was expressed in the following comment: 
…. And where we are just saying, if there are investors coming and they have, maybe, the 
protection of the president, yes, you will see them coming in and surely investing in the 
country. Two years down the line, their investment is affected, yes, but I think it is two-sided; 
some may come knowing very well that their investment is going to be protected and some 




Investors need the protection of the law and an independent judiciary and not the president. However, 
this comment shows that the practice of ‘protection from the president’ was a concept some investors 
understood and followed before and during commencing operations in Zimbabwe. It is inferred that 
the weak institutions in Zimbabwe, coupled with the strong man leadership, resulted in having lower 
levels of political risk for some foreign investors.  
 
5.2.1.4 Rule of law 
The concept of rule of law is when there is no bias in applying the law. The law is consistently and 
equitably applied to all citizens irrespective of their political affiliation, wealth, education, race and 
societal standing. An independent judiciary is expected to support the effective implementation of the 
rule of law. Zimbabwean laws and procedures for conducting business were observed to be difficult 
to understand and were too cumbersome to follow, especially for foreign investors (KII Embassy, 
Respondent 2). Worth noting is that before 2000 and the implementation of the FTLRP, the judiciary 
system was observed to be highly independent (Chikwanha-Dzenga et al., 1999; Magaisa, 2016; KII 
Academia, Respondent 1). After the FTLRP in 2001, Chief Justice Gubbay and several other judges 
were forced into early retirement. Their replacements were people who were perceived to be 
malleable, subservient and partisan towards ZANU-PF (Human Rights Watch, 2008; Magaisa, 2016). 
The public generally perceived the judiciary system as corrupt, partisan and bribe-able, which was 
highlighted by some respondents (KII Academia, Respondent 1, 4; KII Embassy, Respondent 2; KII 
NGO, Respondent 3 and KII MNC, Respondent 1). If the general citizens had this perception, it can 
be deduced that foreigners operating in Zimbabwe had a similar view of the judiciary as being corrupt 
and requesting for bribes. 
 
Many respondents highlighted that there were inconsistencies in the application of the law. It was 
suggested that the country had two different sets of law, one for ordinary citizens and the other for 
ZANU-PF political elites and politically connected people, resulting in the law being applied on a 
discretionary basis (Magaisa, 2016; KII Academia, Respondent 1 and KII NGO, Respondent 3). This 
selective application of the law resulted in poor rule of law. KII Academia, Respondent 1 mentioned 
that political elites, if charged with any criminal offence, were hardly prosecuted and the procedures 
that accompany effective investigation and prosecution were not effectively followed in Zimbabwe. 
The executive arm of the government was observed to interfere in judiciary procedures. This was 




What signals are we sending out to the rest of the world in terms of our respect for rule of 
law, for example? Interestingly you have, on the one hand, government portraying itself as 
respecting rule of law. In other instances, you also have the same government creating the 
impression that the political leaders exercise a lot of discretion. If the Head of State says he 
had to intervene to have Tendai Biti (MDC-A opposition leader) released from prison, now 
he is interfering with the judiciary in the country…  
This reflects that horizontal accountability between the arms of government was occasionally 
weakened by such practices of the executive interfering with processes that the judiciary should 
preside over. It resulted in ZANU-PF political elites and politically connected people creating the 
impression that the law was not important, it could occasionally be circumvented and that they were 
above the country’s laws. 
 
A majority of respondents corroborated the relationship between rule of law and political risk in 
Zimbabwe as one in which low adherence to the application of the law resulted in high levels of 
political risk. MNC activities were observed to be affected by poor rule of law in Zimbabwe. Chiefly, 
respondents mentioned that there were no guarantees as to what would happen to one’s investment. 
In addition, the high levels of uncertainty could lead to expropriation or confiscation of the MNCs 
assets and investment because the law was applied in a selective manner (KII Embassy, Respondent 
2; KII NGO, Respondent 2 and KII Government, Respondent 1, 2). Respondents also suggested that 
Zimbabwe would benefit from more foreign investors if the law were applied consistently, 
irrespective of the political and social status of the offenders (KII Academia, Respondent 1 and KII 
Political risk company, Respondent 1).  
 
It was mentioned that the judiciary system lacked the integrity that it should have and that there was 
no political will to restore the integrity of the judiciary system. KII MNC, Respondent 1 highlighted 
this in the following comment: 
Now when you look at our political system, court cases can drag for long up to 3 or 4 or 5 
years and you are looking at possibly a loss of USD4 000-00… If it goes to court, some people 
have better ways to manoeuvre around the judiciary system and will get away with it, while 
some do not have. But all that comes back to the political environment to say, do we have the 
political will to say the judicial system needs to have this type of integrity? It’s not there and 
just giving a blind eye. Company B, as big as it is, might have the muscle to say, ‘We will see 
how it goes,’ but it can’t be a permanent thing to say this year you have a loss of USD3 
million, the following year you encounter another loss of USD5 million…  
This indicates that MNCs operating in Zimbabwe were cognizant of the inefficiencies and losses that 
could potentially be caused by the judiciary system. However, continued operations in Zimbabwe 




judiciary system. MNCs with less capacity would probably not continue operations, in contrast to 
MNCs with greater capacity to absorb the losses. In addition, as discussed in Section 5.2.1.3, some 
investors continued investments because they had adequate protection from the president’s office 
(KII Government, Respondent 3), which was above the protection of the law. This indicator showed 
that investors valued rule of law, however, operating in a hybrid system, the foreign investors had 
adapted to the inconsistencies of how rule of law was applied. The investors that continued operations 
showed an awareness of this; their options were either to incur the losses that accrue to them from the 
judiciary system or to seek “protection” from informal institutions- either the president or a high-
ranking political connection.  
 
5.2.1.5 Summary of political structure and institutions 
In Zimbabwe, elections occurred regularly, however, it lacked a record of conducting clean elections 
between 2000 and 2018. This resulted in the country’s leadership being perceived as illegitimate. A 
free and fair election was established to reduce political risk. Although in theory it would lead to 
increased political risk, the MNCs operating in Zimbabwe echoed that contestation of an election 
alone would not warrant increasing political risk. If the contestations resulted in violence, then the 
associated political risk would increase. Politically motivated violence was observed to have 
substantially reduced in elections conducted after 2008. The perception of illegitimacy in Zimbabwe 
had resulted in receiving low FDI and impacted negatively on political risk. Formal state institutions 
were observed to have less power than informal institutions. As a result, formal institutions were 
perceived as weak. The relationship between weak institutions and political risk was established as 
negative in Zimbabwe. Rule of law was described as low and the judiciary system was discussed as 
bribe-able, impacting negatively on political risk. MNCs and foreign investors in some instances 
sought the ‘protection of the president’ regarding their investment. This indicates that foreign 
investors were aware of the weaknesses of state institutions and the judiciary and some occasionally 
circumvented formal channels and used the informal institutions as well. Table 5.2 gives a summary 









Table 5.2: Political structures and institutions indicators impact on political risk 
Indicator Impact on PRA Direction of impact 
Free and fair elections Decrease Direct 
Disputed elections No effect Indirect 
Election violence Increase   Direct 
Illegitimacy  Increase Direct 
State institutions (weak) Increase Direct 
Rule of law (poor) Increase Direct 
Source: Author’s compilation (2019) 
 
5.2.2 Political Stability  
This category in the political risk framework will focus on the following indicators: 
i. Corruption  ii. Tutelary interference  iii. Political elite cohesion 
 
5.2.2.1 Corruption 
Corruption is the abuse of an office for personal gain. It is present in both public and private sectors, 
conducted at different levels and is observed to occur in every state. Public corruption is difficult to 
prove before carrying out an investigation, thus the acts could continue for a long period (KII 
Embassy, Respondent 3). Many respondents identified Zimbabwe as being a largely corrupt state in 
both the public and private sectors. Public corruption was identifiable at every level but with different 
amounts being demanded. Political elite’s corruption contributed the most to the high levels of public 
corruption. Public corruption was highlighted to have become so rampant that some government 
ministers openly demanded 10% of the value of the project as a pre-condition to approving the project 
(Moyo, 2016; KII Academia, Respondent 1; 4; KII Embassy, Respondent 1, 5 and KII Political risk 
company, Respondent 1). The Auditor-General produced reports of how several government 
departments made advance payments for goods and supplies that had not been delivered between 
2008 and 201885 (Dube, 2019). These payments were used as avenues to syphon money from public 
funds for the benefit of a few elite individuals. 
 
85 In the report, examples cited include, i) Zimbabwe Electricity Transmission and Distribution Company made a USD4,9 
million payment in 2010 but by the end of 2018 the transformers were still not delivered, ii) Grain Marketing Board made 




The relationship between political risk and corruption was explained by the majority of respondents 
as a high perception of corruption led to a high perception of political risk. The resultant adverse 
effects of corruption influence the political risk rating to rise, explaining the indirect relationship. The 
adverse effects of corruption on MNCs were highlighted as: i) it increased the cost of doing business 
which could be passed on to the customers (KII Academia, Respondent 1; KII Embassy, Respondent 
4; KII NGO, Respondent 2; KII MNC, Respondent 2, 4, and KII Political risk company, Respondent 
1),  ii) it resulted in uncertainty in project planning and outcomes (KII MNC, Respondent 2, 4 and 
KII Political risk company, Respondent 1); iii) corruption increased inefficiencies and caused delays 
(KII NGO, Respondent 3 and KII Government, Respondent 2); iv) corruption created the impression 
that the law was irrelevant (KII Academia, Respondent 1); v) it could discourage further investment 
by the same MNC from coming into the corrupt host country and other potential MNCs who could 
be considering investing in the host country (KII Embassy, Respondent 5); and vi) had the potential 
to cause political instability within a host-country (KII NGO, Respondent 4). These comments 
indicate that operating in a country that had a less corruption rating was observed to be preferable for 
foreign investors because there is more certainty and predictability. 
 
One respondent highlighted that foreign investors operating in Zimbabwe had adjusted and learnt to 
budget for the “extra brown envelopes”, despite the negative consequences of corruption. They 
highlighted that it was a commonly known practice and it was referred to as lubricating the state 
machinery (KII Embassy, Respondent 5). However, KII Embassy, Respondent 4 emphasised that, 
“Corruption will increase costs of doing business. Once you are involved in the “brown envelope”, 
the price goes up. Companies from country number 4 are bound by the country’s ethics and code of 
conduct and they are not allowed to engage in corrupt activities.” Unless the code of conduct had 
punitive measures for MNCs that participated in corruption, it would be difficult to enforce this rule 
while operating in a highly corrupt country. MNCs interviewed did not reveal if they participated in 
corruption. It would have been difficult for them to say this as corruption is illegal. It is assumed by 
the study that due to the highly corrupt environment, some MNCs could have participated in the 
‘brown envelopes’ at one point to acquire a tender, a licence, or to renew a permit.  
 
A majority of respondents thought that public officials sponsored and allowed corruption to continue 
in order to create patron-client relationships that were for their personal benefit. Two respondents had 
an opposing view, they perceived that the Zimbabwean government was vigilantly fighting corruption 
(KII Embassy, Respondent 2, 3). Politically connected individuals were hardly prosecuted for 




4; KII Embassy, Respondent 1, 5 and KII Government, Respondent 5). There were various 
mechanisms to fight corruption, for example, ZACC, the anti-corruption unit and various anonymous 
whistleblowing platforms, nevertheless, the growth in public corruption indicated that the 
government lacked the political will to aggressively curb corruption in the public sector. In a hybrid 
regime, high corruption is indicated to increase the political and economic risk for foreign investors. 
 
5.2.2.2 Tutelary Interference 
This indicator explored the possibility of tutelary interference being experienced in Zimbabwe and if 
this had any impact on political risk. ZANU-PF and the military were the two distinct groups that 
emerged as influencing the actions and decisions of elected officials. China, SADC, and the IMF 
were mentioned as other reserves of power in Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, these relationships could not 
be collaborated in depth by many respondents, thus this section will not discuss them. The discussion 
is centred on ZANU-PF and military tutelage. ZANU-PF tutelage overlaps with ZANU-PF political 
elite cohesion, the latter is discussed in Section 5.2.2.3. 
 
Regarding ZANU-PF tutelage, ZANU-PF has been the dominant political party since 1980. As such, 
it has determined the trajectory of politics in Zimbabwe and the terms of engagement with the other 
political parties. Many respondents stressed that ZANU-PF as a political party had interfered with the 
actions and decisions of elected officials to make decisions that enriched the political elites at the 
expense of the citizens. ZANU-PF’s interference was observed at the top and bottom structures of 
leadership. For example, to be a village headman, a person needed ZANU-PF approval (KII Embassy, 
Respondent 2), however, anyone with suitable leadership qualities could perform this task without 
necessarily being affiliated to ZANU-PF. It was emphasised that foreign or local investors needed at 
least a ZANU-PF political connection to enter and operate in the mining, energy and petroleum 
sectors (KII Embassy, Respondent 5). The link between ZANU-PF tutelage and political risk was not 
explicitly defined by respondents. The respondents discussed more about the effects of ZANU-PF 
factionalism on business and governance issues. Two respondents mentioned that ZANU-PF tutelage 
did impact on political risk, but they did not mention whether it would increase or decrease (KII 
Academia, Respondent 3; KII NGO, Respondent 4). ZANU-PF tutelage that had a lasting effect 
would probably be exerted by influential figures. Thus, exploring the political elite cohesion within 





In terms of military tutelage, ZDF and the whole security sector were identified by a majority of t 
respondents as an informal enclave of power that influenced the decisions of elected officials to 
benefit a few representatives from the security sector. It was suggested that ZANU-PF was not in 
control of the governance of the country (KII NGO, Respondent 1, 3). KII NGO, Respondent 1, to 
emphasise this said, “ZANU-PF doesn’t seem to be in control, the army is in control. Fortunately for 
ZANU-PF, the army is ZANU-PF.” Individuals in state institutions could have political aspirations 
but the institutions could not be used to further the political aspirations of a few individuals. However, 
in a hybrid regime, where the distinction between government and the independence of state 
institutions was blurred, this overlap was possible. The notion that the military was the key driver of 
the political agenda was more prevalent after the military applied pressure of former president 
Mugabe to resign.  
 
The military was discussed as a powerful player which could not be disregarded politically. Its 
capacity to act as a political player was evident when it persuaded Former President Mugabe to step 
down, regardless of him being their commander in chief (Moore, 2018; KII Academia, Respondent 
4; KII NGO, Respondent 3). ZANU-PF factionalism was highlighted as the main reason why the 
military disposed of Mugabe because he preferred a faction which rivalled the one backed by the 
army (KII Academia, Respondent 6 and KII Embassy, Respondent 1). It was highlighted that it was 
uncertain whose interests the military sought to protect by being actively involved in politics instead 
of implementing its core business of defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zimbabwe 
(KII Academia, Respondent1; KII Embassy, Respondent 1 and KII NGO, Respondent 1). 
 
There were two conflicting positions regarding having retired military officers dominating key 
government positions and their involvement in politics. A few respondents emphasised that it was the 
retired military officers’ constitutional right to work anywhere and this was perceived to not impact 
political risk (KII Academia, Respondent 2, 5; KII NGO, Respondent 2 and KII MNC, Respondent 
3). Furthermore, military involvement in politics was not seen as an anomaly as this model was 
evident in some developed countries, for example, the USA, the UK and China. However, it was 
raised that the retired servicemen deployed in key government positions had not gone through the 
civilising or winding down process, which could have an impact on their governing style (KII 
Academia, Respondent 1, 4, 5, 6). The retired military personnel would probably be inclined to run 




On the contrary, retired military officers’ involvement in government was perceived to increase 
uncertainty and instability in government (KII Academia, Respondent 1 and KII NGO, Respondent 
3, 5). It was negatively perceived because it resembled the militarisation of state institutions (KII 
Embassy, Respondent 1, 5 and KII NGO, Respondent 1, 4). Having a government dominated by 
retired military men was highlighted to blur the distinction of the civil-military relations in Zimbabwe 
(KII Political risk company, Respondent 1). It was indicated to affect investor confidence negatively 
(KII MNC, Respondent 2). Three respondents emphasised that retired military officers serving in 
influential positions in state institutions could not be viewed as apolitical and be trusted to conform 
to civilian rule (KII Embassy, Respondent 1 and KII NGO, Respondent 3, 5). 
 
There were two divergent opinions on the impact of military tutelage on political risk. One dominant 
view was that military tutelage increased political risk (KII NGO, Respondent 1, 3, 4 and KII Political 
risk company, Respondent 1). While in the short run a military tutelage could be perceived as stable, 
in the long term it was suggested to cause instability which increased political risk negatively (KII 
Political risk company, Respondent 1). One respondent suggested that the political risk of Zimbabwe 
would only improve after 20 years from 2018 because of the military’s involvement in politics (KII 
NGO, Respondent 1). The political risk was suggested to increase each time the military’s core 
interests were threatened. Therefore, if the military’s interests are not satisfied, the associated political 
risk would fluctuate.  
 
An opposing view was that the military’s involvement in politics did not influence political risk in 
Zimbabwe for two specific reasons (KII Academia, Respondent 4, 5, 6 and KII Embassy, Respondent 
5). First, it was pointed out that the investors operating in Zimbabwe had intimate knowledge of the 
importance of the military’s role in the politics and business of the country. It was observed that 
before foreign investors officially commenced a business, they held meetings with key heads of the 
military at their private residences (KII Embassy, Respondent 5). Secondly, it was suggested that 
there was an overlap of the civil-military relations in Zimbabwe between the military and political 
leadership, which was something birthed during the liberation struggle. As a result, the military’s 
involvement in politics did not influence political risk. It was only when the military was disregarded 
politically that political risk would increase significantly (KII Academia, Respondent 4). Hence, 
actively including the military in the governance structures of Zimbabwe was suggested to keep 
political risk low (KII Academia, Respondent 4). In addition, the majority respondents highlighted 
that after the military assisted change of government in November 2017, the perception of the 




stable does not hold in all cases. The instability could potentially arise within the military if there are 
divisions caused by succession and power struggles. Hence each time the key drivers in the military 
change, there could be a shift either to increase or decrease political risk.  
 
5.2.2.3 Political elite cohesion 
This indicator analyses the political elite cohesion of the dominant party in Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF, 
led by President Mugabe for 37 years. The party had been perceived as relatively stable from 1980 to 
2013. One respondent emphasised that political parties were broad groupings, having a continuous 
adhesive element would be difficult. One respondent claimed that corruption had been the glue 
binding ZANU-PF for 37 years, it was only when the elites could not agree on how to benefit 
personally from the amassed wealth that divisions within the party became magnified (KII Academic, 
Respondent 1). Another respondent pointed out that ZANU-PF significantly started fracturing when 
it expelled Mujuru as the vice-president from the party (KII Academia, Respondent 5).  
 
It was highlighted by the majority of respondents that unity within ZANU-PF between 2017 and 2018 
was weak compared to previous years. The major dividing issue within ZANU-PF was highlighted 
as the issue of who would succeed President Mugabe (KII Academia, Respondent 3). In addition, 
Former President Mugabe showed his preference for G40 over Lacoste in the illiberal hybrid regime 
period, which acted as a catalyst for elite political disintegration (KII Academia, Respondent 6). It 
was pointed out that ZANU-PF was unlikely to dissolve completely due to factionalism because the 
officials depended on the party for its influence, access to the state’s resources and power (KII 
Political risk company, Respondent 1).  
 
Factionalism within ZANU-PF was observed to cause political instability in Zimbabwe, which led 
the military to force Mugabe to step down and install their preferred candidate (KII Academia, 
Respondent 1, 3 and KII NGO, respondent 3, 4, 6). The weakening political elite cohesion created 
political uncertainty about whether Zimbabwe would be led by a family dynasty under the G40 faction 
or continue to be a constitutional democracy (KII Academia, Respondent 1, 3, 5, 6; KII NGO, 
Respondent 4 and KII MNC, Respondent 1). G40 had key members of the Mugabe family who were 
vying to continue the Mugabe legacy. The concept of family dynasties has been observed to be 
common in Africa, motivated by the serving leaders need to safeguard their family wealth and 




dynasties because they are more stable and predictable than having to deal with new leadership with 
no experience. If Mugabe had not faced internal opposition within his party, a family dynasty was 
possible as a result of his strong personality and the resultantly weak formal institutions. 
 
Factionalism and infighting within ZANU-PF resulted in the political elites taking each other to court 
over various corruption charges (Fletcher, 2017: 11; KII Academia, Respondent 1). The infighting 
adversely affected some foreign investors who had joint ventures with political figures. ZANU-PF 
elite factionalism created uncertainty for business which caused some investors to withhold major 
investments (KII Academia, Respondent 1, 3 and KII NGO, Respondent 4). In addition, factionalism 
made it difficult to formulate long-term strategies and forecasts because the environment was 
unpredictable, policies changed constantly and the government occasionally pronounced conflicting 
statements (KII MNC, Respondent 4). Differences in factional alignment were also observed to cause 
government officials representing the same ministry to take different positions on one issue. This was 
experienced by KII MNC, Respondent 3 who mentioned that the minister of agriculture and the 
deputy minister of agriculture would take different positions over the same issue during the illiberal 
hybrid regime. Despite the negative effects of factionalism, one respondent highlighted that their 
organisation was surveying for possible opportunities that could arise due to the elites political 
fighting (KII MNC, Respondent 5). If ZANU-PF had agreed to a succession plan, perhaps 
factionalism within the party would have been minimal. 
 
A majority of respondents emphasised the effects of ZANU-PF elite political disintegration on the 
state and the economy, they did not relate it to political risk. The relationship with political elite 
cohesion was mentioned by one individual. They suggested that when the ruling party elites agreed 
there would be stability in the party and the associated political risk was low because there would be 
predictability. Conversely, when the political elites disagreed, the party would be unstable, increasing 
the associated levels of political risk (KII Academia, Respondent 5). The magnitude of political and 
economic uncertainty that the respondents highlighted seems to validate the claim that is suggested 
above; that weak political elite cohesion leads to increased levels of political risk. It also confirms the 
hypothesis by this study that weak incumbent political elite cohesion could lead to increased levels 





5.2.2.4 Summary of political stability 
It was revealed that corruption in the public sector was significantly high. Despite the various ways 
to fight corruption, it was shown that there was minimal political will to curb public corruption. 
Corruption was seen to increase the level of political risk. Investors were cognisant of the corruption 
levels; some participated, while some looked for other markets to operate in. In Zimbabwe, tutelage 
was observed to be exercised by ZANU-PF and the military. The presence of a guardian indicates 
that formal institutions were relatively weak. This was already established in the discussion of state 
institutions. The impact of ZANU-PF tutelage on political risk was not explicitly defined, however, 
because it was the dominant political party in Zimbabwe, it was established that it could possibly 
impact on political risk. The stability of ZANU-PF was determined by the relationships between the 
political elites. ZANU-PF political elite cohesion was highlighted to be high until it started 
fragmenting between 2014 and 2018. The main reason was that ZANU-PF lacked a clear succession 
plan; hence different factions sought to succeed former president Mugabe. This factionalism caused 
high political and economic uncertainty in Zimbabwe. When political elites agreed, the party was 
stable, and the political risk was established to be minimal. Conversely, when there was disagreement, 
the party was unstable, which increased the associated levels of political risk.  
 
The military was highlighted to have been a political player from independence. The military was 
seen to take the same position with ZANU-PF until the two had a fallout during the illiberal hybrid 
regime period, caused by the succession issue. The impact of military tutelage on political risk was 
discussed to be positive. Contrary to this, military tutelage was perceived to have no negative impact 
on political risk in this case study because the military was involved in politics for a long time and 
foreign investors were aware of it. Thus, under this hypothesis, the political risk would significantly 
rise if the military’s interests were not preserved, showing that military tutelage would be viewed as 
short term stability. There was also the possibility that there could also be infighting within the 
military, which would increase the associated levels of political risk. Table 5.3 gives a summary of 









Table 5.3: Political stability indicators impact on political risk 
Indicator Impact on PRA Direction of impact 
Corruption Increase Indirect 
ZANU-PF tutelary No link - 
Military tutelary (short term) Decrease  Direct 
Political elite cohesion (weak) Increase Direct 
Source: Author’s compilation (2019) 
 
5.2.3 Economic Development 
This category in the political risk framework will focus on the following indicators: 
i. The government’s participation in the economy   ii. Adverse government regulation  
iii. International perception of host country   iv. Economic performance 
 
5.2.3.1 Government behaviour and participation in the economy 
This factor focused on the involvement of government in the economy and general government 
behaviour. Venter (1999) suggests using the contribution of tax the government receives as a 
percentage of GDP to measure the government’s involvement in the economy. Tax as a percentage 
of GDP should not exceed 30%, which points to low government involvement in the economy and 
moderate government consumption, which are desirable for foreign investors. In Zimbabwe, the tax 
percentage of GDP over the period 2009 to 2018 was highest at 18.06% in 2015 and lowest at 9.19% 
in 2009 (World Bank, 2018). These figures do not exceed the aforesaid 30% during the eleven-year 
period, indicating relatively low government involvement. Given these statistics, only without other 
substantial investigations, the environment indicated that the government’s involvement in the 
economy was acceptable for foreign investors. 
 
To analyse government behaviour, the study used policy consistency. Policy consistency focuses on 
how the government adheres to the economic, social and developmental policies it formulates. When 
a government adheres to the set policies, it enables better planning and a more predictable 
environment for investors. Zimbabwe’s past performance with regards to policy consistency was 
highlighted to be inconsistent. Furthermore, it was highlighted by some respondents to be a factor 




Respondent 1 and KII Government, Respondent 2, 4). Only a few respondents mentioned the 
relationship between political risk and policy inconsistency as one that was inverse. The relationship 
was illustrated as indirect in that the magnitude of the positive impression caused by policy adherence 
resulted in positively influencing investors to be interested in investing in Zimbabwe. This increased 
interest by investors would resultantly influence the political risk of the country to go down (KII 
Government, Respondent 1, 2, 3 and KII MNC, Respondent 3). Inconsistency in policy 
implementation was highlighted to affect medium to long term planning of MNCs (KII Government, 
Respondent 2 and KII MNC, Respondent 3, 4).  
 
ZANU-PF factional disputes were cited as one source of policy reversals which caused confusion and 
uncertainty (KII MNC, Respondent 5). In addition, a lack of consultation by the government with all 
relevant stakeholders was highlighted as another reason for policy reversals (KII MNC, Respondent 
3, 4). KII MNC, Respondent 4 emphasised on policy inconsistency and reversals by saying, “It’s 
difficult at times. There’s one classical policy announcement that was made and it was reversed by 
the end of the day. You then ask yourself questions that, was it given enough space though? Probably 
there was not enough consultation. Some of the policies, they are meant to address certain issues, but 
they will have an effect on other fundamental issues such that when everything else is put into context 
you will then say, it’s not the best time to introduce this policy but you find a decision will already be 
made. And it will have some serious implications.” This resultantly implies that if the government 
consulted widely, there would probably be fewer reversals on policies. The underlying motive for 
being inconsistent was emphasised as the potential and personal gains that could occur from reversing 
the aforesaid policies (KII Embassy, Respondent 1). This observation is consistent with that already 
discussed under corruption, that the public officials had an increased appetite for corrupt activities. 
They would likely use any available opportunity to gain rewards and further their personal ambitions 
at the expense of the state.  
 
The Zimbabwe government was aware that its behaviour was perceived as showing signs of 
inconsistency and that the country was categorised as a politically high-risk destination for 
investment. As a result of this perception, the government took the proactive initiative to join the 
African Trade Insurance to assist local private companies as a grant guarantor for their trade activities 
outside Zimbabwe (KII Government, Respondent 3). While political risk is predominantly taken to 
be for foreign investors operating in a host country, it shows that local companies coming from the 




into business beyond their borders. Although the Zimbabwean government’s participation level was 
observed to be ideal for foreign investment, its inconsistent behaviour increased political risk. 
 
5.2.3.2 Adverse government policies and actions 
Several government regulations were alluded to have had high adverse repercussions on foreign 
investors and MNCs. The case study focused on the period 1990 to 2018. The respondents, however, 
dwelt on the regulations that had a major adverse impact on foreign businesses after the year 2000. 
The FTLRP, the IEEA of 2007, SI 64/2016, the introduction of the bond notes in 2016 and the 2% 
tax for all financial transactions of 2018 were highlighted to have had the most adverse effects on 
foreign investors and MNCs. The FTLRP expropriated land from white commercial farmers in early 
2000 (Mlambo, 2014; KII Academia, Respondent 4). The IEEA of 2008 instructed public and private 
companies to restructure ownership composition to a ratio of 51% to 49% in favour of indigenous 
Zimbabweans (Government of Zimbabwe, 2008). SI 64/2016 imposed import restrictions on 43 
products to protect the home industry (Murangwa & Njaya, 2016; KII Embassy, Respondent 3). 
Zimbabwe adopted a multi-currency system in 2009. However, foreign currency availability was 
constrained in 2016, thus the country introduced a currency which could only be traded locally, which 
was called bond notes (KII Government, Respondent 1). The liquidity crisis continued through to 
2018, hence the country resorted more to the use of electronic money. In October 2018, a new 
regulation of taxing 2% of every amount transferred electronically was introduced. Of these policies, 
the IEEA was highlighted to have been the most adverse regulation, followed by the FTLRP. Hence 
this section will dwell more on the IEEA. Bond notes will be discussed under economic performance 
in Section 5.3.3.2. There is minimum discussion on SI 64/2016 and the 2% tax because not many 
respondents spoke about the former and the repercussions of the latter were still unfolding as it was 
implemented three months before the closing period of the study. 
 
The IEEA of 2007 instructed public and private companies to restructure ownership composition to 
a ratio of 51% to 49% in favour of indigenous Zimbabweans. Under this law, MNCs had to realign 
their ownership structure in accordance with this Zimbabwean law. It was suggested by many 
respondents to have been aggressively implemented between 2009 to 2016. It was highlighted that 
the IEEA was one of the major factors that negatively deterred investments by foreign investors and 
MNCs (Mawanza et al., 2013: 78; KII Academia, Respondent 1, 2, 4; KII Embassy, Respondent 1, 
3, 5 and KII Political risk company, Respondent 1). The IEEA had a creeping expropriation effect. 




It targeted foreigners and required them to cede control of their investments to the locals which was 
reflective of creeping expropriation.  
 
It was highlighted that the IEEA aimed to seize investments from foreigners to empower locals (KII 
Government, Respondent 3). The government was aware that the IEEA would negatively deter 
foreigners and that the policy had an expropriation impact, but politicians aggressively pushed for it, 
both as a ZANU-PF campaign strategy and motivated by the wealth they stood to gain personally. 
This was suggested by KII MNC, Respondent 4 who said, “The IEEA was mainly targeting highly 
lucrative businesses. I think it was deliberate. People had spent time out on farms, and they saw how 
difficult it is to farm, so people were not keen on expropriating more farms and what have you; but 
they were interested in high net worth cash-rich businesses which were easy to run mainly, in 
towns…”. Elite politicians were strategically positioned to be the first contenders to receive a portion 
of the 51% of shares reserved for indigenous Zimbabweans, hence they aggressively pushed for its 
implementation.  
 
As an adverse government regulation, the IEEA was highlighted to increase political risk (Mawanza, 
2015: 124; KII Academia, Respondent 2, 4; KII Embassy, Respondent 4; KII Government, 
Respondent 1, 2, 3). KII Embassy, Respondent 4 made the following comment on the IEEA, “The 
general feeling was it was the second round of land reform, looting of properties and assets, people’s 
private assets and companies- this with no compensation. This creates anxiety with respect to 
property rights. This Act affects political risk negatively.” This shows that the IEEA unsettled foreign 
investors in a similar manner to land reform. It made it difficult for foreign governments to encourage 
their natives to actively invest in Zimbabwe knowing that after investing they could potentially lose 
control of their investments. 
 
The IEEA created uncertainty for MNCs with regards to the security of their investment (KII 
Academia, Respondent 1, 6 and KII Embassy, Respondent 2, 4). The IEEA was inconsistently applied 
as a piece of legislation which created confusion and uncertainty (KII Academia, Respondent 1; KII 
Embassy, Respondent 1 and KII Government, Respondent 1). This inconsistency was also observed 
to create rent-seeking opportunities, especially for political elites and senior government officials (KII 
Embassy, Respondent 5). The major fears for investors were highlighted as expropriation without 
compensation, confiscation of their companies and the failure to recoup or repatriate profits (KII 




which led them to reconsider continuing operating in Zimbabwe (KII Academia, Respondent 1, 4, 6 
and KII Embassy, Respondent 2, 4). Under the IEEA, foreign investors had to find local partners to 
create joint ventures. However, the local businesspeople who were willing to form joint ventures 
wanted controlling stakes but did not want to make the equitable financial commitment that would 
enable them to do so (KII Embassy, Respondent 5). Political elites from ZANU-PF, for example, 
President Mnangagwa, benefited immensely from the IEEA (KII Embassy, Respondent 5). 
 
It was emphasised that removal of the strict IEEA regulations of the IEEA in December 2017, keeping 
it only in the diamond and platinum sectors, had a positive impact on increasing interest by foreign 
investors (KII Academia, Respondent 2, 4; KII Embassy, Respondent 2, 3 and KII Political risk 
company, Respondent 1). Nevertheless, to show real commitment to foreign investors, the 
government could return the foreign investments ceded due to IEEA or compensate the disadvantaged 
investors (KII Embassy, Respondent 5). It was highly unlikely that the government of Zimbabwe 
would do so; the repeals to the IEEA were meant to attract foreign investors during the euphoria 
period of the ouster of former president Mugabe. Adverse government regulation is noted to increase 
political risk in this case study. 
 
5.2.3.3 Economic performance 
The economic performance indicator analyses a few economic indicators that could possibly raise 
warning signs for foreign investors. Economic indicators that are of interest as suggested by Venter 
(1999: 79) are: 
• Outstanding external government debt as a percentage of GDP, it should not exceed 40% 
which points to long term financial problems. 
• Current account deficit as a percentage of GDP, it should not exceed 7.5 per cent of GDP. 
• Government budget deficit as a percentage of GDP, this should not exceed GDP. 
 
In 2016, Zimbabwe had a domestic debt of USD4 billion and an external debt of approximately 
USD13 billion owed to different multilateral lending institutions86 (IMF, 2017: 5–6). The external 
debt was relatively large; investors would need to analyse and be convinced that Zimbabwe had the 
potential to service its domestic and external debts. The external government debt, as a percentage of 
 
86 The breakdown of Zimbabwe’s debt expressed in USD million: 
1. Domestic debt: Government financing debt 1 569, Capitalization 611, RBZ Capitalization and debt 720, Suppliers 
Arrears 164, RBZ overdraft facility 942. Total 4 006 U$ billion  
2. External debt: Paris Club 3 041, Non-Paris Club 1 142, WB 1 402, African Development Bank (AfDB) 642, EIB 250, 




GDP, was above 60% between 2009 and 2018 (Trading Economics, 2019a). This figure, according 
to Venter’s (1999) criterion, was unacceptable as it affects the ability of the country to repay debts. 
The current account deficit as a percentage of GDP was lowest in 2017 at -17.45% and highest in 
2018 at -1.39 between 2009 and 2018 (World Bank, 2019). Zimbabwe showed an improvement in 
the current account from 2016 to 2018. A negative balance indicated that the country’s imports 
outweighed the exports and the country had low saving rates. Zimbabwe’s government deficit as a 
per cent of GDP from 1990 until 2018 averaged -3.24 per cent of GDP. It reached a high of 1.30 per 
cent of GDP in 2008 and a record low of -11.20 per cent of GDP in 2017 (Trading Economics, 2019b). 
The figures point to more than 100 which raises possible warning signs for investors.  
 
Regarding the liquidity of the country, Zimbabwe adopted a multicurrency system in February 2009; 
between 2016 to 2018 the country experienced a liquidity shortage and the government introduced 
bond notes as a form of currency to assist with this liquidity shortage. Nonetheless, bond notes were 
only tradable locally. The country experienced a hyper-inflationary period in 2008. Economic growth 
was recorded between 2009 and 2014 and a recession was faced from 2015 to 2018. Only one 
respondent commented on the relationship between foreign currency constraints and political risk. 
They suggested that political risk had the potential to cause shortages in foreign currency availability 
in a country (KII Government, Respondent 1). The liquidity crisis also confirmed that Zimbabwe was 
a net importer of goods and services; if it exported more, the receipts from exports would probably 
have alleviated the liquidity crisis.  
 
The liquidity crisis was highlighted by the majority of respondents to have had an adverse impact on 
business operations for locals and foreign investors. Shortages of foreign currency were highlighted 
as deterrents to future major investments and FDI coming to Zimbabwe (KII Academia, Respondent 
2; KII Embassy, Respondent 5 and KII NGO, Respondent 3). In addition, investors feared the 
possibility of not being able to repatriate their profits from Zimbabwe when the liquidity crisis began. 
This fear was further exacerbated by the introduction of the bond note (KII Academia, Respondent 
2; KII Embassy, Respondent 5 and KII NGO, Respondent 3). The foreign currency shortages resulted 
in a thriving parallel market (KII NGO, Respondent 4). Companies that imported raw materials to 
make finished products found it expensive because they were forced to purchase foreign currency at 
the black market (KII MNC, Respondent 2). A growing parallel market could potentially cause 





KII MNC, Respondent 1 mentioned that they entered the Zimbabwean market in 2014 because the 
country operated using foreign currency, which was an advantage over the other southern-African 
countries which used local currencies. This MNC envisioned that it would collect the excess USD 
available in the market. Unfortunately, the bond notes and the use of electronic money left MNC 1 
with huge electronic bank balances that could only be used locally (KII MNC, Respondent 1). This 
means that Zimbabwe had lost its competitive advantage to MNC 1 and possibly other companies 
that had entered the market preferring the use of the hard currency. Furthermore, Visa and Mastercard 
facilities could not be used for international payments in Zimbabwe from 2017 (KII MNC, 
Respondent 5). This meant that MNCs had difficulty in making foreign payments, thus constraining 
the operations of MNCs even further. 
 
Regarding the history of nationalisation and expropriation, as discussed under adverse government 
actions, the two policies that had a huge expropriation impact were the IEEA and the FTLRP, which 
has already been discussed in Section 5.2.3.2. After 2000, Zimbabwe expropriated white-owned 
commercial land. The FTLRP displaced approximately 4 000 commercial white farmers and 
displaced 450 000 farm labourers (Raftopoulos, 2009: 212; Mlambo, 2014: 235). Furthermore, 
Zimbabwe implemented the IEEA of 2008, which aimed to expropriate foreign-owned businesses. 
However, this piece of legislature was selectively implemented. Expropriation was observed at a 
small scale and targeted basis (KII Political risk company, Respondent 1). Given this history of 
expropriation and nationalisation, foreign investors had to be aware that future expropriations were 
likely. However, the scale of expropriations could, perhaps, be minimal since the major 
expropriations had already occurred. 
 
5.2.3.4 Health pandemics 
The factor on health pandemics87 analyses the state’s ability to manage a major health pandemic and 
if that would impact on political risk. Reference was used of earlier pandemics that had gripped 
Zimbabwe, the HIV and AIDS pandemic in the late 1990s and the Cholera outbreak of 2008, for 
emphasis. It was highlighted that major health pandemics, if not managed promptly and effectively, 
negatively tainted the country’s image (KII Government, Respondent 4). In addition, health outbreaks 
experienced in Zimbabwe had the effect of exposing the collapsed health system (KII Academia, 
Respondent 6; KII Embassy, Respondent 5, and KII NGO, Respondent 3). This indicates that if, 
 





suppose, there are no pandemics, the state of the health service’s capacity to deal with outbreaks 
would probably not be under scrutiny. It was also highlighted that most political elites received 
medical attention outside the country (KII Embassy, Respondent 5). This had the impact of draining 
public funds of the much-needed foreign currency.  
 
A handful of respondents opined that health pandemics had no impact on political risk (KII Academia, 
Respondent 5; KII Government, Respondent 1, 4; KII Political risk company, Respondent 1). KII 
Academia, Respondent 5 made an emphasis of this point by saying: 
Ebola can affect, for example, in DRC, but I haven’t heard any mining companies closing 
because of Ebola. So, cholera, yes can affect, but it depends where the cholera is. So, just by 
itself is not necessary. Then Zika, in Brazil, it didn’t mean that people didn’t put money in 
Brazil. Depending on the location, there are floods in Colombia, if the whole state the roads 
are not working but people will wait until the rains go. You know businesspeople, it doesn’t 
matter where they are. If they are reasonably satisfied, that they can make money, tomorrow, 
the day after, they will go. 
This highlights that MNCs with enhanced capacity can operate in the most adverse of environments 
if there is a possibility to manoeuvre in the given situation. On the contrary, four respondents 
mentioned that health pandemics positively and indirectly impacted on political risk (KII NGO, 
Respondent 1, 3 and KII Government, Respondent 2, 5). Nevertheless, the pandemic needed to 
severely undermine state institutions for it to have a possible impact on political risk. The location of 
the outbreak was regarded as an important factor in determining the influence on political risk. MNCs 
operating in the affected locations could potentially be more affected than those that are not located 
in the affected area. The location and nature of the outbreak were also emphasised to enable tourists 
and MNCs to devise plans of how to insulate themselves from outbreaks (KII Academia, Respondent 
5; KII NGO, Respondent 2 and KII Political risk company, Respondent 1). Health pandemics were 
described as an unbudgeted expense which entailed shifting resources from priority areas to finance 
the health outbreak, thereby increasing government expenditure (KII NGO, Respondent 5). If the 
increase in government expenditure was not managed properly it could potentially cause economic 
and political instability. Overall, the influence of health pandemics on influencing political risk is 
very negligible in this case study. 
 
5.2.3.5 International relations 
This indicator explored the possibility of political risk being influenced by the relationships between 
the home state of the investor of MNC and the host state. A few respondents highlighted that their 




Respondent 2, 3 and KII MNC, Respondent 1). These respondents had various MNCs with 
international flagship operating in Zimbabwe. KII Embassy, Respondent 3 referred to eight MNCs 
that were operating in Zimbabwe that they could think of during the interview. The respondent 
highlighted that the political risk for their home MNCs operating in Zimbabwe was minimal because 
of the two countries’ cordial relations. KII Embassy, Respondent 2 made the following comment, 
“The level of political risk here is probably close to zero because my country and Zimbabwe are on 
a friendly basis… So, since we are enjoying, I mean very good relations, thus I do not think there is 
any political risk here… All this is a confirmation that our countries have good relationships, so the 
political risk for my country and this embassy in Zimbabwe is close to zero.” It illustrates that good 
relationships can possibly have the effect of lowering the potential political risks that foreign investors 
are exposed to in a host country. 
 
A different view was expressed by some respondents who indicated that they had severed 
relationships with the Zimbabwean government. As a result of this, the political risk for MNCs 
originating from these countries was observed to be substantially higher than other countries that had 
better relations (KII Embassy, Respondent 1, 4, 5). Investors from countries one and four were 
adversely affected by the land reform which expropriated land from commercial white farmers (KII 
Embassy, Respondent 1, 4). The IEEA which required foreign-owned companies to give majority 
shareholding to indigenous Zimbabweans had a negative impact on MNCs from country one, four 
and five (KII Embassy, Respondent 1, 4, 5). Commenting on home-host relations with Zimbabwe, 
KII Embassy, Respondent 5 said: “They (The respondent’s government) have not barred companies 
from my country investing, but they have barred companies from doing business that supports the 
Zimbabwean government. As a result, the relationship has been very acrimonious and as a result, the 
flip side is that the Zimbabwean government hasn’t been very welcoming to business from my country 
that want to try and invest in Zimbabwe, at least between 2002 to November 2017. Things may have 
slightly changed in the last 7 months……” Severed home-host relationships are observed to 
discourage investment between the two countries. The majority of respondents highlighted that the 
major challenge for MNCs operating in Zimbabwe, regardless of the home-host relationship was the 
prevailing liquidity crisis. This was discussed in greater detail in Section 5.2.3.3 on economic 
performance. Regarding home-host relations, the reflections of respondents show that political risk 
is determined by the home-host relationships. Severed relationships accrue substantially higher 





5.2.3.6 Geographic location and natural disasters/extreme weather patterns 
This indicator focused on the geographic location and natural disasters88 of Zimbabwe and the 
possible impact on political risk. It was highlighted that Zimbabwe is a landlocked country, rich in 
primary resources and has a favourable climate which was perceived as an opportunity by investors 
(KII Academia, Respondent 2; KII Embassy, Respondent 1, 3 and KII MNC, Respondent 1). KII 
Academia, Respondent 2 said, “Our geographic location, us being a landlocked country rich in 
minerals resources, rich in agricultural land, rich in proper climate. I think we (Zimbabwe) are, or 
any other country a foreigner would want to be associated with Zimbabwe, but we devised our laws 
to protect ourselves from intruders. That is who can have a claim on our land and a claim on our 
resources and so forth.” It was emphasised that Zimbabwe had not fully utilised the advantages 
derived from the geographic location. Rather, foreign investors were risk aversive due to other 
constraints in the country which included the business laws, and fear of failing to repatriate profits 
and recoup their investment (KII Academia, Respondent 2 and KII Embassy, Respondent 1, 3). It 
was emphasised by the majority of respondents that there was no relationship between Zimbabwe’s 
geographic location, climate and natural disasters/extreme weather patterns in relation to political risk 
which was contrary to what this study had hypothesised. The political risk would only arise in cases 
of border disputes which have an impact on civil unrest (KII Academia, Respondent 2; KII Embassy, 
Respondent 1, 3, 4). 
 
5.2.3.7 Summary of economic development 
The Zimbabwean government’s level of participation in the economy was deemed acceptable. 
However, the external and domestic debt levels of the country could potentially be worrying for 
foreign investors. Zimbabwe was noted to have had two large scale events of expropriating foreign 
assets, first under the land reform programme and secondly, the IEEA. The threat of major 
expropriations was lower but fewer and more targeted cases were possible. Several policies were 
indicated to have had an adverse impact on foreign investors but the IEEA and the land reform 
programme were the two most adverse regulations that increased political risk. Zimbabwe went 
through an economic recession from 2015 to 2018, which caused a liquidity crisis. It was suggested 
that a high political risk could have a negative impact on the economy. Health pandemics were 
discussed to marginally increase political risk only in cases where the pandemic weakened the 
capacity of the state to respond. The location of the pandemic was a factor that needed to be 
 
88 The study is working with the hypothesis that geographic location and extreme weather patterns have the possibility of 




considered in evaluating the possible impact on political risk for foreign investors. For Zimbabwe, 
geographic location and natural disasters were considered insignificant in impacting political risk. 
Home-host relations were highlighted to influence political risk. Severed relationships accrued 
substantially higher political risks than cordial relationships. Table 5.4 gives a summary of how 
economic development indicators impact on political risk and the direction of impact. 
 
Table 5.4: Economic development impact on political risk 
Indicator Impact on PRA Direction of impact 
Government participation Acceptable - 
Government behaviour: Policy inconsistency Increase  Indirect 
Adverse government policies Increase Direct 
Health pandemics Minor increase Indirectly 
Geographic location and natural disasters Does not impact PRA - 
Home-host state (cordial relations) Decrease Directly 
Economic performance Could not be determined - 
Source: Author’s compilation (2019) 
 
5.3 Discussion of the findings 
The findings of this section reinforce several theoretical propositions regarding PRA in a hybrid 
regime. Nevertheless, some traditional claims are contradicted. This section will discuss how the 
findings confirm, contradict and expand theoretical claims of political risk in a hybrid regime.  
 
5.3.1 Political Institutions and Infrastructure 
The findings show that elections are pivotal in influencing political risk in a hybrid regime. An 
election that is free and fair, with an enabling political environment for all political players, was 
established to lower political risk. The findings suggest that there was an acceptance of a free but 
unfair election because it was observed to have no impact on political risk. Additionally, if the election 
was substantially contested, it potentially discredited the candidates involved, however, this study 




and procedural flaws; they do not influence political risk in any way. If, however, violence occurs 
during an election, it was found to directly increase the political risk profile of a country. Political 
violence during an election, depending on the magnitude and location, could lead to massive civil 
unrest and widespread protests which cause political instability and damage to foreign investors’ 
properties. Investors were concerned about election violence erupting because this could result in loss 
of property, disruption of operations and harm to their staff members. Therefore, this finding is 
consistent with the traditional political risk conceptualisation that political violence leads to civil 
unrest and disorder, which directly increases political risk (Robock, 1971: 7; Jarvis & Griffiths, 2007: 
15). This finding shows that the MNCs operating in Zimbabwe had adjusted to the narrative of 
contested elections and the possibility of election violence occurring. MNCs also took precautionary 
measures to insulate their businesses from political violence by purchasing political risk insurance. 
The process of elections was hypothesised to impact political risk to go down according to Jensen 
(2003:1041-1045). This finding also confirms that the process of elections impacts on political risk 
in a hybrid regime.  
 
Illegitimacy was found to increase political risk, which is consistent with the traditional 
conceptualisation that illegitimacy directly increases political risk as validated by Howell and 
Chaddick (1994: 76) and Venter (1999). When a government lacks legitimacy domestically, it 
suggests that the citizens do not willingly accept the government. To enforce acceptance of its 
authority, the government may use force which may be disproportionate. The use of force and 
violence leads to civil unrest which increases political instability and resultantly political risk. While 
this study found a contested or unfair election to be tolerable and not impact political risk, there was 
no compromise found in the case of illegitimacy. Hence, illegitimacy was confirmed to increase 
political risk in a hybrid regime.  
 
In Zimbabwe, the findings show that horizontal accountability, rule of law and state institutions were 
weak, resultantly influencing the political risk to increase. Political risk literature traditionally claims 
that strong political institutions enable an environment that has lower political risk, while weak 
political institutions attract higher political risks (Green, 1974). Jensen (2008: 1050) explains it by 
saying that when effective constraints exist on the executive, it has the impact of reducing political 
risk. The existence of military and ZANU-PF tutelage confirms that the state institutions in the case 
study were weak. The findings suggest that foreign investors had, to some extent, a tolerance level 
that made them ignore a partial judiciary, selective rule of law and weak institutions. Thus, while 




tolerance level for their non-existence in a hybrid regime. This increased tolerance enables foreign 
investors to place their investment in a place that traditional conceptualisation of political risk would 
deem unsuitable.  
 
5.3.2 Political stability 
The findings show that staleness or longevity of leadership increases political risk in a hybrid regime. 
Staleness in leadership is also alluded to foster a culture of corruption and nepotism (Venter, 1999: 
79), which were observed to be present in Zimbabwe. It was revealed that the staleness of Former 
President Mugabe led to the political elite within ZANU-PF fighting over his succession. This conflict 
among the political elite inevitably spilt into the business sector. As Chapter Four illustrated, 
factionalism over the succession of Mugabe spanned from 2000 until it was resolved by a military 
assisted transition in government in November 2017. It confirms what Green (1974: 33)  postulated, 
that unless a clear succession was planned, there was the possibility of the political elite fighting to 
replace a long-serving leader. The political risk of Zimbabwe was confirmed to have significantly 
reduced when President Mugabe resigned. Furthermore, it was shown that many foreign investors 
enquired of the possible investment opportunities from the Zimbabwean government after Mugabe 
resigned. The finding confirms the traditional theoretical proposition by Howell and Chaddick (1994: 
76) that staleness in government potentially increases the political risk of a host country. 
 
Military tutelage in a hybrid regime was found to decrease the level of political risk. The military was 
established to have been involved in the politics of Zimbabwe since independence. When the military 
implemented Operation Restore Legacy, which marked the beginning of the military hybrid regime, 
the associated political risk of Zimbabwe significantly reduced. Having the military or generals 
involved in politics was traditionally perceived as a sign of high political risk (Green, 1974: 35; 
Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 76). This tolerance of the military in politics contradicts the traditional 
conceptualisation of political risk on two levels. First, when the military was visibly in control during 
the military hybrid regime from November 2017 to the end of 2018 as discussed in chapter four 
Section 4.8, the country’s political risk was significantly reduced. The political risk was less than that 
of the preceding periods and there was a marked increase in foreign investors seeking opportunities 
to invest in Zimbabwe. Traditional conceptualisation of political risk would have expected the 
political risk to escalate even higher because of the military tutelage and many retired military 




Secondly, tutelage, whether of the military, monarch or political party, was expected to possibly 
increase the political risk of a host country. This is because tutelage undermines formal institutions 
and subjects elected officials to informal domains of power. This case study confirmed that the 
institutions in Zimbabwe were weak. Under tutelage, the guardian who is motivated by self-interest 
has the power, and not the elected officials (Wigell, 2008: 239–240). Thus, tutelage of any form was 
expected to increase political risk. During the military hybrid regime, the government relaxed the 
conditions of the IEEA to lure foreign investment, which had a positive impact. Although military 
tutelage in the case study was a short-term period from November 2017 to 2018, the findings show 
that military tutelage in a hybrid regime decreased political risk. Thus, this finding contradicts the 
traditional conceptualisation of military involvement in politics and its impact on political risk. 
 
Unabated public corruption was established to indirectly increase political risk. This confirms the 
hypothesis made by BERI and the EIU models to estimate the political risk that a high level of 
corruption distorts the economy and leads to high levels of political risk (Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 
79–82). The case study showed a high willingness by public officials to use their positions and 
resources of the state for personal gain. This mentality deters foreign investors in a host country. As 
found in Zimbabwe, the consequences of corruption were costly for any business, regardless of its 
capacity to absorb the negative impact of corrupt activities. Therefore, the consequences of corruption 
lead to an increase in political risk, making it an indirect link between corruption and political risk. 
Hence, the findings confirm that unabated corruption will always indirectly increase political risk in 
a hybrid regime. 
 
The case study established a link between political elite cohesion and political risk. Hybrid regimes 
are indicative of having a popular dominant party that could be in government for several years. This 
incumbent party could be challenged by one or more political parties. The study hypothesised that 
when political elite cohesion was weak, the incumbent party would be hampered by instability. The 
instability of the incumbent party causes political instability of the country, which consequently 
increases the level of political risk. The findings in Chapter Four showed that political elite cohesion 
was strong during the liberal hybrid regime between 1990 and February 2000 and it was weakest 
during the illiberal hybrid regime period of July 2013 to October 2017. The political risk of the liberal 
hybrid regime was perceived as relatively low, while that of the illiberal hybrid regime was ranked 
as high. Section 4.7 in Chapter Four demonstrated how factionalism led to the dismissal of the vice-
president and several cabinet ministers, showing the level of fragmentation that hampered ZANU-




the infighting of the ZANU-PF elite caused high political instability in Zimbabwe. Some strategic 
members were dismissed from ZANU-PF  when the military hybrid regime started and, of those who 
remained in ZANU-PF, a one-mindedness in direction was observed. The restoration of political elite 
cohesion brought stability back within ZANU-PF and subsequently the country. Accordingly, the 
study confirmed that in a hybrid regime, when the political elite disagree, the incumbent party is 
unstable and there are higher levels of political risk. 
 
5.3.3 Economic development 
The findings show that government policy and behaviour have an impact on political risk. Depending 
on how the policies are framed, political risk could either increase or decrease.  The traditional 
political risk factors are skewed in terms of the effects that arise from government policy, for example, 
confiscation, expropriation, nationalisation, breach of contract, operational restrictions, transfer and 
convertibility restrictions, discrimination of taxes, non-honouring government guarantees  (Robock, 
1971: 7–12; Lloyd, 1974; Bunn & Mustafaoglu, 1978: 1558; Jakobsen, 2012: 8; MIGA, 2012). The 
findings confirm that the government has a variety of policies at its disposal that can impact on 
political risk as asserted by Jakobsen (2012). In addition, the case study also confirmed that adverse 
government regulations targeted at foreigners and unwarranted interference increase the perception 
of political risk in a host country. In Zimbabwe, some adverse government regulations had an 
expropriation effect, while the other regulations increased the government’s returns from foreign 
investors. The finding that adverse government regulation increases political risk is consistent with 
the traditional claims of political risk in a hybrid regime made by Fitzpatrick (1983: 249) and MIGA 
(2011: 21). Hence, this study confirms that government policy directly impacts on political risk.  
 
Home-host relations between Zimbabwe and the MNCs parent countries were found to have an 
impact on political risk. The findings show that when a MNCs parent country’s relationship with the 
host country is hostile, by extension, the level of political risk exposed to the MNC from that country 
is substantially higher than for MNCs with parent countries with cordial relations. The effect of the 
relationship between the host and home country cannot be underemphasised. Foreign investors 
originating from countries with hostile relationships with Zimbabwe had their assets expropriated 
more in comparison to states with cordial relations with Zimbabwe. This finding is consistent with 
political risk literature which postulates that countries with close political, economic and military ties 
are less likely to expropriate investments originating from countries they have friendly relations with 




parent country and the host country. Hence, this finding on home-host relationships confirms that 
MNCs parent country and host country relations have an impact of influencing political risk in a 
hybrid regime.  
 
The relationship between economic performance and political risk was not verified in this case study. 
Economic indicators reveal the possible challenges that the potential and current investors could face 
in a host-country. In the case study, it was observed that Zimbabwe was experiencing an economic 
recession between 2015 and 2018. The country’s history had two episodes of massive acts of 
expropriations and a high debt overhang. These indicators inform investors of the possible challenges 
they could encounter by investing in Zimbabwe but the relationship regarding economic development 
and political risk was not established by this study. This is contrary to political risk literature that 
claims that the level of economic development lowers the political risk of the host country as claimed 
by Green (1974: 35) and Jarvis and Griffiths (2007: 15).  
 
Contrary to the expectation of this study, geographic location and natural disasters were found to be 
insignificant in influencing political risk. In addition, health pandemics were found to minimally 
increase political risk, and this was in extreme cases where the pandemic severely undermined the 
institutions of the state to respond to the pandemic. If there is a ranking of factors that affect political 
risk, health pandemics would rank very low in influencing political risk. This suggests that political 
risk is more influenced by the traditional factors that arise from politics or as a by-product of political 
actions than by natural disasters/extreme weather patterns, geographic location and health pandemics. 
 
This section has so far discussed the main findings of this study. The discussion now focuses on 
analysing how the findings answer the main research question. The main research question was 
presented as: To what extent are the traditional conceptual perceptions of political risk in hybrid 
regimes still applicable, with specific reference to Zimbabwe from 1990 to 2018? 
 
PRA has, from the beginning of the discipline in the 1970s, been influenced by democratic norms 
and values. As such, factors, for example, strong institutions, strong rule of law, free and fair elections 
and horizontal accountability, if present, have been perceived to influence political risk to be 
significantly low. The study seeks to answer how political risk can be conducted in a political system 




whether the traditional conceptual perceptions of political risk in hybrid regimes are still applicable. 
The study does not seek to make a normative statement or moral judgement on the correctness or 
incorrectness of a political regime. However, the study intends to prepare the answers to how PRA 
may be conducted if, suppose, democracy in the foreseeable future declines as the dominant 
development strategy.  
 
Based on the findings of this study, the traditional perceptions of political risk in hybrid regimes were 
less stringently applied in 2018 than they were in the 1970s. This study confirms that the traditional 
conceptual perceptions regarding illegitimacy, corruption, staleness of leadership, adverse 
government regulation and the home-host state relations between the MNC parent country and the 
host state still have the impact of increasing the perception of political risk in a hybrid regime 
(Robock, 1971: 7; Fitzpatrick, 1983: 249; Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 76, 79–82; Venter, 1999: 79; 
Berlin et al., 2004: 9; MIGA, 2011: 21). However, regarding elections, election violence is more 
pertinent in influencing the political risk to increase because violence could potentially lead to civil 
unrest and disorder which could destroy foreign investors’ property. A contested or unfair election 
was shown to have no impact on levels of political risk expanding the understanding of the impact of 
elections on political risk.  
 
Political elite cohesion was hypothesised by this study to have an impact on political risk. The 
findings confirm that the agreement or disagreement between the political elite of the dominant party 
has an influence on political risk. Contrary to the study’s expectation, a link between political risk 
and economic development could not be established. Geographical location and natural 
disasters/extreme weather patterns were regarded to have no impact on political risk. The factor of 
health was observed to minimally influence political risk. The study suggests that if factors are to be 
ranked on their impact on political risk, the traditional political risk factors would have more weight 
than health, extreme weather pattern changes/natural disasters and geographic location. 
 
The findings show some contradictions with regards to some traditional conceptual perceptions of 
political risk in a hybrid regime. There was a tolerance level exhibited for military tutelage, weak 
institutions, relatively flawed elections (absent of violence), military generals in power, undemocratic 
means to retain power, minimum horizontal accountability and weak rule of law. These factors have 
traditionally been perceived to be undemocratic and warning signs that would lead to increasing 




because the military was assumed to lack governing experience, which would be detrimental in the 
long term (Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 76; Venter, 1999: 75). The findings show that investment was 
highly revived in Zimbabwe, even when the signs pointed to weak institutions, having military 
tutelage and a government that was installed through undemocratic means during the military hybrid 
regime. Although the military hybrid was short-term, investors were willing to compromise and invest 
in a host country with a government which was overtly co-governed by the military if certain 
minimum requirements were adhered to. The associated political risk of Zimbabwe during the 
military hybrid regime was lower than the preceding illiberal hybrid regime.  
 
The absence of a strong rule of law and an independent judiciary was observed in the case of the 
competitive hybrid regime and military hybrid regime. However, these aforesaid hybrid regimes had 
considerably high foreign investors showing interest and some investing. Foreign investors 
compensated for the weak institutions and weak rule of law by using informal institutions in the form 
of the strongman leadership of former president Mugabe and forming joint ventures with businesses 
owned by high ranking ZANU-PF political elites. Investors who made use of this avenue were 
guaranteed of some level of protection, especially in the mining, petroleum and energy sectors. The 
potential political risk to foreign investors who adopted these methods was low. Traditional 
conceptualisation of political risk regards weak institutions and a partial judiciary to invariably 
increase political risk. This traditional expectation is defied in the case study during the competitive 
and military hybrid regime.  
 
This study is not disregarding or undermining the importance of the traditional values and norms that 
have influenced political risk conceptualisation. Rather, judging by how investors made investments 
in the case study, this study is pointing out that foreign investors are showing a tolerance threshold 
of the traditionally unacceptable features that, if present, would cause the political risk to increase. 
The study offers several suggestions as to why foreign investors were becoming tolerant of the less 
desirable norms. One reason could be that there was an increase in the number of MNCs with the 
capacity to invest internationally in 2018 compared to 1970. Hence, there is high competition among 
foreign investors to acquire raw materials at an affordable and sustainable price and to manufacture 
their products at a low cost to have an assured market. This highly competitive environment could be 
one reason why some investors have been inclined to tolerate the traditionally unacceptable features 





The increase in non-democracies that are performing economically well is another factor that can 
possibly answers why foreign investors have become more tolerant of factors that were traditionally 
undesirable to political risk. Examples include China, Russia, Singapore and Saudi Arabia. Most 
foreign investors are hesitant to place large investments in undemocratic countries; they sometimes 
wait for the country to implement some democratic reforms before making huge investments. Taking 
China for example, it does not require a country to implement democratic reforms before its state and 
private MNCs can invest in a host country. As such, Chinese businesses are adequately represented 
in most countries, especially in Africa. Some non-Chinese foreign investors, by applying stringent 
demands to host-countries, have lost out on some possible investment opportunities. This subtle 
competition imposed by the Chinese model and other non-democracies performing better 
economically could have prompted other MNCs to also tolerate the traditionally unacceptable 
features of political risk. 
 
The increase in the number of hybrid regimes is the third reason that possibly explains why foreign 
investors are accommodating the traditionally undesirable features of political risk. Hybrid regime 
indicators include the possibility of tutelage, underdeveloped institutions, election irregularities and 
a relatively strong incumbent elite. These same indicators are directly observable as some of the 
traditionally undesirable features of political risk. There has been a marked increase in states that 
resemble the hybrid regime after the third wave of democratisation. The democracy index for 2018 
noted that 39 out of 167 countries resembled the hybrid regime (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019: 
2). These figures account for approximately 24% of the number of countries included in the sample 
by EIU. Investors cannot avoid investing in these regimes because 24% is a significant part of the 
global market share. 
 
Lastly, countries with abundant natural resources in terms of land, minerals, crude oil and cheaper 
labour have the potential to attract attention from many investors. For example, Zimbabwe is a typical 
resource-abundant country in terms of land, mineral deposits and cheaper skilled labour. Due to an 
abundance of some type of raw materials or cheaper labour, a country usually has no shortage of 
investor interest. A resource-abundant host country is aware that if one investor turns away from an 
investment, another will come to take advantage of the available resource. In such countries, investors 
cannot make too many demands to the host country because they know they can lose the investment 
opportunity to another competitor. This could be the reason why some foreign investors have adapted 




This section concludes that political risk in the hybrid political regime is progressively changing. 
Many indicators of the political risk framework showed that the traditional conceptual perceptions 
are still applicable to a large extent. It should be noted that with respect to some critical indicators 
considerable changes were observed, which show that political risk is increasingly changing for 
hybrid regimes. The findings and discussion of this chapter suggest that political risk can potentially 
be conducted, influenced by norms and values of the hybrid political regime. The concluding chapter 
will discuss how political risk can be conducted using the hybrid political regime.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter was to answer the main research question that has been posed throughout the 
study. The political risk framework was applied to the case of Zimbabwe. The study finds that the 
traditional conceptual perceptions of political risk in a hybrid regime are still applicable to a large 
extent. However, the study observed that there is a shift- the traditional conceptual perceptions have 
not been applied in the same strict manner in 2018 as they were in 1970. The next and final chapter 






Chapter 6: Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The final chapter of this study aims to provide a comprehensive summary and conclusion of the 
research. The chapter is organised as follows: it begins by giving an overview of the study and 
discussing the main findings. Thereafter, the contribution of this study is discussed. Lastly, the 
chapter concludes by making recommendations of what future research could focus on. 
 
6.2 Overview and summary of the main findings of the study 
This study sought to assess if PRA could be adaptable to be measured using a different political 
system from democracy. Academic literature suggested that democracy could be experiencing a 
possible recession (Diamond, 2015: 144; Plattner, 2015: 4). It was not the intention of this study to 
research about the democratic recession but rather, how the recession could potentially impact on 
PRA. The platform that PRA has been conducted from, from inception in the 1970s, has been founded 
on democratic principles. Thus, if, suppose, democracy declines as the dominant system, it affects 
how PRA will be conducted and conceptualised. Although academic literature discusses that 
democracy could be in recession, this research is fully aware that it may take a few years before it 
declines. The intention of this study was to start the conversation among scholars of how PRA will 
be conducted in future if democracy declines. This study takes a proactive position of researching if 
PRA could be adaptable to principles of a less known political regime by taking on the hybrid regime. 
The study posed the main research question as: “To what extent are the traditional conceptual 
perceptions of political risk in hybrid regimes still applicable, with specific reference to Zimbabwe 
from 1990 to 2018?”  By answering this question, this study examines if PRA was adaptable to be 






Figure 6.1: Frameworks developed by this research 
Source: Author’s compilation (2019) 
 
Before the study examined if political risk was adaptable to the hybrid regime, it first revisited the 
conceptualisation of the hybrid regime to comprehensively understand this regime. To conceptualise 
the hybrid regime, this study developed a hybrid regime framework. The hybrid regime conceptual 
framework was developed from the indicators of tutelary interference, elections and civil liberties 
(Wigell, 2008; Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011). Political elite cohesion of the incumbent party was an 
additional indicator that this study added to those given by Wigell (2008) and Gilbert and Mohseni, 
(2011). Political elite cohesion was added to this study because hybrid regimes are indicative of 
having one dominant party that will have served in government for several years. Hence the 
agreement or disagreement of the leadership of the incumbent party was proposed to have a bearing 
on the type of hybrid regime it would exhibit. The elements denoting political elite cohesion were 
stipulated as factionalism, leadership turnover, political elite cooperation and the prevention of threats 
from external actors by political elites. This hybrid regime conceptual framework was applied to the 
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The second model that was developed by this study was the political risk framework for the hybrid 
regime as illustrated in Figure 6.1. This framework was developed to answer the main research 
question. Indicators for the framework were drawn from political risk indicators typical exhibited in 
hybrid regimes as suggested from the research output by Green (1974), Jensen (2003, 2008), Berlin 
et al. (2004) and Jarvis & Griffiths (2007). In addition, hybrid regime indicators discussed in the first 
framework became inputs in this second framework. The framework had three categories, which are, 
political structure and institutions, political stability and economic development. Political structure 
and institutions examined four factors, which were elections, state institutions, rule of law and 
legitimacy. The second category, political stability, had three factors which were corruption, tutelary 
interference and political elite cohesion. Economic development is the last category which focused 
on government’s participation in the economy, adverse regulations, health pandemics, geographical 
location and natural disasters, as well as the host country’s economic performance and international 
perception by other states. This framework was applied to the case of Zimbabwe from 1990 to 2018. 
 
When the hybrid regime framework was applied on Zimbabwe, this study found that Zimbabwe 
exhibited five forms of hybridity. The liberal hybrid regime from 1990 to February 2000 was the first 
type; it transitioned into the competitive illiberal hybrid regime from March 2000 to 2008. From 2009 
to June 2013, Zimbabwe exhibited the third type called the competitive hybrid regime. The illiberal 
hybrid regime, from July 2013 to October 2017, was the fourth type observed. The military hybrid 
regime between November 2017 and 2018 was the last type of hybrid regime. The Zimbabwean 
hybrid was observed and discussed as one that was durable.  
 
By applying the political risk framework for the hybrid regime, this study confirmed and contradicted 
some theoretical propositions. The study confirmed that the traditional conceptual perceptions 
regarding illegitimacy, corruption, staleness of leadership, adverse government regulations and 
home-host state relations between the MNC parent country and the host state still have the impact of 
increasing the perception of political risk in a hybrid regime (Robock, 1971: 7; Fitzpatrick, 1983: 
249; Howell & Chaddick, 1994: 76, 79–82; Venter, 1999: 79; Berlin et al., 2004: 9; MIGA, 2011: 
21). Election violence was found to increase political risk, while a contested or unfair election had no 
impact on political risk. Low political elite cohesion was confirmed to increase the perception of 
political risk. The study could not establish a link between economic development, geographic 
location and natural disasters/extreme weather patterns with respect to their impact on political risk. 
Health pandemics were found to minimally increase political risk, only when the pandemic severely 




With respect to military tutelage, weak institutions, relatively flawed elections (absent of violence), 
military generals in power, undemocratic means to retain power, minimum horizontal accountability 
and weak rule of law, the study found that there was an awareness and a tolerance, to some level, 
exhibited by foreign investors. These factors have traditionally constituted to increasing political risk, 
but the tolerance by foreign investors in the case study showed that they do not automatically increase 
political risk in contemporary times. The study proposed four reasons why foreign investors have 
grown to adapt to the undesirable features of political risk.  
 
The increase in the number of foreign investors who can competently invest globally in 2018 as 
compared to 1970 is one reason that is suggested to influence why investors tolerate the undesirable 
features. Foreign investors have to actively compete for markets for their products and, in the process, 
some have become inclined to operating in hybrid regimes while accommodating the undesirable 
features of political risk. The second reason could be the subtle pressure that foreign investors 
experience due to some non-democracies performing economically better and making huge 
investments in countries that are governed using far less democratic principles. While foreign 
investors usually wait for a country to make convincing strides in adopting democracy before they 
can commit substantial investments, authoritarian regimes, for example China, do not subscribe to 
the same values. Hence, for fear of losing potential markets to autocratic competitors, some foreign 
investors have tended to tolerate traditionally undesirable political risk factors.  
 
Another reason why some foreign investors have become tolerant of traditionally undesirable features 
could be the increase in the number of hybrid regimes. The hybrid regime exhibits some features that 
traditional conceptualisation of risk viewed as increasing political risk. However, foreign investors 
cannot ignore investing in hybrid regimes as these constitute a substantial potential market share. 
Lastly, countries with abundant natural resources usually have leverage in dictating the terms and 
conditions of engagement with foreign investors. In order not to lose possible opportunities in these 
resource abundant countries, foreign investors have become tolerant of factors that have traditionally 
been perceived to increase political risk. 
 
As a result of these findings, this study answers the research question by stating that the traditional 
conceptual perceptions of political risk in hybrid regimes are still applicable, however, they are less 
stringently applicable in 2018 than in the 1970s. The next section will answer if PRA is adaptable 




6.3 Contribution of this study  
This section will answer if PRA is adaptable to the hybrid regime. The section first discusses the 
contributions made by this study, which fall into two categories; first, the conceptualisation of the 
hybrid regime and second, the conceptualisation of PRA in a hybrid regime. Regarding the hybrid 
regime, literature has confirmed that when comparing hybrid regime states, they resemble different 
forms of hybridity (Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011). Gilbert and Mohseni (2011: 234) provide a list of the 
different hybrid regimes resembled by different states from 1990 to 200989.  This study finds that 
within a single state, hybridity also varies. This is shown by Zimbabwe, which exhibited five different 
types of hybrid regimes. Figure 6.2 shows Zimbabwe’s hybrid regime development in detail. 
 
Furthermore, this study finds the hybrid regime to be fluid; it changes form, it is not constant. The 
five Zimbabwean hybrid regimes are not equal in length of time. The liberal hybrid regime lasted for 
ten years, the competitive illiberal regime lasted for eight years and the competitive and illiberal 
hybrid regimes both existed for approximately four and a half years. The military regime was 
observed for one year. The first two hybrid regimes are longer in length than the succeeding hybrid 
regimes. The chief reason proposed for the differences in longevity was the disagreements among the 
political elites in the incumbent party. Political elite cohesion was stronger in the liberal and 
competitive illiberal regimes than in the following hybrids. The change from the illiberal regime to 
the military was necessitated by the disintegration of the various factions within ZANU-PF. This 
study emphasises that hybrid regimes are fluid and not constant. 
 
Lastly, this study notes that the broad group of the hybrid regime is durable. While the individual 
forms vary in length, the study found that one hybrid form transitioned into another hybrid form. 
Hence, collectively, the hybrid regime was observed to be durable. This study proposes five factors 
that promote the durability of the hybrid regime after observing the Zimbabwean hybrid regime.  The 
hybrid regime should have an incumbent political party that has been in government for a lengthy 
period, which has high political elite cohesion and is possibly led by a statesman with a strong 
personality. In addition, there should be low turnover in political office holders and a very competitive 
opposition that forces the incumbent not to degenerate into authoritarian rule, thus making the hybrid 
regime durable. The claim that the hybrid regime is durable is consistent with the claims made by 
Carothers (2002: 3),  Merkel (2004: 50), Morlino (2009: 282) and  Mufti (2018: 115). 
 





Figure 6.2: Zimbabwe’s hybrid regime development 
Source: Author’s compilation (2019) *Compiled from the discussion in Chapter Four. 
 
The focus of this study was until the end of 2018; the Zimbabwean hybrid regime, if analysed in the 
next ten years, could possibly still reveal a hybrid nature. During the write-up of this dissertation in 
2019, applying the hybrid regime framework to the case study showed that Zimbabwe exhibited a 
military illiberal hybrid regime. Although this study does not fall within the realm of future studies 
and scenario analysis, based on what this research found, I forecast that Zimbabwe will continue to 




conducted. The hybrid regime will transition into another form of hybrid after the elections, but this 
will be dependent on who holds the levers of power within the dominant party ZANU-PF. 
 
Therefore, regarding the hybrid regime conceptualisation, this study concludes that: A single state 
can show diverse forms of hybridity. It can transition from one form of hybrid to another in unequal 
intervals. The hybrid regime is observed to be fluid and not constant. In addition, the regime proves 
to be durable over an extended period.  
 
The second contribution of this study is with regards to political risk and the hybrid regime. The 
guiding hypothesis of political risk in political regimes assumes that the hybrid regime invariably 
accrues high levels of political risk (Green, 1974: 35; Simon, 1984: 127; Jarvis & Griffiths, 2007: 
15). However, this study finds that the levels of political risk differ within the different types of hybrid 
regime. Some hybrid regimes accrue low levels of political risk while others accrue substantially 
higher levels of risk, which is contrary to the traditional claims that the hybrid accrues high levels of 
political risk. The study makes these claims based on how political risk was perceived in Zimbabwe. 





Figure 6.3: Political risk illustrated in Zimbabwe’s hybrid regime 
Source: Author’s compilation (2019) 
 
The liberal hybrid regime was perceived to have the least political risk. This study proposes that it 
was because of the presence of the following factors: an independent and impartial judiciary, strong 
rule of law, high horizontal accountability, the government perceived as legitimate and strong 
political elite cohesion. The overall perception of political risk during this period was low, regardless 
of there being minimal competition from the opposition, occasional intimidation on political 
opponents which was not violent on a large scale, and traces of tutelage. The competitive hybrid 
regime had the second lowest perception of political risk.  The opposition political parties formed the 
majority in parliament in the competitive hybrid regime, which was the major distinction from the 
liberal hybrid regime. However, the judiciary was partial, rule of law was not consistently adhered to 
and horizontal accountability was average, which made it have a higher perception of political risk 
than the liberal hybrid regime. 
 
The military hybrid regime and the illiberal hybrid regime are numbered third and fourth respectively, 




features that can be compared in Figure 6.2. However, these regimes differ in that the military regime 
gave political opposition space to share their ideas to the electorate with minimum restrictions, while 
the illiberal aggressively clamped down on an active opposition. The military hybrid was a new 
government, so investors probably had more confidence in the new government’s ability to engage 
investors than the government of Former President Mugabe. It should be noted, however, that the 
military hybrid was a short-term phenomenon; possibly, after a few-years, investors would regard it 
differently. 
 
The competitive illiberal hybrid regime was perceived as accruing the most political risk in a hybrid 
regime. The competitive illiberal hybrid shares many of the features of the illiberal regime, however, 
the competitive illiberal regime type unleashes violence and suppresses political opponents on a larger 
scale and higher level than the illiberal hybrid regime. Furthermore, legislation that had an effect of 
expropriating foreign owned businesses, for example, the FTLRP and the IEEA, was passed in this 
period. Security of private property rights changed in this period. The factors highlighted above made 
investors cautious and perceive the competitive illiberal hybrid as accruing the most political risk in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Therefore, regarding the conceptualisation of PRA in a hybrid regime, this study concludes that: The 
levels of political risk differ within the different types of hybrid regimes; some hybrid regimes accrue 
lower levels of risk, while others accrue substantially higher levels of risk. 
 
Regarding whether PRA is adaptable to the hybrid regime, this study concludes that yes, PRA is 
adaptable to be measured using principles of the hybrid regime. However, to measure PRA using 
the hybrid regime is only possible by taking into consideration the research findings of this study 
which are:  
i. Hybridity is fluid, it is not stagnant. Furthermore, within a single state, the levels of political 
risk differ within the different types of hybrid regimes. PRA needs to identify the different 
types of hybrid forms; hence constant monitoring is required. 
ii. This study recommends the following political risk factors as constituting moderately lower 
levels of political risk: competitive elections, an impartial judiciary, moderate rule of law, 
strong political elite cohesion of the incumbent, average horizontal accountability, election 




intimidation of political opponents, a partially active civil society and favourable 
government policies. 
 
6.4 Recommendations for future research 
First, this research only used one case study to put forward the theoretical propositions of political 
risk in a hybrid regime that it concluded. This study suggests that future research use the hybrid 
regime and political risk analytical frameworks and apply these in another hybrid regime to either 
confirm or expand on the theoretical propositions that this study made. The possible hybrid regimes 
that could be used to compare with Zimbabwe are Zambia/                                                                                                                                                   
Rwanda in Africa, Venezuela in South America or Turkey in Europe. An African country could offer 
similar conclusions, while a non-African country could share different insights due to the differences 
in culture and the environment that shapes the governance system of each country.  
 
Secondly, in the process of submitting this thesis, Britain was negotiating to exist the EU. The process 
of leaving the EU started in 2016 and was officially going to be endorsed on the 31st of October 2019.  
Future research could investigate the impact of Britain leaving the EU on the levels of political risk. 
Specific research could focus on the political risk for MNCs from the EU operating in Britain and the 
political risk of MNCs from Britain operating in the EU. The USA and China were experiencing a 
trade war in 2019. Future research could focus on the possible impact of the trade war on the political 
risk of Chinese companies operating in the USA, or of USA companies operating in China.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a brief overview of how the study was conducted and presented the main 
findings of this study. This research provided a timely re-conceptualisation of PRA, as well as the 
hybrid regime. The study found that the traditional conceptual perceptions of political risk were less 
stringently applied in 2018 than the 1970s and contributed that the principles of the hybrid regime 
were adaptable to measuring political risk, only after taking into consideration the fluidity of the 
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Appendix A: Chronology of Zimbabwe’s history  
850-1150  Leopard Kopjes people move west into the Kalahari to form Toutswemogola culture 
1220-1290  The rise and fall of Mapungubwe state 
1325-1550  Rise and fall of Great Zimbabwe 
1450-1830  Rise and fall of Mutapa, Torwa and Rozvi states 
1506   Portuguese establish presence in the Mutapa state 
1569-1577  Portuguese attempt to invade the Mutapa state 
1684   Changamire Dombo defeats the Portuguese at the battle of Maungwe 
1830  Ndebele people flee from the Mfecane and Boer migration. They establish a state in 
present day Matebeleland 
1857   Ndebele successfully subject the major Shona chiefs to their ruling 
1870   Lobengula signs the Tati Concession 
1879  Ndebele defeated by Shona in Nyaningwe Chivi; this is the first major military setback 
of the Ndebele by the Shona 
1888   February- Lobengula signs the Moffat Treaty 
1888  March- Lobengula tricked into signing the Rudd Concession, a document granting 
exclusive mining rights to Cecil John Rhodes and partners  
1889  October- Cecil John Rhodes uses the British South African Company (BSAC) to 
occupy Zimbabwe on the legal basis of the Rudd Concession. Southern Rhodesia is 
then established.  
The Queen of England grants a royal charter 
1890  Pioneer white settlers funded by mining magnet and establish Fort Salisbury at the 
future capital (present day Harare) 
1893   Ndebele uprising against the BSAC. Hunt Tax introduced 
1895   BSAC adapts the name Southern Rhodesia 
1902   Cecil John Rhodes dies at 42 
1898  Southern Rhodesia Order in council recognised by the British imperial government as 
the governing instrument of Rhodesia 
1912   Southern African Native Congress (SNANC) formed 
1919   Matabele Home Movement petitions the Queen for the return of Ndebele land taken 
1922  BSAC administration ends. White settler minority effectively begin to self-govern 
their own territory 
1923   Southern Rhodesia becomes self-governed after a referendum 




1930  Land Apportionment Act adopted and becomes effective in 1931. The Act allocated 
land according to race, thereby restricting access to land for black people. 
1935   African National Congress (ANC) revived by Reverend Samkange 
1947   African Voices Association (The Voice) is founded by Benjamin Burombo 
1953  Britain creates Central African Federation, which merges Southern Rhodesia, 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which are present day Zimbabwe, Zambia and 
Malawi respectively. 
1960   The National Democratic Party (NDP) is formed 
1961  NDP is banned and replaced by Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU)  
Southern Rhodesia adopts a new constitution under Edgar Whitehead’s leadership 
1962  March- Rhodesia Front (RF), a white party, is formed and wins general elections in 
December 
1962   September- ZAPU is banned 
1963  The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland dissolves because Zambia and Malawi 
gained independence 
1963  August 8- Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) is formed. It is a breakaway 
from ZAPU affiliated to tribal differences between the Shona and Ndebele people in 
leadership. 
ZAPU and ZANU send their operatives for military training in socialist bloc nations 
1964  Ian Douglas Smith, an RF candidate, becomes Prime Minister. He was born and raised 
in Southern Rhodesia. Smith tries to persuade Britain to gain independence. 
1965  November 11- Smith declares Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)  
Britain retaliates by imposing economic sanctions on Rhodesia 
1966  United Nations imposes oil embargo on Rhodesia; Britain imposes full embargo on 
Rhodesian trade. 
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), which was ZANU’s military 
wing, engages Rhodesia forces in the battle of Chinhoyi 
1968   UN imposes full mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia 
1969  Anglo-Rhodesian Agreement institutes a new Constitution extending franchise to 
selected groups 
1971   Power struggles paralyse ZAPU; FROLIZI is formed 
New ANC formed under Muzorewa to oppose Anglo-Rhodesia Agreement 
1972  Pearce Commission initiated referendum to test the acceptability of the Anglo-




1972  Guerrilla war against the white minority intensifies, with ZAPU and ZANU operatives 
operating in Zambia and Mozambique respectively 
1973  Zambia closes its border to Rhodesia 
1974  UANC is formed, which combines ZAPU, ZANU, FROLIZI and the ANC under 
pressure from the Frontline States 
‘Protected villages’ in Madziwa Tribal Trust Lands and Chiweshe are created as a 
counter-insurgency measure 
Nhari rebellion rocks ZANU 
Nationalist leaders in detention are released in the spirit of détente 
1975  Hebert Chitepo, ZANLA leader, assassinated  
Mozambique attains independence and closes is border in Rhodesia; Mozambique 
allows ZANLA to use its territory 
Robert Mugabe topples Sithole as ZANU leader 
ZIPA is formed in attempt to unite Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), 
which was ZIPRA’s military wing, and ZANLA fighting forces 
1976  Patriotic Front (PF) is formed as an initiative of the Frontline States to unite ZAPU 
and ZANU. 
Over 1 000 black refugees from Rhodesia are killed by Rhodesian forces at Nyadzonia, 
Mozambique 
1977  Massacre of civilians and ZANLA guerrillas by Rhodesian Forces at Chimoio and 
Tebwe camps in Mozambique 
1978  Internal Settlement Agreement agreed upon by Smith, Muzorewa, Chirau and Sithole, 
creating Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, but this fails to gain international recognition. 
Patriotic Front (PF) boycott the subsequent general elections, hence the civil war 
continues. 
1979  Lancaster House Conference reaches a constitutional settlement to end the war, this is 
attended by all parties. 
1980  Robert Mugabe wins the British supervised elections as Prime Minister and ZANU, 
his party, wins most of the parliamentary seats.  
Joshua Nkomo, Mugabe’s major rival is named in the cabinet.  
1980   April 18- Independence Day. 
1980  Zimbabwe becomes a member of the Frontline States (FLS), joining Tanzania, 
Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and Angola. 





North Korean trained fifth Brigade is deployed to crush rebellion by pro-Nkomo ex-
guerrillas. 
1982-1987  ‘Gukurahundi’ atrocities in the midlands and Matabeleland areas are perpetuated by 
Mugabe’s North Korean Fifth Brigade, killing over 20 000. 
1987  Gukurahundi ends when a Unity Agreement is signed by Mugabe and Nkomo to merge 
their parties to form ZANU-PF. 
1987  The constitution is amended to introduce an executive president and the prime minister 
post is abolished. Mugabe becomes executive president. 
1990   Indigenous Business Development Centre (IDBC) 
1990  Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) is formed as an opposition party by former ZANU 
PF Secretary General, Edgar Tekere. 
1991   Commonwealth Summit is held in Harare. 
1991   Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) is introduced. 
1992  First ZCTU protest march against government’s economic reform programme, this 
was poorly attended, and the police used force to disrupt it. 
1994   Affirmative Action Group (AAG) is formed. 
1996   Largest Strike of civil servants, post-independence. 
1997  November 14, Black Friday, the Zimbabwean Dollar (ZW$) crashes, plunges a record 
72 percent. 
War veterans pressurise the government into paying an unbudgeted gratuity. 
1998  Rioting in major cities because of rapid increases in corn and other staple food prices. 
Zimbabwe sends troops to the DRC. 
1999   MDC is formed 
Government fails to make debt repayment to the IMF and WB 
2000 Government led draft constitution denied by a popular No vote in the referendum 
conducted 
Land invasions by war veterans known as the ‘Third Chimurenga’ 
MDC gains nearly 50% in the parliamentary elections 
2002  February- The European Union imposes sanctions on Zimbabwe. EU team leader is 
expelled, the observer mission is pulled out. 
2002   March- Mugabe wins contested presidential elections 
2002  June- Land acquisition law passed in May, begins the 45-day countdown for some 
2,900 white farmers to leave their land 
AIPPPA and POSA introduced 




2003   Zimbabwe pulls out of the Commonwealth 
2003   Tsvangirai arrested on treason charges 
2004  March- Simon Mann and company are intercepted after landing at the Harare 
International Airport en route to Equatorial Guinea to execute a coup. 
2005  Operation Murambatsvina, an urban clean-up campaign, is executed; an estimated 700 
000 were displaced and became homeless. 
ZANU wins 2/3 majority seats in the upper house of parliament, The Senate 
2005  MDC splits over its leader’s decision to boycott the elections and tribal issues. MDC-
T and MDC-M are created. 
2006   May- year-on-year inflation exceeds 1 000% 
2007  February- Rallies, demonstrations are effectively banned for three months. The ban is 
extended in May. 
2007  June- ZANU-PF and opposition MDC hold preliminary talks mediated by President 
Thabo Mbeki in South Africa. 
2008  March- Harmonised presidential, parliamentary and local government elections. 
Opposition MDC wins the parliamentary elections. 
2008  May- MDC’s Tsvangirai announced to have won the presidential elections by ZEC, 
but not enough to avoid a run-off against Mugabe. 
2008  June- Tsvangirai pulls out days before the run-off because of intimidation and 
violence. 
Mugabe wins the run-off. 
Russia, China veto a Western-backed UN Security Council resolution to impose 
sanctions. 
2008   July- EU and USA widen sanctions against ZANU-PF leaders. 
2008  September- Mugabe, Tsvangirai sign power-sharing agreement called the Global 
Political Agreement (GNU), however implementation stalls over who gets top 
ministerial jobs. 
2008  December- Cholera epidemic breaks out, which deepens the humanitarian crisis in 
Zimbabwe. 
2009  January- Government adopts a multi-currency system of foreign currencies to stem 
hyperinflation. 
2009  February- Tsvangirai is sworn in as prime minister, after protracted talks over 
formation of government.  
2009  March- Tsvangirai is injured, and his wife is killed in a car crash. Retail prices fall for 




2009  September- One year after power-sharing deal, MDC remains frustrated and alleges 
persecution and violence against members. 
2010  March- New "indigenisation" law is selectively applied, it forces foreign-owned 
businesses to sell majority stake to locals. 
2010  August- Zimbabwe resumes official diamond sales, amid controversy over reported 
rights abuses at the Marange diamond fields.  
2010 December- Grace Mugabe takes legal action over claims released by WikiLeaks that 
she profited from illegal diamond trading. 
2011  February- European Union eases sanctions on Zimbabwe by removing the names of 
35 of President Mugabe's supporters from a list of people whose assets had been 
frozen. 
2011  August- General Solomon Mujuru, husband to Joice Mujuru, the Vice-President, dies 
in a mysterious house fire. 
2011  November- The Kimberly Process, which regulates the global diamond industry, lifts 
a ban on the export of diamonds from two of Zimbabwe's Marange fields. 
2011   December- President Mugabe says he will run in the 2013 presidential elections 
2012  Constitutional Select Committee completes draft of new constitution, but ZANU-PF 
and MDC disagree on some details. 
2013  March- Referendum votes ‘Yes’ to adopt the new constitution, subject to 
parliamentary adoption. 
2013  July- Presidential and parliamentary elections are won by Mugabe and ZANU-PF 
dominates parliament.  
The opposition MDC-T dismisses the polls as a fraud 
2013  September- MDC-T boycotts the opening of parliament presided over by President 
Mugabe in protest at what it says was a rigged election. 
2014  February- Zimbabwe marks President Mugabe's 90th birthday after he returns from 
medical treatment in Singapore. 
2014  August- Grace Mugabe, the president's wife and a political novice, is unexpectedly 
nominated as the next leader of the governing ZANU-PF's Women's League, fuelling 
speculation that she may succeed her husband one day. 
2014  December- President Mugabe sacks Vice-President Joice Mujuru, accusing her of a 
plot to kill him. 





2016  November- A new national currency called bond notes is introduced to ease the cash 
crisis but there is public resistance. 
2017   September- Pastor Evan Mawarire is charged with inciting a crowd to violence. 
2017  November- Mr Mugabe resigns days after the military takes control. Emmerson 
Mnangagwa becomes president. 
2018   February- Opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai dies after a battle with cancer. 
2018  June- A bomb explodes near Mr Mnangagwa at a rally in Bulawayo, leaving him 
unhurt but killing two people. Campaigning for the 30 July presidential election is 
underway. 
2018  July- Presidential Elections are won by Emmerson Mnangagwa. ZANU-PF gains over 
two-thirds majority in parliament. 
2018  August- The military fires live ammunition on protestors who were marching towards 
ZEC offices demanding the release of presidential results. Six people died and several 
injured  
2018   August- Constitutional Court, Chamisa loses the case 
2018  September- Commission of inquiry set up, chaired by former South African president 
Motlanthe 












Appendix B: Key Informant Guide questions 
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Create political risk 
 
Measure political risk 
 




















1. What is your 
understanding of the 
term political risk? 
2. What is your 




1. What is your understanding 
of the term political risk? 
2. What is your perception of 
political risk in Zimbabwe 
in the past and possibly a 
forecast for the next 2-3 
years? 
3. Which industries have been 
vulnerable the most to 
political risk in Zimbabwe? 
4. What is your understanding 




1. What is your 
understanding of the term 
political risk? 
2. What is your perception 
of political risk in 
Zimbabwe in the past?  
What is your opinion of 
political risk in 
Zimbabwe, say 2-3 years 
from today. 
3. Is political risk constant 
or it varies depending on 
the industry? Which 
industries have been at 
most risk in Zimbabwe? 
4. What is your 
understanding of a hybrid 
regime? 
5. In the past, which of these 
two characters has 
Zimbabwe exhibit more 





And what is the 


























1. Which industries do you 
think have been most 
exposed to PR in 
Zimbabwe? 
2. Do you suppose that 
following through on the 
implementation of 
policies by the 
government e.g. 
ZIMASSET influences 
the political risk index of 
Zimbabwe? 
3. Does being a SADC/AU 
member have any impact 
on political risk levels of 
Zimbabwe’s  
4. Suppose in the future 




states or more 
specifically with the 
Western countries, will 
this have a significant 
impact on our PR? 
 
 
1. Why do you measure 
political risk? 
2. What factors do you 
consider significant in your 
compilation of political risk 
index for Zimbabwe? 
(NOT THE TRADE 
SECRETS JUST A 
GENERAL OVERVIEW 
OF FACTORS) 
3. What factors do you 
consider significant in your 
compilation of political risk 
index for Zimbabwe? 
(NOT THE TRADE 
SECRETS JUST A 
GENERAL OVERVIEW 
OF FACTORS) 
4. Do Zimbabwe’s geographic 
location and climate 
influence your calculation of 
political risk? 
5. Do foreign currency 





1. Which political risk factors 
do you consider as most 
influential in your 
constructing a political risk 
index for Zimbabwe? 
2. Do you think that it is 
important to measure 
political risk? 
3. Suppose Zimbabwe’s 
relationship with the G-20-
member states deteriorates 
will this impact on the 
political risk index? 
What if the Zimbabwe - AU 
relationship deteriorates, 
will this have an impact on 
political risk? 
4. Which methods do you 




5. Does the Indigenisation Act 
influence Zimbabwe’s 







6. Do foreign currency 







































1. Zimbabwe’s elections 
have been contested, 
either on the precedence 
of rigging or suspected 
foul play, suppose this 
July 2018 election is not 
contested, how will this 
impact on political risk? 
2. Suppose other countries 
suspect that the election 
results are not reflective 
of the will of the people 
will this significantly 
have an impact on 
political risk, if it does. 
3. How has the 
Indigenisation Act of 
2007 influenced political 
risk if it has in 
Zimbabwe? 
4. Suppose there is another 
pandemic like the cholera 
outbreak in 2008 or the 
AIDS pandemic of the 
1990s will this have an 
impact on political risk in 
anyway? 
5. How has the various 
indicators of corruption 
 
1. With regards to election 
irregularities be it in terms 
of violence, vote buying, 
suspected rigging, do these 
irregularities affect your 
perception of political risk 
in Zimbabwe in anyway? 
2. Does the presence of 
retired army personnel (e.g. 
current Vice-President and 
other ministers) in 
government influence your 
calculation of political 
risk? 
3. Zimbabwe’s corruption 
index according various 
indicators for example 
Transparency International 
ranks it at 167/176, if it 
improves, will this 
significantly influence its 
political risk? 
4. Does the legitimacy or 
acceptability of the 
President and 
Parliamentarians 
significantly impact of 
political risk especially in 
Zimbabwe where the 
 
1. Is there a period in which the 
government was under the 
guardian of unelected 
institutions or personnel? 
Does the presence of a 
guardian influence political 
risk calculations? 
2. Suppose there is a similar 
operation like 
Murambatsvina or 
Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe, 
will this affect the political 
risk rating for Zimbabwe? 
3. Does the presence of retired 
army personnel (e.g. current 
Vice-President) in the public 
office influence your 
calculation of political risk? 
4. If the reputation of the 
government to award 
contracts in exchange for 
political support increases in 
the future, will this 
significantly impact on 
political risk in Zimbabwe? 
5. If vote rigging or mass 
violence are reported during 




impacted on political risk 
perception in Zimbabwe? 
6. Rule of law hasn’t been 
consistent in most cases 
and suppose the trajectory 
changes and rule of law 
becomes consistent 2018 
going forward. That is 
today onwards and how 
will that impact on our 
PR? 
7. Does the shortage of 
foreign currency 
influence of impact on 





legitimacy of President 
Mugabe has been contested 
from 2000? 
5. The military intervention of 
2017, which disposed 
Mugabe as President, did 
this in anyway influence 
your perception of political 
risk in Zimbabwe? 
6. The hegemonic party 
ZANU-PF has been 
hampered with 
factionalism and the splits 
are in the public domain. 
Does the inhouse fighting 
influence your perception 
of political risk in 
Zimbabwe? 
7. Property rights have not 
been respected in 
Zimbabwe in times past 
especially with regards to 
the Land Reform 
Programme of 2000, if the 
trajectory of the country 
changes and the country 
begins to adhere to the 
protection of property and 
adhering to the law, will 
this significantly influence 
Political risk? 
8. Will a serious disease 
outbreak like Cholera, or 
Typhoid or an increase in 
elections in Zimbabwe, will 
this affect your calculation of 
risk? 
6. If the perception of 
corruption worsens in 
Zimbabwe from the rated 
167th corrupt country by 
transparency international, 
how will this affect political 
risk? 
7. Does the  political elite  
cohesion of ZANU-PF 
influence or affect political 
risk? 
8. How did the military 
intervention of 2017 that 
resulted in a change in 
government affect the 






the HIV pandemic 
influence your perception 
of political risk of 
Zimbabwe? 
9. Do you think that the 
country has been under the 
guardianship of any 
unelected person or body at 
any one time in the 
country’s history and has 
this influenced 
significantly your 
calculations of political risk 





             MNC 
 







Adapts to political risk and 
possibly measures 
Assess and judge political risk 
for the benefit of their home 
firms 
Included in the discussion 


















1. What is your 
understanding of the term 
political risk? 
2. Do you think your 
industry is more exposed 
to political risk than other 
industries? 
3. What measures has your 
organisation taken to cope 
with political risk in 
Zimbabwe? 
4. What is your 
understanding of the term 
hybrid regime? 





1. What is your 
understanding of the 
term political risk? 
2. In your opinion which 
industries are more 
vulnerable to political 
risk in Zimbabwe? 
3. What are some of the 
measures you would 
prescribe to your home 
MNC to take to mitigate 
political risk in 
Zimbabwe? 
4. What is your 
understanding of a 
hybrid regime? 
5. In the past which 
characteristic has 
Zimbabwe 
demonstrated more the 
democratic or autocratic 
features? 
What is the implication 
of this to political risk? 
 
 
1. What is your 
understanding of the 
term political risk? 
2. What is your 
understanding of a 
hybrid regime? 
3.  In your own opinion 
does Zimbabwe exhibit 
more democratic or 
autocratic features? 
What is the implication 








































1. Do you measure political 
risk? Inhouse or private 
company? 
If so which methods do 
you use to measure? 
2. Which factors do you 
consider paramount in 
your assessment of 
political risk in 
Zimbabwe? 
3. Does the indigenisation 
Act (51% to indigenous 
Zimbabweans) influence 
your calculations of 
political risk in 
Zimbabwe? 
4. Suppose your home 
country’s and 
Zimbabwe’s relationship 
becomes hostile, will this 
have an impact on the 
political risk index in any 
way? 
5. Does Zimbabwe’s 
geographic location and 
climate influence your 
opinion of political risk in 
Zimbabwe? 
6. Suppose Zimbabwe 
becomes inconsistent in 
policy implementation 
 
1. What key factors do you 
consider in assessing or 
judging political risk in 
Zimbabwe? 
2. Have any of your home-
based MNCs operating 
in Zimbabwe 
experienced significant 
challenges due to 
strained relations 
between your country 
and Zimbabwe? 
Any opportunities 
because of a good 
relationship? 
3. Does Zimbabwe’s 
geographic location and 
climate influence your 
assessment of political 
risk? 
4. Does the Indigenisation 
Act influence your 
perception of political 
risk in Zimbabwe? 
5. If suppose Zimbabwe 
pulls out of the AU will 
this affect political risk 
in any way? 
 
 
1. What if Zimbabwe’s 
relationship with the G-
20member states 
deteriorates will this 
influence political risk 
in Zimbabwe? 
Assume that Zimbabwe 
pulls out of the AU will 
this affect political risk 
in any way? 
2. Does Zimbabwe’s 
geographic location 
and climate influence 






(e.g. fiscal, labour, 
monetary, exchange rate), 
will this impact the 
political risk index for 
Zimbabwe? 
7. Suppose the government 
starts to revise contracts of 
other companies in your 
industry, will this change 
or affect your risk index of 
Zimbabwe? 
8. Do foreign currency 
shortages have an impact 








































1. If suppose ZANU-PF 
wins the next two 
successive harmonised 
elections, will this affect 
your calculation of 
political risk in 
Zimbabwe? 
2. Zimbabwe’s corruption 
perception index is 163/ 
176 by if it drops to 170 
will this affect your 
calculation of political 
risk in any way? 
3. If going forward there is 
selective application of 
the laws that govern 
 
1. How much does the 
alteration of power between 
ZANU-PF and the 
opposition at the level of the 
Presidency and legislature 
contribute to your 
judgement of political risk? 
2. Is there a period that you 
presumed that Zimbabwe 
was under the guardianship 
of unelected officials?  
When and by whom? 
And did this affect your 
judgement of political 
risk for Zimbabwe? 
 
1. Do you think that the 
government has been 
under the guidance of 
unelected bodies in the 
history of Zimbabwe? 
By whom? When? 
Has this influenced 
political risk for 
Zimbabwe? 
2. Suppose the 2018 
harmonised elections 
are marred by massive 
violence and vote 
rigging, will this affect 







Zimbabwe, will this affect 
political risk in 
Zimbabwe? 
4. How do elections affected 
political risk? Suppose 
going forward in 2023 the 
elections are contested 
how does that influence 
on political risk? 
5. Does the legitimacy of the 
president and 
parliamentarians’ matter 
and does it have any 
impact on political risk? 
6. Does having retired 
serving military officers 
serving in key influential 
positions affect the 
political risk perceptions 
of the country? 
7. Does the political elite 
fighting visible in the 
media affect your 
calculations of political 
risk? 
 
3. Suppose the 2018 
harmonised elections are 
marred with mass violence 
and suspected vote rigging, 
will this affect your 
judgement for political risk 
in Zimbabwe?  
4. Does the legitimacy of the 
president and 
parliamentarians’ matter 
and does it have any impact 
on political risk? 
5. Does having retired serving 
military officers serving in 
key influential positions 
affect the political risk 
perceptions of the country? 
6. Does the political elite 
fighting visible in the media 
affect your calculations of 
political risk? 
7. If Zimbabwe's corruption 
perception increases how 
will that affect political risk? 
 
 
3. Does the presence of 
retired army general in 
the apex of government 
influence political risk? 
4. The military assisted 
change in government, 
in November 2017, 
how did that affect 
political risk? 
5. Does the legitimacy of 
the president and 
parliamentarians affect 
political risk? 
6. Does the political elite 
fighting visible in the 
media affect your 
calculations of political 
risk? 
7. If Zimbabwe's 
corruption perception 
increases how will that 
affect political risk? 
8. Suppose a health 
pandemic rips 
Zimbabwe to the 
magnitude of the 
cholera of 2008 or 
AIDS in the 1990s how 
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